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CHAPTER OlJE. 
InTRODUCTIOll 
A. sto.t<nont or tho problom nnd oouroos. 
Tho aubjoot or this study is tho philosophy or rel~lon or John 
u. E. !!cT~:Lr.Go.rt• The works of' t.~o nut.hor r.oot relevant to our study aro 
~ porzma ~ RoUr.alon, Stud.ioo _!!! ~ Ho;.oUnn Cosnol$Y• and Studios ,!!l 
~ H~olinn Dinloet.to. Tho ot.hor sources llatod in tho bibUO[;rnphy• 
whothor by tho SC%!20 nut.hor or by ot.hors, nro or secondary it'tport.nnco.1 
In Studies ,!!! ~ HOfjolinn Dialoctic l!cTamart prosont.s and do{"onds his 
lo.;:;ical r.ot.hod nnd conoral philosophical conclusions. In Studioa _!!! .!:,!!2 
F=$o11nn Coc:::olo:;y he applies his spoeulntive ~othod nnd conolusiono to 
pnrt.!culo.r probltr.s, r:ost. or which nro or rundnr.tont.nl relicioua inpor-
t.anoe. In~ D0(7'ns 2!. Roli.r;ion ho presents tho rol~ioua i.":!pl!co.tions 
or his philosophy. 
B. Derlnltion of roli.cion. 
~rctnc;cll.I"t dctlnos roHcion as •an ecot.ion roottnc on n convic-
tion or o. hnrnony bot.woon oursolvos nnd the universe nt lnrr;o. "2 
1. Doscripttvo or nornat.tvet 
A dof'lni t.!on or roltcion my be oi thor doocr!ptl.vo or norm ttvo. 3 
If' doscrlptlvo it. r:n1st. bo broad on~h to include all historical rolictona 
and rolit;!ous attitudes. U nomntive it nuat be proclao enough to O%prosa 
tho truth or roltcian. In other words. it. ~7 either describe rell.r;ions na 
thoy hnvo boon or o.ro, or it r..ny dof.'tno roltcl.cn ao it. should bo. 
I 
i 
J 
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a. As dosor1pt1vo l'cTagr;o.rt' s doi"inltion docs justice to historical 
rolir;iono. 
T'oTO{;gart intmds hio detlnition to bo doocriptive. I!o o.U:ls to do 
.• justice to histroico.l roli{;iono. Ho points out. tho.t oven .t3uddhim, in pr~­
istng an ooc:t.po into ntrvnno., nnd prit:itivo not;io, in o.ssorting tho.t certain 
• 
nnturnl rorcoa cnn bo bont r:oro or loss to ... tlll' s will, inPly a. r.oa.aure or 
harr.tony botweon tho universe o.nd !'".tm.4 Evon such diverse doctrines o.s those 
are doscrlbod by tho do!'inltion. At tho on~o tiMe tho doi"inition r.ould ac-
cept as rolic;ious tho conclusions or such thl.nkers as Plato, Spinoz:a o.nd 
Iiot;ol. 5 Thus tho do!'inttion proves to be historically inclusive. It o.voida 
the r:isto.ko or idonttrying roU.cion with i"Q.rtioulnr doctrines widely rcgo.rdod 
at en.y special tine o.nd pla.oe o.s !'undnr.:ontal to religion. Boliof." in a. per-
sonal God or in personal ~orto.lity, thou;:;h hold b:,r r.nny in our ar.n do.y nnd 
oivilbo.tion to be ooaont.io.ls or reli{;ion, could not bo so rec;o.rdod !'roo a. 
doocriptivo point or vimr. ''oTo.;;r;nrt correctly boliovoo t1ut ho has o.voidod 
such on error nnd ho.s orrorod a doi'init.ion that dooa juat.ioe to tho olcr.mta 
o~ to o.ll rolir;iona. 
b. T~To.;:r:o.rt r;ivoo it n n()l'retivo chnrnotar in tho qunHrico.tion 
t.hnt tho univoroo !:!USt bo conceived aa Good. 
As soon as !'cTnr:£;o.rt b~lna to olabcrato hla do1'1.n1.t.1on he gives 
it a. norno.tive chnraotor. I1' rolir;ion bo dof'lnod. as "an motion roatlnr; on 
a convtction or n mmony between ourselves o...U t~ univoroe o.t largo," tho 
question at once arlaos, iio1r m10h harnony l.a nocosao.ryt ''oTncc;o.rt' o nnuvor 
1D tlut tho unlvorao as a. whole r.:uat be jud{;od to bo r;ood. Thio ia tho only 
vimr tmt ~· in contrast to prL."'lit.ivo tl:~os, ca.n rooult in a. roUcious at-
tltude.s For this roo.oon !'cTn.r;cart ratusos to eall roll.cious o.ny o.t.titudo 
or do1'1anco, hO':'evor worthy nnd dit;nif'iod, to-curd a mivoroo concoivod o.s ovtl. 1 
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this is nn l!!rportant stop tOfro.rd a nomativo dot"inlt.ion. In~ 
Do:)ao ~ RoU.r;ton he c;ooa on to elabornte hia nonntivo def'!.nition. 8 He 
o.ttmpta to dofino tho nat.uro or relir;ious motion and its objoota and he 
indicates tho r;rounda tor his conviction that tho mivorae, concoivod as 
good, is in hnrnony nth the individual. Thour;h he does not of."tor a nOI"r.:a-
tive doi'inition in a sine;lo statc:r.ont, ho loo.voa no doubt as to his concep• 
tion or Tlhnt roltcion ~ht to bo. 
2. llio dofinition dietin{;ulshes rolic;ion tr~ r.oro.lity. 
!~Tnec:;art' s dof'inition has tho ~erit of distin~ulshin(; roHc;icm 
.rroo norality. I!o will not concodo trot "puro rolicion and undo!"llod" ccn-
siots r.oroly in tho obocrvanco or certain ~oral dut1os.9 It wo 1dcnttry ~or-
o.lity and rolic1on "cTnc&art. insists thnt we are r;uilty ot applyinr; two T:ordo 
to ono thin._-; and of." leaving tho othm- thine ru!!"!Olona.10 This is noodloos con-
tusion. ''atthow Arnold' a doi'ir.ition or rclicion ia opon to such en objection. 
Rols.&ion is ~oro than "MoraU.ty touched by o-:otion." Enthusiasr. tor an idoo.l, 
hcmovcr -r,orthy, is not roU.r;ion. there r.ust also be the ~otion ariainc fro:::! 
11 
tho conviction thnt tho univorao reopondo to, or 1.a in hamony Tli th our idoo.l. 
C. Rolic;ion' s nood of philosophy. 
1. Rolaticm of relic1on and philosophy; def'initton of philosophy. 
naw a boliof' 1n tho oxiatonce or such a ha.rnony is an aonort.ion 
about tho ult!r..ato r.nture or tho univoroo. It is a philooophic tr.oory. Ro-
ltcion !nvolvoo an appeal to philosophy which alone can justtry ito oxiotonco. 
For philosophy (or r.otaphyoioo) is but "tho ayatar~tlc study of t~o ultir~t.o 
nnturo or roal1ty."12 
2. l'oT~art' a uae or the term "dogr.:a." 
T!cTcuart dot1nea dou-..a as "any proposition which hila a cetaphyal-
oal al{;nlticnnco. d 3 lio ratuaea to concede this tom to those who hD.ve abused 
tt. ·~· orten serves aa a tem ot reproo.oh to cover dootr1noa rogo.rdod aa 
talae. Or it 1a applied to highly o~llcatod theories that only tho sophis-
ticated can undoratend.14 Thoro 1a also a "tondenoy to confine tho una or the 
word to atllh propositions aa o.re aaaertod without proof' - a tendonoy probably 
duo to tho tact thD.t tho adjective d~tlo Ina this ~:oo.ntng.w15 But auoh 
~opular aiaoonooptlona should not prevent tho proper use ot the word. For 
"alnoe no proposition w1 tb:rut cot.aphyaioal a1gn1t1canoe 1a called a d~a, 
and alnoo ao cany which hnvo thnt o1gn1t1cance are oomoonly called by tht:l.t 
rw:~e,. 1t aeoca • • • • deairnblo to give tho naz::e t.o all propositions 11'1 th 
16 t"!otaphystcal oi{;nlticanoe." 
3. ~ oaaential to religion. 
l'le have soon tmt reU.glon i.nvolvoa r:otaphya1cal aaatr.pt1ona and 
that all such boUeta r:m.y properly be called d~a. It follows that dog:o::a 
ia eaaentlal to reU..g1on.17 1lot all dq;r.:u are roligioua,. howovor. The be-
lief' 1n tho e:xiatenoo ot no.tter cay or NJ.Y not tnrl1Dloo a person' a rellgloua 
position. !!cTat;gart def'lnea as rol!Gioua "those ~etaphyaloal propoait!.ona 
whose aoooptanoe or rejootion by any person would altor h1a rol1G1oua poottton."l6 
a. Tho two aro not identical. 
This dooa not inply the identity at religion and do!7'4• ·~ is 
not rollcion, any core than the skeleton 1a tho 11Ting body. But 1ro can no 
r.ore be rol1g1oua ?.lthout d~ t~iiLD. our bodies could live 1rithout their 
akolotona.•17 
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b. Religion can not be baaed on aclonce 'Which 1a abstract. and 
relatlvoly auportlclal. 
Tho conclusion is tlnt religion l!!ust bo ba.aod upon do~. Tmt 
t.hia 1a inavltably eo r:ny be aeon by conaldorlng tho cla!.r:us ot othor types 
or knowledgo t.o aorve aa tho baala at religion. 
SO'!!O would eata.blish rollglon on the t'Ln:'l tounclntlon ot oclont.itic 
tact.. Such knowledge 1a hold to be certain and plain in contrast to tho un• 
cort.atnty and cbocurlty ot oot.aphyatca.18 
1) It la true that. both acionce and 0oraltty, in contr~at. t.o l!!ota-
phyalca.oan claim to have made detlnlte progreaa. 
trcTngga.rt' 11 reply is thtlt it' general agr~ent be the test ot cor-
tainty both science and r:oral1ty possess an advantar;o over oataphyaica. Sol-
once eapeoiallyl bah boast. ot detlnlte progress and ot problem attar problm 
aolvod, tho aolutlona having boca:~e the "cor:con and undoubtod property ot r:an-
klnd. d9 ~ advnnoea t!l&do by noralltY•. tho~h not so apparent. are yot un-
donlable. "Tho poaslbllity ot oivllisod lite proves that tho coneral acreo-
t:~ont aa to morality ouat be considerable. •19 In co!ltraat, t:!Otaphyaica can 
point to n') probla:us t~lly aettlod and to no poaltlona roached and ostn.b-
H.ahod beyond tho lino ot contrO'Ioray. Philosophy "advances. no doubt," but 
it is "not by oottllng any problGI:!l tl.nAlly. The questions evolve into dlt'• 
toront r~a but the anmrero are atUl various. •19 
2) But thla dooa not rendor t.ha:t tit to serve u tho bo.ala ot re-
llt:ion; nor dooa lt provo :-otaphyalca to be abstract and rutno. 
a) l'Gttlphyalcs ia concrete; aclence, a.bot.ract. 
All thia l'cTar;Olrlo ad:1U.a. Ho t;rants that "tor oonturios to c01:1o• 
dog.m rill involve controversy and u:ncort.alnt.y. 20 nut he holda this to be no 
rea.aon tor rojoottnc dor;oa as tho baaia ot relteton. floithor Yill bo a.d::11t 
it to prO'Ie that notaphyatoa 1a abstract o.nd useloaa. On the oont.ro.ry. nata• 
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physics is tho ~oat concrete or all our intcroata.21 Although her concluniona 
cu-e not yet rtnal and indisputable. her probloca are the ones that nun nost 
• 1 want to havo solvod.20 In tho YOrld aa wo know it the things that oatter r.1oat 
aro tho thlnr;a nost involvod 1n uncertainty. It t:tetaphyaica can bo chart;od 
with uncertainty. aclonce can bo accused or narrcmneaa. By hor vory nnturo 
science ia rcrcod to lenore the probl«ia that eost. concern us. If' hor advti.noa 
ia doi'inite and &toady it ia etten because bj' her "cOMparative abstraction" 
abe ho.a gnined "in oaaa and aiaplicity" what ahe haa lost "in abaoluto truth."22 
By her lnhorent Hmtationa Science ia not able to dsnl with the 
quoaticn that ia docialve tor religion. The aubjeot tu1tter of' aclonoo lo 
what we oa:r.only rater to tis cattor. and ita eocr.anical lawa. Thlo to tho 0%-
tent or hor 1ntorost. iihothor thoao lnwa are ult.i~ato or but. tho extrooolon 
of' B doopor ronU.ty aho dooa not won onquiro. And rlchtly ao. Should oho 
olam thnt. llor noohanioo.l lnwa oxproaa tho ulticn.to na.ture or the univorao. by 
the very net aho would ooaao to bo aclenoo and boco:to notaphyalco, and hor laws 
would bo eotaphysicnl propoalticna. i.o. dog.:na. But. 1t h the pooaib!Uty or 
go~ttng rid or do&ea that ~o ere d1aouaatng.23 
b) Evon 1i' science usurped the role or 'Metap}Valoa aho could provo 
nothing ooncorn~ tho character or tho unlveno. Thla is thO 
quoat.ian that roll&ian wants answered. 
U thla objection wore wnlvod• acionoo. aasming tho role or nata-
phyaica, could no~ dooldo aa to the hamony and ccodnoso ot t~.o universe. 
Ja She nlt;ht. deoanatrato thnt. ~attar acta acootcUng to law and 1.o put. to;;other 
"r:l1nd-riao." But troo thla rnct. aha co cl.d not. inter tho preaonoo or God a a 
the controlltr-t; mnd. To be God the cont.rolltng clnd cust be coed and ac!-
once could error no aaaurnnoe conoornillb the ~oral oharllctor or t.ho untvor-
sal cind. On tho baala ot crmlrionl obaern.t.lcu alone no intorenoo oo.n bo 
_.,_ 
made aa to tho goodnosa or badnosa cr the univorae, nor \n tact. aa to e.nythint; at 
all oonoerninc tho world aa a whole.24 
c. tlor ce.n religion bo baaed on eorality. 
1) To care tor virtue. 1a to care tor ita ult.b!ato auccesa. 
!'cTag&art as Gr.%phatically rejocta morality aa a baala tor religlon.26 
By it.aolt aorality ann otter t::an no aonse or tamany with his universe. The 
ideo. or the r;ood ':lAY be btnclil\b an ao rocnrdleso or tho nature or the un!.vel"'Be. 
It is ponslble to bcllavo that virtue 1s ita om rev.Lrd and tho.t tho COod tan 
is dopcmdent tor hla happtnoaa en nothing, net non tho univeroo, Outdclo or 
bl:!aol.i'. But. U' a r.m.n caroa tor virtue I::Wlt he not eare tor ita ultimate auo-
coast Ii' ho ~:ourna not hh own cuf'tertng la he not yet b0111d to rosont a uni-
verse thnt intliata auttering on othorat 
"A virtue which was ao intense that it rendered ua indirtoront to tho 
auf'torincs or othora eight be held to haTe pe.ued into ita opposite. q 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
"Unloaa 1re have reason to believe that ntl ia outwoi,;hod by cood we 
have no right to annrove the universe. J\nd we can haVe no roo.aon tor 
bolining this "'hich 1a not a dogea."26 
2) t~TAgbflrt'a oonc~tion or the rmotion. or !:!OrAlity nncl ot sci-
ence 1a corroct, aa 1a his idea ot their relation to relir;ion. 
It aecrta to ua tho.t theca concluaiona or l'cTfL&{;Brt are vnlid. Sci-
ence abatncta troo the value and purpoalve ractora in oxperionce and r::!O.kea 
no attocpt. to interpret htran uporionoe aa a whole. Conaeq'D8ntly tho "ro-
lf.glcn ot ucionoo" !.a a relicicn with no oanv!.oticn regardtnc the ultir.ato 
!!10Ming or hmnn ura. Again, t.ha theory that fl'fary r-.an should U.vo tho 
good lito, cor:nonda itaolt to U.D tndopondcll'lt.ly or our cotaphyaioal poait1on. 
eut ouch a theory, accepted aa a philosophy or a roU~;icn, h ~th noar• 
atghted nncl tndolcmt. A ~an' a dfft'otlan to tho good 1s to bo ~••ured by hie 
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intoreat in the cood' a aucoesa. And his interest ought to be judged not only 
by hie praot.ionl errorta but also by his intolleotml ourioaity. !'orality. 
like aoionoe. can orrer no oxeoption rroc !!l0to.phys1oal study toot tno intel-
lect will honor. Tlms religion must. reject both as aubatitut.oa tor dogna. 
:S) Critloim or !'oTaggart' a use o£ the et.hica.l tor."la "valid" ond 
"bind~." 
In theao oonoluaiono we o~cur. It is only in regard to a single 
at.atmont mde in l'oTa,:;gnrt'a diaouaaion ot corality aa a substitute tor doga 
tblt we would raise a question. In urging th1a objection wo ctcht bo o-pen to 
the oharce or l".a1r-aplitting and o£ ptckl.ng our phrases without regard to con-
toxt did not our objection relnte itaelt to a tunda~ontal contuaion 1n l'oTag-
gart.' a aysteo. Tho .t.at«1ont tollous: 
"l'orality. no doubt• still rs:-.aina binding on us whothor the univorae 
!:l~~~t~d~1;~~.~~0:o~u!~0t~~o;:ev;!!dt~:r~~;er~.~~718 not 
It t'cTncga.rt. noa:u to aay tl1:Lt the aonoe ot obli~;&tion ia hoodod 
oven bj philosophora vho deny ita r.ot.aph:yai.cnl ai.gni.tioanco. and tmt in tho 
evant that all r.on turned vatorialiata they would probclbly contl.nuo to find 
a&tiataotion in loyalty to tho idea o£ t.ho &COd• llO o.crce vith ht.,. But in 
its proaont rorm the po.aat;e 1a tar core noepin{;. It. aoaorta tmt the GOOd 
1a binding upon r.~e and valid tor eo rega.rdloaa or whether tt 1.a vuUd tor tho 
ml.vorso as a. vholo. U this be true the tom vnlid can only r-e:m •deal. rod. • 
Rem t.hia la not ita usual eonnlng. To be valid cOCU18 to be objoot1.voly roe.l; 
\- to exist tor all cinda that aro thlnld.nt.; truly; to bo tl'"..oro rc&a.rdleaa ot cy 
recognltlao or wlahoa. !lathing la binding on r::e boca.uao I or othors doalre 
and adnlro u.. It ta binding or valid tor ee onlJ u lt ls objoctlvoly roa.l. 
In this aonae the idea or the good 11 not. valid tor no and la not bindln& uPon 
1:28 unloaa it 1.a also vo.lid tor tho univerao, tor by tho unlvorao 110 r:ocm pre-
olaely the objective order which we t'!nd. rather than desire or create. Should 
thia objoot.ivo ardor prove tndlf'torent to diat1nctiona betwem good and crvn. 
I might oont.tnuo to cherish and obey r:ry !doo. of tho e;ood, O.P';'lrove those t:ho 
did llkarlao. and dor!vo aatiafaot.!on thoref'roo. In thlo oo.se tho binding 
pawer ot tho r;ood TIOuld depend upon m:'J 1ncllnnt1on or upon tho dooiro:~ ot 
ot.hora given force 1n social ouct.O':!a• but not. upon an objootivo rmllty inde-
pendent ot any and all des!ro. 
Tfo urgo this d!et.tnctlon bocauso or ita l.!~porte.noa ln a oritlclam 
or t•atnggart'a r,enornl philoaophlcal posit!m. Ita tull !nport.a.noa will ap-
ponr 1n chapters three, raur and f'!va. It wUl bo seen that ''cTag(;Clrt hna 
condatant.ly tcnorod this d!&ttnct1on. Tmt such ner;leot. as oppoood t.o ocre 
oareleaanosa or expresa!on, 1a Htll'onaiblo tor the wording or thh paaea.r;o. 
would aeon o. lor;!t.!!"'ato !nt'oronco. 
.. 
4) Thus there ia no "pure" Chr!at1anity t'reo rroo d~t.ia o.oau::rp• 
tiona. 
1'oTar;gnrt conoludoa thla 41oousa1on with a tolltnc or!ticta::s ot 
the alo.!I:I ttnt thoro b o. "puro" Chrinti.o.n!ty rreo rroo all dopondonco upon 
dOr;:'A• 28 no boliovoa tho.t Jooua and tho {;rent rAGa or Chr!otiano OU(;ht to be 
the beat o.uthor!t!oa on tho quooticn ot' tho content or their rellgi.on. Por-
l'npa tho-/ havo boon o!ata.kon ao to tho i.t-:portanoo or their bolters. They could 
hardly lave been contused as t.o the 1n;>ortance or their boHera ror thCI:laolvoa. 
It onn hnrdl1 be doubted that Jouua !"tOld "various d0{7'.aa to be true and i.':lp()r-
ia t.ant; "29 thAt 1n this respect tho churCh has rollowod hor rmator;30 and that. 
tho Semon on tho l'ount. 11aor:tet.L~oo ratorrod to o.s tho ideal or undo~~t!o 
rel~lon. 1n reallt.y cont.nlna dot7l& 1n alo::oat. ovory Une. "29 lliator!cally 
Chrlattan1t.y haa rostecl an a dor;::at.io buis. This 1a not. surprising, tor had 
it not. dono ao U. could not ho.ve been a rol!Glca.:n 
J 
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D. Practical importance ot doga and rel1.giCil. 
1. UcTagcnrt recinda ua that the practical !J:rportanco ot a aubjoct 
ffiAY be l~icnlly irrelen.nt.. 
?'cTa~rt r8'11nda us that the practical lcport.ance ot a question 
'f!.'IAY be logically irrelevant. Tmt a belief' s.y r.nke ne either happy or mis-
erable ie "no reason whatner tor accept,1.n; or rejectin,; tt.•:52 
2. He re{;reta the practical conaoquencea or his own concluaion thllt 
only !:!etaphyslcians nO"It' have a right. to rollf;ion. 
Tho roltcioua conolualona to whl.ch hb pilloaophy leads him attest 
hie loyalty to tho rorecoill{; principle. He 1a a"ftl"e ot the serious conse-
quences or hl.s theory; tlwlt his conclusions. tr 'li.dely acceptod. will :-:oan 
aurrer~ and disappointment to the rajority ot r.anldnd. This he regards to 
be both unfortunate and inevitable.S3 Ho pointe out tlwlt 1n the TlO-St ~em have 
believed in the hAr::lony and r;oodnoaa or tho un1Terae e1 ther as a roaul t or 
•revelation" or of' r-~et.aphyaical at.udy.M The result or l.'cT~rt• a philosophy 
1s to dtacredit. revelation. l.'etaphyaicnl atudy ro::11.ina the solo road by whloh 
doc;r.a. and thua roll.cion• r.ny be reached. 
Since "t:toat people. aa tho 1r0rld at.anda at present. have not the 
dhpoaitton. tho education. and the leisure necessary ror the study 
or ee-t.o.phyaica • • • • we are driven to the conclualon that• whothor 
any reltr;ion 1a truo or not.. ~:~oat people ~vo no right. to accept any 
relt,:;1on aa truo. •:55 
It there 1rere any conoonaua or expert. opinion 1n rat.tora or dO[;T".a. tho c~ 
(- r.an olr;ht bo justltied 1n acoeptill{; a do17..n. which he r.nd not invost!.ga.tod aa 
rondUy na he n01r nccopt,e tho V.eory or cravitatton on tho tost~ony or sci-
ontltlc authority. Dut such unan1J:l1ty in rat.tora ot dCIG!'"'& h not in sight •• 
It Tould be rash to declare 1t to be rtnnlly t~aalble. The tact rr.nino tho.t 
the ccrMon ~an 1s not ncm and lfUl not. soon be entitled to accept. nny dor;:-:aa en 
I 
I 
••• 
• 
authority. 
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3. Hoply to thin. If', ns ~o Mys, avery tord nnd notion tr.rrlioo 
n oynton or r.otnp:.yntos, ou!lt not t~-:o c0!7":on :-an connidor ~:.in­
aolp an 1nvetornte :.:otnp,•ysioinn 1 
To tl-,tn ccnolunion ;:o night reply tr.nt li.fo inovttnblo runa c.~1rod 
or lo,--;tc. Indood U' tt 'l':oro not so, thorc T:ould bo no oxportenoo for tho 
phUosop:1er to intorprot. Evon tho philosopher onnnot e.lr.nys r.ntt ror his 
lor:;ic. ~Io nuzt Hvo durtnc tho procooo or v.orkinr, out hio philosophy, nnd 
should his syston fnU to sntinfy avon hb.aolf it is doubtful whothor he 
out;!1t to tsolnto ht:--:olor frOM the fnots t:;n t ho cannot oxplntn. ''cTn;:c;nrt 
hbsolf oonf'osoos t:"Ytt he to tmnblo to explnin the tL..,o procoos.36 Yot r.o 
would bo rnoh to Ocr.'lcludo that thoroforo ho Ot:Cht to ooor.aw nll rolntions 
TTith t:1o clock. :ito retort ni::;ht be t':n.t !10 has oonvnsood nll t!:o poanibil-
itioo o.n:i :no ronchod tho :-.o.rd-'l't~n oo:1clunion t!•nt t'lorn is no vmy or rccon-
ctli~ tho lo:;icn.lly dcr.onotrntod rortoction of tl:o universe nn:i tho rncts 
or Ch.O.~O nnd ovn. Dut is his sttuntion no dU'roront fro::l t!mt in T;;,ich 
tho c~on -nn fi.ndo hil"'oolt'! lie need not be n trninod phllooophor to sco 
t~nt hi:~ <P:rortonoo sc~o to pronont. contrn:Uct..ions. Porlnps >-:o boliovos 
in n ·;oo;l Go:i; yot hero o.ro the brute ro.cto or m!!'fortn,::; n:".:i cvU. ::on 
a:-.nll ho roconcilo t:1o npparont contrndlotian'! If he conoults tho experts 
ho rtn:io t.~:n.t. t:-:oro io no God; thnt there is n God; thnt tho univoroo to 
tun:in...,ontr:.ll;,• tn:iU'foront; t.ho.t tho uni.vora& is rundn:-ont.ally cood.. T\~o~o 
roosibtHttoa nould ooO!"l t.o bo ox1·.nustivo. ···hich a>-nll ho 11coopt.? Accord-
1~ to "c'l'n::r;"lrt' s thoory it -;>ould no<n t":'.nt ho ~-:no no rit4ht to ~nko tr." h1o 
r:tnd ono r.n:; or t.'•o ot~1or. 13ut "cTn; ..r;nrt nloo sn:rs t:--.nt "aver; -rord nnd 
avor;1 notlon \.:':""lllon :JO!":O t~1oory or ... otnph:,•otos.•37 If t.hlo bo truo r:uot. 
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not the c<ro.~on nan conclude that he is an inveterate notaphysician, doomed 
by nature to como to his cr..n best conclusion as to ~hother lifo be good or 
evil1 If so, he cnn only procood by accepting tho theory that best se~s to 
fit in Tlith the facts Of his Oxperionce and look to the future to justify 
his half-instinctive, ho.lf-roasonod belief. In other VIords, he will hope 
that the futuro ~ill grant the desired synthesis of contradictions. 
That t:1io is often tho ccr.r:on ,...an's :-::ethod, even in reference to 
scientific truths, r.ould so0r.1 to be the case. The mas of :-en do not beHove 
that tho earth is round o.nd accept t:1e law of gravitation noroly on t'he tos-
tL'Jony or scientific experts. Ro.thor, they accopt the theories of tho ox• 
ports as tho truth because thoy thcr.solves can reach the west by sailing east 
o.nd hnvo Tro.tched tho stone l:urlod into the air yield to the oo.rth' a attrnc-
tion o.nd return to tho eround. Tt1e point is that the con:-:on nan r..ny, a.nd 
often does diocovor truth by use of the only criterion available to the 
philosopher, - the o.b~lity of a. thoory to explain tho facto of experience. 
The COtltlOn r...an' s ro.ngo of oxnerionco ;:o.y be lini ted. Ho may i.:;noro or bo 
blind to r-:any of tho contrc.dictions contained therein. Often he r:ay for-
sake reason to rely on instinct or fooling or custom. In doing so he GOOs 
wron::;, ao doos tho philosopher who has access to the sane expedient. i'ihilo 
tho Cot~Con t:::m' s risk is tho e;rentor; whilo his conclusions r...o.y not possess 
the pr1na fncio value of tho philosopher's, he yot is obligated to tnko tho 
risk o.nd to !".o.ko up his nind concerning t~1e ~caning or hur..an lire. In do-
•'j inr; so he "'-O.Y T:oll r<r.enbor that he ':".UY hnvo n "nose for fo.cts" thnt cortnin 
philosophers r.n.vo nissod. Indeed, it r.ay be thnt ftcTar;go.rt' s denio.l or rc• 
li.:;ion to n.ll but notaphysicians io due to his blindness to tho sir;nificnnca 
of ethical cxpcrionco. !n tho common r.~'s tenacious devotion to rolicion 
is there not an inplicit j~ont of profound r.otnphysical sicnificnnco, 
- 13 -
namely, that lite does possess moani.n; and value, and that there is a roala 
or vulue that not only otoopo to, but ct::~tnands, the hu:::tbleatt Granted that 
this may be but on instinctive belief' on the part or multitudes. Granted 
that we have no final right to declare it valid before we have exartined it 
to the best or our ability. Granted that ouch a judgr:!ent often is as the 
grain concealed beneath doctrinal husks. The fact rEir.lllins that tho judg-
nent is as vo.Ud and -uorthy or respect, and, we repeat, or the philosopher' o 
attention, as the common man'o instinctive belief in the existence of the 
physical world. Any philosophy which holds, as does Mctaggart• a, to tho run-
dartental rationality of the universe, mizht seen bound to recognize in this 
tenacioua persistence of' religion and morality, the impact upon tha hur:l!Ul 
mind of tho t!loral and rational order or which r.an is a part. Any thinker 
-.ho holds, as !~cTaggart does not, thn.t tho facts or lifo cannot bo explained 
without ref'eronce to a Person or supra!le wrth and goodness, will not be sur-
prisad that God does not. restrict the rnnlfestation or himself to metaphysi-
cians. 
This is not to nnko the common man tho final court or appeal in phil• 
osophy. It is not to advance instinct as a criterion or truth. Nor is it an 
apotheosis or ·willful ir;norance. It is only to insist that the philosopher 
interpret the C<X!r.1on man' a experiences, noral as 'Yrell as physical. It is 
only to insist that lifo does not wait for loeic and that the common man, as 
well as the philosopher, is bound to discover truth as best he can, -by ac-
• cepting and acting upon the principle that best explains the facts or his own 
experience. 
4. ''c'laggnrt cmphe.sizes the importance or dogr:ta and relir;ion. 
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l'lhilo l~Taggnrt would restrict. the right or religion to those who 
have onrned it throu;:;h mot.aphyaical st.ucty. he does not deny the importance 
or religion and philosophj.38 In fact there seeos to be a religious and 
ethical notivo at the ba.sis or his syste:n. He believes t~.at those \7h0 pro• 
ross to be interested in goodness or in people ought to be concerned as to 
tho rate or these in the univorse.39 The solution or this problem hns 
great signitieanco for the happiness or nisery or mankind. This is tho quos-
tion thnt fiOople want anS'I'fered. As tb.Otr reli&ious views are challenged. 
they are learning that it cannot be answered by "revelation." Consequently 
they o.re bound to tum to netapbysios. which will "become or all studies 
the nost practieal.n40 Nor is it strange that netapbysical knowlodg~ vbould 
be both rare and difficult or attainment. 
"Is knowledge eo easy to got t~.at tho highest and deepest or all 
knavrledgo is likely to be had for ti1e asking? Or is everything 
good so cOT!I."'!on. that we should expect that reli2;ion - al.r:tost the 
beat or ~t earthly things - should be never absent vzhoro it is 
desired? 
In these hir;h toms docs !JcTaggnrt appraise the value or relit;ion. 
(. 
---------.,.......===~~--=---------------··~ 
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CHA...~ Tno. 
I. IS THERE HAIU'ONY DETiiEEN THE HU''.FJJ SELF' Ai"iD ITS UNIVE.tSE? 
We have discussed HcTae;;:;art' s theory oi' tro natura oi' religion. 
its relation to philoeo~r~. science ~~d rornlity, and its practical i~por-
tnnce. Tho question n0\7 arises, Is tho nature oi' the universe such o.s to 
mn.1.."'0 religion possible? Is there the nocessnry h..<U"nony coti7con t!1e solr 
end tts Ullivcrso? 
In discussing !:cTaztarl' s final nnsr.or to this question wo s>.all 
consider his conception of the psycholo;,;icul nature of t!:o salt, 42 of the 
relation of tho self' to physical nnturo,43 and or tho othicnl nature or tho 
self •14 Those studies will furnish the dntn ,·;hich T!cTnr;Gart. should inter-
prot in his ccneral philoso!'hicul conclu::;to:1s. 1ie shall consider his con-
ero.l net:10d und conclusions under the hcndir..:;s: "The :<otnphysical nn.ture 
or the solf't45 and "Is tho l12.rnony of' the universe due to a supre:'lo per• 
... .2 'Jn46 son, or ... o~, 
A. Tho psycholo:::;icnl nature of the soli'. 
1. Characteristics of tho soli'. 
''cTae;~rt defines the self as a "unity • • •• that, in the :-:!idst 
of the flux of cxnorience • • • • rE!"'.,nins identical l"Tith itself. n4? It is 
i.nplied in all thoucht• 48 It is cnpnbl o of recognizinc i tsolf. 49 "The 
soli' is o. c~lox, but not a col:lpound."50 It r".n.y be analyzed into its con-
stituent pn.rts. But theso parts are "of such a. nature t:"l!l.t they would cease 
to exist. when tho solr coased to exist. "51 T!1e self is not n I:'!ere series 
ot sonsntions; nor is it n o~~ound of el~onts. 
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"To ra:;ard tho sell' as built. up of parts. -which could exist e.fter 
it. ar..d be rcc~bined lil.:o the uricl:s fron e. houoo which r.as been 
pulled dmm, is to render it inposaible to explain conociouonass."52 
Consciousness nust be studied synoptically. as a unique whole. 
~!cTagcart Er.tpbasizes the tmiquenoss and privacy of t~10 self. H.o 
holds t!-:at no self cnn ever be a part of nnothor self. 63 Again, he points 
out that the n~ture of the self io to will, desire ~~d feo1.54 In ~~~ony 
with his General theory of ethics, ho does not erlphflsizo tho purposive char-
actor of t~~e nelf'. 
2. Tho self not a. DinG an sich. 
--
T~oTac~;nrt opnoses tho self of Y:hich he speaks to tho ~ 2:!1 ~· 
of t:1o old soul psycholo;:;y. Ho is 't:illinc to uno tho phrase 11 identi'ty of 
substance" v1:1ich is., he nd:~tts, "a rnthor unfashionable node or expression." 
But the substance of wl~ich he speaks is not an abstraction. It is not an 
"• i Di i , n66 m~ n:1ry --~ ~ ~~· 
s. Tre.oes of ir:oonsistcnoy in his psyc:1olo::;y. 
Thoro are evidences t!1at ''cTact;art t":lils to keep in nind tho dis• 
tinction upon which he r~s insisted. 
a. Tho "pure I" an elroa1t. 
ITis roferonce to self-consciousness or "the pure t" ns nn cl~ent 
r~· raisas a doubt in t:1is connection. 56 For a critic of oenso.tionn.Hon o.nd 
soul substa::.co this is '""ialeadin& tar::~inolo~y • The ''I" taken by itoelr, apo.rt 
rrom ito content, is a.n abstraction. But to sp~ of it as !!! el(T.!ont is to 
s1JGbest that it is a distinct part of consciousness, rather t:nn the abid.iUG, 
self•ido~ttcal relation in nl.uch ell conscious experience occurs. 
- ------------~----------'~) , 
'I 
rr~~ __ ····~~.~~ ...~--~--.~~-------··----------·----------------... ~ ... ,w.,.-,·· -·-----------r--~ ';J<. "·-
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Howavor, a ~an nood not be botmd by tho terninolo~ of his predo-
cessors or his critics, nnd he should be ju:l{;od by tho gonernl tondency of 
his thour;ht, rather tl'an by isolated expressions. Judged in ~his Tm.y, '!c-
Ta~Gart. scc::-:s to disprove this ~-urticulnr charge of' atomisr:t. If' he calla 
the "pure I" nn el~ent, he conaidera it an indispons~ble ol~o~t. He like-
wise calls tho not-self, the content of' tho solt, a ~ere abstraction. To 
tmderstand tho knO\"J'ing self he v:ould go to the concrete whole from trhich 
those two abstractions hn.vo boon nado. Ei thor a.bst.ro.ction, taken by itself, 
is r:onntnc;loss and "can only exist in coobination with tho other olenont.n57 
Tiith such qualifications he seens to correct the interpretation to which his 
atomistic to~inolo~y lends itself'. 
b. Concreto self, or abotrnct, pnoaivo soul? 
nut his Mode of' oxproosion is avon -oro questionable in other por-
tiona or the exposition ro!'orrod to above. In this and other connections 
his lang~o raises a serious doubt as to whother ho does not often think of' 
tho self as n passive, receptive soul substa:1ce. 
1) In cnp~~sizinc tho solf''s dopcndonce u~on tho not-solf, he 
is in danger of' denying its privacy and uniquoness.68 
In discuasiflG tho paradoxic~l nature or the solf' '"cTnc;e;'lrt sn.yo: 
"Thuo tho nature or t'.1e self' is ouf'f'iciontly ~arado.xi.cal. \':hat 
doos it include'l h'verything or which it is conscious. • • • i'1hat 
can it any is not insido it? nothtnr;. \~hat ccn it nay is not out-
side it? A single abatraotion. • • • If we try to r.ake it e. dis-
tinct individual by sopnre.tiU0 it f'ron nll other things. it loaoa all 
the content or which it can bo conscious, and so looes tho very indi-
vidun.H.ty >zhich we st&rtod by tryiflb to prosorvo. tt59 
l~Ild again: 
"If no oxcludo whatever is not soli', the self shrinks to a point, end 
vnnishes altogothor.n60 
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It is not clear whother McTaggart intends this as a genetic or 
logical account of' the distinction between the eelt and not-salt. He !:laY 
mean that at birth, or at its beginning, the eel£ 1a canpletely dependent 
upon the external world for its content. This is obvious. From the first 
tho self is dependent upon a body which is part of' the "ttorld of' nnturo. in 
CO!!I!terce with which the self develops. Erperience knows nothing ot' the 
"pure I." Solf-connciousneas always involves sense-experience, i.e., ex-
perionce tor which the self is dependent upon the not-self or outside world. 
Dut it would seem that l!oTaggart intends to say rn.ore than this. 
He .gems to bo giving an analysis or tho relation ot the self and not-selt 
at any particular mO!:lent. If so, hio statanent that the salt • in contraot 
to the not-self, is a more abstraction, a point that "vanishes altogethern 
is t'alse. Granted that selt' experience always involves sensory elEr!ents, 
and that much of' tho soli'' e experience cooes independently or its will, it 
does not follow that at any moment the l'lhole content of the soli' is but a 
reflection or tho outside world with which it is then in comnercs. To say 
so is to ignore tho fact that tho salt ":"'..ay "turn a deat' ear" to all it:lpres• 
sions cominc fran without and by an act of will initiate a train of thought 
and series or ir:lages that have no necessary relation to its present oonnec-
tlon with the environment. There,!! a relation to past sensory experience, 
and even in ~er::ory the conscious process is closely associated wi tb a brain 
process. The point is that nothing in the present external situation can 
t.-· tully explain the present experience of' tho salt. To say that in a logical 
' ' .... 
separation of' tho self and not-3el.f'" tho f'orn.er would shrink to a point and 
disappes.r is to Diarepresent the facts. And further, since the self is a. 
willine; .. idealidnc ar;ent. thero may bo rnny f'oatures ot its present exp&r-
ience that are independent of the present external environnent. 
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Nor is UoTagga.rt nl.ways so conoervative as in the passage quoted 
above. lie gooo so far as to say that if knowlede;e and volition were per-
teet. so that the self "knew and acquiesced in the whole of reality." there 
would be nothing contained in the self "in such a way as not to be also out-
side it."61 Judging from this st~tecent alone. it would seem that this 
state ·or affairs which is to exist in ultir.late reality. would involve the 
disappearance or selthood. UcTaggart would disown thie theory as he do• 
sires to make individuality a basic principle or his a,1sten. The alter-
native explanation appears to be that• reGardless ot his protestations to 
the contrary. he tends to regard the self' as a soul substance which is 
passively L"lfluonced by the external world and !.n l:ncrnledge t:1erely reflects 
its environr.1ent. Thus v1hen all selvas reflset.ed. the sru:'!e envirO!r.lont they 
would be identical. ilia ex-plicit sta.te'"1ont that the self' is activo in 
knowledge does not explain away the othar tendency in his thought.62 
Our conviction is that he is bent upon fitting the to.cts or psy-
chologioal experience to his theory or a universal harnony of tL~elessly 
existing selves.63 His task. r.hich ~e regard as impossible. is to d~on-
strato hO'l' individuals can thus exist in a r~o.l unity and han:1ony. His 
answer is that the nature or the individuals is to express their CO!'!tplete 
individuality in their mutual relations. The psychological it!'plico.tion or 
this theory is t rn t the selt must be in complete harmony with the not-sell' 
(i.e •• ot!:cr solves) and possess no individuality which nay not bo oxl".austed 
in 1 to relations with the not-self. 'We have attertpted to prove this qtr1-
cally false. To hold it is to reduce the concrete, purposi've, private indi-
vidual to a lo&1cal abstraction. 
• 
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2) Passive soul or activo self in ethical theory? 
The su~e influence ~ay be nnrtially responsible for his ethical (., 
· , : detem1ni~.64 It is conceivable that a self-psycholor;iat should nlso be 
an et.hicc.l dcterninist, although it would seer.1 that tho purposive character 
of conscious experience and its final reality (as opposed to ~ore appear-
ance) r.ould be evident to a psychologist who reco~nizes that the soli' iD 
to be studied as a whole. ~'oTnggart denies tho self tho power or choice 
and holds thnt on any other theory it is necessary to believe that a man's 
choices r~vc no relation at all to his character.66 According to him tho 
ir.dotor.ninist r.ns no right to speak or the probability tlw.t a r.an will net 
one mlY or tho other. 
!~ answer is that tho self is an activo, purposive agent, whose 
nets do help to determine its ch.1.\racter. 1'1hilo a self's character r.ay s~-
gost a choioo n3 ~robnble, it does not r.nko tho o~oioe necessary. 4 notive 
is not ~crol:,r a roroc strild~ us !'rOD without. It !':!O.Y havo been aroused 
or encourar;ed by forces playing U"'lon us. ''any influences i'ron tho oxtornal 
world ha.ve ontorod into its being. But it is no sin;;lo one. nor cO!'Ipotmd 
or, those influonccs. It is tho self's own creation. Upon it i3 tho ~nrk 
of' the self's uniqueness. It can bo explained only as a wholo and not by 
being separated into its el~ents. As the self' is truly individual, so 
o.re its motives. They e.r.prcss its nature but its nature io not oxhe.uetod. 
:.) in its rclo.tions 't:ith the not-self. This, v;e i~nr;ino, is tho stl.r'bline 
·'' block to .. cTr.;::Gurt. llc Trould huvo hi a self in l".o.reony d th, i.e., Oor.t• 
plotoly dctcrz::incd by, tho not-solr. 66 Consequently he speaks as if' de-
sires i~~inGcd. u~on tho self vhose only possibility or notion lay in the 
ohotoe ol' ono or the desires presented by the environnent. 67 This is to de-
I 
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grade the self to a more or less po.esiva noul substance. A selr that can 
only choose between dcairos that strike it fr<n wit.hout is a logical ab-
stract ion. It me:;; l"\OCt J~cTo.ggart' s de:and for o. soul acquiescent in the 
W1iversal hamony of Absolute Rcality.68 It does not meet the demand of' 
ethics o.nd psychology in their study of the self' present in all experience. 
3) Soul, not sell", in theory of immortality. 
"cTaGE;nrt' s theory or i!!!!!!ortaH.ty nrui pz-olhistenco involves tho 
saMe fallncy.69 He believes that the eternity or the self' consists in a 
series of existences, "perhap~ en infinite number" with no continuity or 
r..anory. 70 Ho is o.T~S.re of the difficulty of this view, - that his theory 
is open to the Charge tmt loss or t:ie!nory !r.rens loss of self'hood.71 But 
he believes t1'lO.t "in b-pito of the loss of !l\rr.lory, i'.o is the SOJ:1e person WhO 
lives in tho successive lives. " 72 In a htcr secticn of our paper we stAll 
discuss our objection to this view in dct!:.tl. 73 At this ple.ce we oho.ll bo 
content to quote the tinoly criticiso or Tsanoff: 
" "Tr£ identity is an identity of substance; the preexistence and 
~ortality nre the preUxistonce nnd ~rtality of a continu~us 
solf•ide:1tical entity. The har.d is the c.and of rlegel but the voice 
is the voice or rational psychology and tho scholastic simple sub-
stance." 74 
Although r.any passages CXPH.eitly repudiate the view• it is evident 
trot l'cT!l{;~art tends to reduce the self or concrete experience to a loc;ical 
abstraction. We have observed this t.en1ency in his psychology. his ethics 
,-! and his theory or immortality. 
B. The self and physical natm-e. 
1. Importance of this subject for our general probla:~. 
II 
ji 
II! ·. ! \ 
L 
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Our aim is to discover "07hether T'cTa.ggart. finds the solt to be in 
mrmony nith it~ universe. Thus far v:o have been discussing his psychologi-
cal interpretation of the sell'. This at once raises the mind-body problem 
vhich is involved in the larger problem of the self's relation to physical 
Il!'.ture. Ir tho sell' should prove to be but an activity of the body or a 
product of physical nature,. our sanrch for tho harmony essential to reli-
gion would ba at an encl. 
2. Physical nature is but a deduction fran tho sensory cxpori-
encos of the self. 
a.) Hattar can be understood only 1n toms of spirit. 
'!cTaggart understands the influences reoponsiblo for tho viow 
that "the sell' is a. t!loro a.ctivity of the body.n76 The soli' exists only in 
intir.:ato connection with a physical body. As far as our experience goes,. 
sensa.tion, nnd thus knowledge, would be i.I:lpossible without the body. Yihen 
tho body is injured, tho mind nay be deranged. '~•hen the body dies,. the 
nind ceases its functions. 76 This body is a part of the world of tl!ltter 
thnt socns to exist and influence us independently of our will. The world 
of r.:nttor is n vast syaten whoso p~ancnco stands in inposing contrast to 
tho briot lifo of spirit.77 Tho fact that a cause need not res~ble its 
effect sugeosts that na.tter nay be tho causa of such a unique substance ns 
spirit.78 
Sucp a conclusion would depend on the proposition that rnttcr can 
exist independently or spirit. This i~ol'ar.;gart denies. 79 As soon as we be-
gin to do5cribo ~ttor wo discover trmt we c~n only talk ubou~ our sensa-
tiona. Thone e.ro ultiT:m.te fnots of experience. liowevor ultinate, they 
- 23-
need interpretation. 80 Corm:!on sense usually explains them by interring the 
existence of a substratum called "mattern as their cause. This is but an 
-81 ir..terencc. Of such a substratUI!l we have no experience whatevor. In i'aet 
the concoption involves us in contradictions. Ir we inter that either pri-
oary or secondarJ qualities of' matter are true of an independent. external 
reality T:e find ourselves in hopeless difficulties. Those provo to bo rola-
tive to the percipient. Of an independent material substratuo we have no 
k::nowledge at all. Is it liko our sensations? Then it can be knovm and tlUSt be 
a sensation instead of their inferred cause. If it is unlike our sensations, 
how could it bo their cauae! Even it we should waive this objection what 
right have v.e to talk about anything so raooved fror.t our expertencotS2 Fur-
thor. if' this r.1atter be unUke its efi'ects, why co.ll it natter at all t83 It 
is as lez,iti.nate to conclude that it is of the nature of' spirit. Sineo our 
only oxpcrtcnce of it is in toms of conscious experience it becooea lo:;i-
cally necesaary so to conceive it. The conclusion is tmt we "can only ex-
plain n~tter in toms of a conscious salt • end to ta~k of' matter existint; 
rlthout consciousness is absura.•84 
b. Tho world of science rolntivoly BU1~ri'icial. 
1) The Understanding presupposes Reason. 
The "rect that physical science treats natte~ as independent of' 
spirit, end thnt physical science forma a vast syst~, coherent, accepted, 
and, !'roo its awn standpoint, irrefut.e.ble"65 1s not for !~cTag{;9.rt a i'ine.l 
objection to this arguoent. Th& point of view or science La relative oupor• 
ficial.eG It is vnlid in the sanae that any e.~strncticn is v~lid. It is 
false if taken no tho canploto truth. The ontegorics used in the Undorstan-
l 
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ding are abstract. '!hoy aro valid as expressing inadequate and imperfect 
points or vi<m c.nd for the Understanding itself they are independent and ul-
ti.oo.to. 67 Tho Understanding doos not know "that tho lO'iler categories are 
abstractions from tho highe~. nS8 In contrast to the Henson it accepts the 
10'\Vor categories as stable and inlepondent and docs not sco that thay in-
evito.bly le9.d to the hit:;her categories. Reason, t?hich sees thirll;s synop• 
tically, de:::ando an ultimate explanation. It is not satisfied mth the e.b-
stra.ctions or science. It sees that "tho earlier categories, ,mless syn-
tlwsisod by the later ones, plunge us in contradictions.~89 Thus Reason, 
or philosophy, tho nost concrete of all approaches to re~lity, presses oa 
b~Jond science, answers the questions which science nas raised and cannot 
ansv;er,90 introduces "froah catQtiories," "not ~oroly as additions, but as 
altori~ ~atorially tho ~enning or tho categories of science,"91 and soaks 
an ulti.!:nte c.."Cplanntion of tho 'l.miverse. The fact th'lt science a.ssu:es t~e in-
dependent reality or tho phyoioal Tiorld is not inconsistent with an idoalistic 
vioo or tr.e universe. The poi.nt of vicm or science ia but provisional. 
2) Coor.cnt end critici~. 
Science provisioool in tno \"ro.ys: 
n) IncO!!!plote; by itself unable to reach conception or physico.l 
world as a whole. 
T~io r.o a.ccapt as vnli:i. Tho point of vitm or soioncc ifl f)ro-
visiona.l i.n two v:a.:rs. It ia inccr.~plato. !Jcionoc seeks to bring tho Tihole 
or physica.l nature undor its laws. It r.ould analyze the physiccl world as 
a. wholo. But this proooos is never CO!!lplote. The T:orld as u wholo is not 
a ~nttor or axperionco. 
l 
• 
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Furthomoro. 1£ the standpoint of science be taken as final tho 
very c~eeotion or the world as a wholo is contradictory. It involves tho 
questions a.s to whether tino and space aro finite or infinite, in att<npt-
inr; to nn!rn'or \7hich we arb driven to dony tho independent reality or tho 
physical r.orld. Th!l.t is• tho inn.deqU!lcy of the physic::.l categorica bcccros 
evident and wo are led to tho hicher. to concoivo tho physics.l univ~rs~ in 
tams of spirit. Thus !'cTaggnrt snys that the Understanding postulo.tes nn 
idoal that it co.nnot by itself roach• and thnt. in order to save itsoll' fran 
the contradictiona in which it bcconos in•:olvod it oust postulate t!1c vnlidi-
ty of fr.eason. Thus 
"to assert tho validity or the l<r.ror co.tcc;orios T:i thout tho higher 
would be to assort a contradiction. and to do this is to destroy 
all possibility of coherent thout.;ht."92 
b) Science is also abstract in disregarding all facts of vnluo and 
purpose. 
Thoro is {mother sense in TThich science is abstract and provisional. 
Its r"ethod conpels it to nnke a prolimnary abstraction fra:t the value and pur-
posivo aspects of oxporionce. Tho business of Reason is to relate theso as-
poets of experience to tho world or· science and to interpret the ~l~lo in its 
concreto fullncos. Thus the UnderstandinG coos abou~ ita work ass~ing that 
Reason ''~ill cor:e to its aid in tt:o "VAys: By solving the contradictions in 
which tho Understanding finds itself • in an interpretation of tho physical 
world na a ~hole; o.nd by recognizing and interpreting tho aapoots of oxperi-
once that science intentionnlly ignores, and by relating thoo to the ~arld 
or science a.nd its i'indincs in a ooript·ehensivo t:-.cory of reality. lic!laon is 
bound to pcrforn both of thoso Laska. It nl4"..t.tors not v.i.th ''hich one it be-
gina. Fori' oct Reason vroul.d bo driven froo. t>.e one to tho other. But htl!llln 
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reason is less trustworthy. Decor.rl.~ preoccupied with one or tho tasks it 
may forgot tlnt tho other rer.1ains to be done. ile believe that T!oTaggart 
is guilty or this error or omission. He see::1s to be content to have Reason 
do the first and net;leot the second or its tasks. lie thinks or philosophy 
as furnishing the higher categories to resolve tho contradictions of tho 
Understanding and account for tho logical hnrnony round in the norld or na-
ture. He fails to dc:r:and that philosophy recover the facts ignored by sci-
ence in its proli~nary abstraction and rolnto th~ to the c~ncoption of the 
.physical ~orld as a whole.93 
c. This is not solipsimc; the c~~on world remains. 
In provi~~ that the physical world does not exist in its own right 
?~Taggart does not fall into the errors or agnosticism and solipsi~. I~ 
does not deny tho oojoctivity or tho '"orld or nature, its lnvrs and regular-
ities. Ueither does he deny that we can know anything about it. llis con-
tention is that the objective order is real and can be known to be of the 
nature of nind. 94 
d• The self and its body. 
In proving this ?•cTng&nrt disposes or tha theory thnt tho self 
is but one of tho activities of its body.95 Body belongs to the physical 
order which he has deoonstrated to be of tho nature of spirit. The ait:l 
(I of the attonpt to account for tho self as an activity or its body \7tl.S to 
roduco the entire universe to physical to~s. Such a procedure has been 
reversed, and ~attor now appears to bo of the nature of conscious oxperi-
once. 
l 
·I 
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o. Failure to account for tho cor.non r.orld. 
If nattor is to be explained in toms or consciousness. the quos-
- tion arises. Of' Tihose consciousness is tho 'World or nnture an expression! 
-
' . 
Any anST1or nust account for the regularity and order or nnture. that is. 
for the c~on ~orld in which finite solves participate but do not create. 
As ncTaggart' s view of ultimate reality is thnt or a system or finite 
solves. 96 ve 'r..ay anticipate that he l'li.ll have difficulty in accounting for 
the physical. logical and Moral orders Tihich these selves discover and by 
which they are united into a systeo.97 
., 
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CH!:.PTLR THREE. 
c. The ethical nature or the solr. 
1'cTa&ga.rt has found that the peysical v:orld cust be conceived in 
terns or spirit. fie has established a. oertain anount or harmony between tho 
self nnd its universe. In substance they are the anne. But are they tho 
all!:le in character? To answer this question an investigation or tho ethical 
nature or the self is necessary. It is conceivable that a non-r.mteria.l uni• 
verse night bo indifferent to tho idcnls or hur:mn lire. t$eforo l'cTc.gge.rt 
can assort thnt ·the ha.mony is a hnrnony or a good universe rl th tho good 1n 
man, he oust invosti{;ato the nature or tho Boals or hlr.lfln lifo and their 
relation to the universe as a whole.98 
1. Tho nature or tho self is to have ideals. 
According to !'cTa.ggo.rt it is the nature or tho self to have idools.99 
But what ia an ideal t How shall wo define tho good 'l l'cTaggnrt attO!:l'pts no 
def'inito a.nmer to these questions. To discover his concoptions wo nust study 
and compare his various references to tho good and his troa.tnent or nore gen-
eral ethical quostions.l00 
T~oTa.ggnrt speaks or the idoals th!lt are fundw::lentnl to our ro.ture.lOl 
l'lhen we press h1rl to indicate why certain idoo.ls are fund!li.'Ientnl he replies 
tmt they alone can satisfy us; l02 they nlono can brin& us into ~ony 
with a rational universe. Even thoUGh this does not answer tho question 
asked• it does state an ii!l~ortant truth. An ideal icplios e. reference to 
renlity beyond cysolf; it is not what I chose nhon guided only by impulse, 
desire, feeling or instinct. llut thoro is sor!ous doubt whether !'oTnggart 
!I 
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would sanction this ini'erenco. For hin the terns "ideal," and "desire" seem 
to be s:,rnonortous. Is i.tlrlorta.lity cood? he asks, and answers the question 
by so.ying that sono people do not desire it .1°3 At one tine he seei!ls to 
identify the valuable with Tlhat interests ua,l04 and states that our desires 
r:rust rule in tho kingd0r.1 of' tho good.l05 At another ti!!lo he clearly inplios 
that our desires nay or Ma.y not be of' n ooral na.ture.l06 Yet he interprets 
the ain of' oorality as that of' finding "tho f'undanentally desirable."107 
He refers to the hi~hest values as pleasures and in the same sentence spooks 
of the pleasure of gratified desire.l08 To the ~e effect is the assertion 
that "pleasure is no nore to be trea.ted lightly than virtue, "105 and that 
"any stnte of' consciousness is valuable only in respect of' the el~ent or 
nl08 
reeling in it. 
Doubtless a thinker has a. ri~ht to create his own terninology and 
is to be pardoned if' he uses T:ords in other than their accepted rennin:;. lle 
can hardly be pardoned if' his uao o1' th~ is inconsistent. To attO!:!pt to 
discover "cTo.r;gnrt' a definition of' the ~ood is to encounter consistent con-
fusion. This is inexcusable. There are some distinctions that avery writer 
of' ethical theory is obligated to r.ako. One of' them is the relation of' tho 
toms 11desirnble," "pleasurable" nnd "~ood." If' ethical experience is clear 
in regard to any one fact it is trAt these words often cannot be used inter-
changeably. To use ther:I so is to confess that one has negleotod to no.ko a 
very ele=-:cntary ethical distinction. ''cTa.Ggart believes that we ahould 
• "cooo to a. clear idea as to what tho f'tmda.!'!'!ental dt:r.'a.nds and aspiration c£ 
our nnturos are. al09 If' he hi.nself' tas done so, his ethical writings do 
him grave injustice. He has nade no serious attcopt to tell us what side 
of' our nature is f'unda~enta.l; which d6".lands ought to be satisfied nnd which 
ought to be denied; what is the distinctive characteristic or an ideal; a.nd 
l 
I 
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wey we have llnY reason to believe that our ideals are valid or n reality be-
yond ourselves. Cn most or those funda!!ental oatters !'cTaggnrt ts both 
vn~ue and inconsistent. 
2. Is the self' free to choose between ideals? 
l'cTaggnrt nentions four possible senses in Trhioh a rum nay be said 
to bo free. "In the first place, vre r:.ny say th!lt a r--an is free to do anything 
which nothinb but his cmn nature provents hin from dotnr;."110 This is free-
dam of seli'-detert!lination. In the s ocond sense of the term "a man is free 
to do anything which nothing but his own will prevents h~ froc doing."lll 
This is freedom of self-direction. "In the third place a nan is said to 
act freely ~hen he nets according to the ult~nte ideal or his nature."111 
This l!oTaggo.rt calls i'reodoc or self-realization. It is evident that in 
all these meanings of tho term~ a nan nay be c~plotely deternincd by his 
nature and envtronncnt and yet be called free. In tho last sense "a ro.n 
is free in any action. if his choice of t~t.a~tion is not cocpletely de-
temined." This freedom is referred to as free vrtll. but is called by '.'c-
Taggo.rt i'reedao of indetorninntion.ll2 Tho question is, Is man free in this 
sense? Or to substitute a dii't'erent teminology • Are nan's choices real 
choices or are they the necessary results of forces or heredity and environ-
mont over ''rhich he has no control? 
a.) l•oTo.r;g;o.rt concedes too nuoh to the provisional point of view 
or science, which is deteminiatic. 
In his ethical theory l'cTag;gart forgets that philosophy is not 
bound to accept the provisional point of view of science as an ulti.I!late 
and consistent interpretation.113 He does "not, proposo to consider nhother 
== l ~ I 
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Ca.usnlity and tho Unifomity c£ He.ture o.ro valid of events othor than voli-
tions." Ho Tlill only point out that "tho indeterminist does not. as a. rule. 
deny that all ovonts exceJ:'t volitions r.uot be complotoly det.erninod. • • n114 
But this is ilrecisely whnt the indeterminist does :. deny and what ~~cTaggo.rt. 
is obligated to deny by the distinction which he hns nade between Understo.nd-
ing and Ronaon. science and philosophy. Tho scientist is entitled to the do-
terrninistic hypothesis as a methodological device and does richt to ignore 
tho facts of spiritual causality nhich invalidate his principle as a. philoo-
ophico.l interpretation. ilut this privilege cannot be ext.edded to T•cTaggart. 
the philosopher. Since his point or viow is to be final he has no rit;ht to 
an -eypothesis that is purely idoo.l and abstra.ct. and thus tmt does violonoo 
to ir.~orto.nt rr.cta. !.!oTagga.rt cannot boti this question by speo.kint; in the 
authoritative tone of the scientist.ll4a 
b. Rightly rejects oero feeUng as proof or either. 
T'cTa6gart rightly asserts that no apt)cal to "irn!;:ediato conviction" 
ean settle this question. Tho debate nust be decided on the basis or ra.tional 
o.rgment .115 
Ho also rejects the nrg~ent based on the sense of freedom that 
one experiences in action. Thio• ho sa.ys. moans only absence of restraint. 
A man expor!.ences thio sense or i'reedor!l when in acting he wills to do so. 
This is coopatible with tho fact, that, his Trill r::o.y bo cocpletoly detemined.l16 
c. Confuses sooial ettect,s with the rationo.l, subjeotive ground 
or notions. 
In his ar~ent l·cTaggo.rt socns to evade the real difficulties ot 
detcroining by shifting rr~ tho subjective ground or tho nora.l lite to its 
Wl 
.. 32 -
noci.nl effects. !!cr.: nny action -ro.y be judged both fro:t an inside and an 
outside point of viow. !n one ease the tern "good" nay have a ve~J differ-
ant nonnin::; froo its use in tho othor. Jud;;od by its sooial effects the 
instinctive love of a oothor dog for hor puP?ios ~AY be oo.llod good. It 
my furnish an cxanple of dovotion to which tl".o attention of yoUil{; children 
nay well be dr~wn. But tho doG's attitude could hardly be cnlled oorally 
good. Ey usinc the tom "good" in the forr:or sense ?'cTaggnrt seeks to 
provo that dcteminiso is CO!:':po.tible "ith e.ll our ;:1oral judgr.:onts. no in-
sists that tho crrocts or an action ere good ...-:hether the o.gent is deter-
mined or free. ttv'lould r.ry O'Ml possession or kncmledge, or tho satisfaction 
or oy ar.n hunger, or the relief of the distress or others, cease to be good 
because" in bri~ing them about my ~ill was coopletoly deternined? ho asks.117 
The onsrrcr is trat frotl the standpoint or their social ei'fects these actions 
migl~ be judGed GOod, but if c~~letely det~inod, rr~ the point of view 
of the agent hinsolf, these actions could not be called ~cod in the full 
senoo of tM.t · tem. If determinis=:t be true, the agent nust reGard all his 
choices as necessary results or rorcos w~ich ho is pov;orless to influence~ 
ra1nt nntter that he is able to say, "rihether oy will is completely doter-
mined or not. it is clear that I shall not learn claosico.l Greek or satisfy 
oy hunger unless I will to do so ••• "117 Tho additional fact is to be con-
sidercd, th~t ~hichovor choice I ~akc, in r~~ it I an not ro~sonoble, 
good or bad; I tm only doing that Tihi.ch I Cllnl'lOt o.voi.d doing. '•cTnggnrt 
• consistently ignores this fact. To de::on:Jtrnto that excellence is not de-
"•"' 
·- pendent upon the troo will or the possessor • l'cTa.ggurt reninds· us that: 
"We re~ard tho tntollectua.l oxcollonco of Shakespeare ~ith r.oro anproval 
than tho excellence shown by thenost brilliant punster. • •• cocause 
we regard excellence in his direction as noro ir:~portant, in tho general 
scalo or values, than excellonoo in p~~iUG•"1 8 
F' 
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Ilo points out that "Shukospco.ro' s t;onius, on t;1o one !'And, nnd tho o.b:lOnoo 
oi' equal gonius in" others aro "i'o.cta OC!:1plctcly dotcrr:inod." This is truo, 
judt;ed aGain 1'1•0!!1 an e=ternal point of vim-:. liut it is nlao true tlnt either 
Shakespeare or a punster oust bo judged by tho nttitude that he nsctr.ec to-
-rm.rd his senius. If ho accepts it as a ooro.l responsibility nnd opportunity; 
develops, instoad of wo.stoo it; and if in doiUG no h.io choice is n 1·oo.l 
choice, both he and his Genius n:-o r;ood in v. sensa of tho word t~.:;.t cannot 
be applied to o.ny action or nny cxcollonco that is cooplotcly dotcroinod. 
iTcTnggart often ee~s on t~1o point of roc~11izing this, - that 
the ~oral lifo consists in a froe choice or tho good, in n TdllinG obodi-
once to ny sonse of oblie;a.tion to c!looso tho best. llo goes so fo.r a.s to 
acloit tMt the nru&"!:lont fr<n tho ju~ont of obligation is tho stronGest 
argunont i'or frco •·rill,. altho~h ho "co.nnot regard it as sntisi'o.ctory, nll9 
and that 
"n ~an does feel a responsibility to hL~seli' for doi'octs or volition 
•••• v:hich he docs not fool in case of a. defect 11ith which voli-
tion has not~ing to do.nl20 · 
Ee appears roo.dy to grapple with tho problO!l or hOT1 c. nc.n can bo expected 
to reel responsible ror actions over uhich ho has no control. Dut ns soon 
as ho i'nces tho issuo he ehU'ts to c.n encr~ml point or view. 
d. Superficial view or noral obli~ation. 
1) External: to ot~:ors, to Goi (?), o.nd to self. 
1•cTnc;go.rt :::ontions "trreo sorts of rosponsibi.lity [that] have 
nl21 
boon assorted - to our fell em' !"On, to God, and to sol£ • Ono night ex-
pect th:lt thoso r.ould bo diecuaeod in tho rcvcrso order. Tho sense o1' 
rcopondbility io pcroonul. It is a.ltro.yo scli'-ir.':710ll0de l·y liCnSO or 
'< i. 
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responsibility to others or to God is not i~osed frcn without. else it 
would not be a nornl responsibility. Its basis ia ~y rondinoss to live 
a responsible lifo. It depends upon whether I do hold nysolf responsible 
for ny r:lOtives tl.l'ld actions. ilawover. !!cTnt;:;art disCUSAeS those typos of 
responsibility in the order s~ested. 
P.e r.a.lces the surprising statEnent tho.t ny r3sponsibility to ny 
follow 'r!on con:11sts "in the fact that it is reasonable ror thao to raward 
and punioh ~e for ny volitions, and in t~At ract only."122 And again: 
"A !"!an is not called responsible to his roll<m !"On because thoy 
do ri~ht to ~udge hi.n evil• but because they do right to punish 
hin. • • •"1 3 
l'lc refer to these statcr.onts as surpristn& because !~cTaGgart loaves uo in 
tho dnrk as to ~ l"'On do right. to rem1rd and punish ~o as thO caso nay 
be. \'!ho cave then this right? 1'lmt tr they abuse it? Aro tho \"l'ishes 
. ~< 
or others nlwayo Morally binding on r.e? TI!nt if riY :::oral judf:~ is oppos od. 
· to their standards of conduct? An I to regnrd nysolf as nerally responsible 
to others whose jud~onts cy nornl sense repudintos. just because they hnve 
the right to rcm:trd nnd punish r~e'l All these questions !'cTQ{;{;a.rt if;norcn.l24 
His discussion or our responsibility to God ~ovcs on the sn::10 
love1.125 If God be cr.nnipotont he cannot be good nnd Tro are not responsible 
to h1!:l on any theory. If he is not or.mipotent. the d.etornintst. no -r.oll c.s 
tho indotcr-inist, MC.Y rool rosponoi.blo to him because or his po-nor to devise 
a syst~ or punishr.lents to ohook t:1an' s ctn. Evidently in his relations to 
• God '!"'an is to be ~idod only by pleasuro.-pain ~otives. no hir;hor notive is 
suggested. As !'oTe.gga.rt denies the existence of Go:i• the superficiality or 
this pnrt or his discussion need not be tnkon seriously. 
ftc turn to his treatMent or responsibility to one's self in the 
I 
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hope tltJ.t he t'Iill atte::1pt to occt i'unda":lc."'ltc.l problo::.s.126 But •:o o.rc dis-
appointed. iic tells us that. just aa I i'eel responsibility to ethers because 
thoy do right to r011ard and punish no. so do I f'ocl responsible to ::1y3elf' for 
defects or volition. because "I recognize that I do well to feel s~o and 
127 
re1:1orse." But what is tho bo.sio or this recognition? r.hy is it well to 
feel shll!!le and remorse ro.ther than pri.ic o.nd satisfaction in rcl'cre:lco to r::y 
defects of volition? r·cTa.uo.rt o.nST.ors "tr.at in tho ono case it -:ay inprovo 
127 
nm.t.tors and in the othor case it c~nnot.." And n!nt docs kprove1:.ent -::c:m? 
l.hy ls it to be c:.oscn? Does it ~ean th:1t I shall ever ir.:prove to tho ex-
tent or actinG from higher motives than a desire for pleo.sure at'.d e. rear of 
pain? t;hon such quostiono as these a.ro left open it !:ardly sott!s that t•cTag-
e;art has oado a serious attcr.tpt to :leal Tiith his problec. 
2) no fails to examine the fundo.":lental nature of' noral obl~ntion. 
The force;oin{; oriticisn, based on ~·cTaggart' s discussion or frco 
will, applies to his definitely fomulatcd theories. H07:c-:er in his ethics 
HoTaggurt is happily ineonsi.E.tent, o.nd in discu&sint; rolntod problcns he 
often corrects tho hasty conclusions criticized abovo. Our present concern 
is with his ad~ssions as to tha icportancc of tho c~cc or obliGution for 
ethical theory • 
a) Iw concedes that tho basis or all r.orality is the personal 
sense of obligation. 
In his diccussion of punisb:!!cnt 1fcTD.b{;art suppl~ents, if he does 
nat contradict, his theory that I an rosponsiblo to ny f'ellowoen because 
they do right to rmmrd and ptmiah no. no distillbuiahaa bot\1een puniolnont 
that d~Jtors tl1rou.:;lt rear un:l tJunisX'.ont t!Jlt ro8::tforccs tho rool nornl notivo, 
:I 
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encourages a tooling or disgrace. and induces repentance. He says: 
"nut n nunis~ont c~nnot l~d to ra~ont~noo unless tt is recognized 
as tho fitting consequence or a noral fault •••• "128 
And again: 
"punishno~~9can only purity by appealing to tho ~oral nnturo of tho culprit." 
And again: 
nwtthout tho approvnl or tho individunl conscionoo no syston of noral-
ity can n~ be sntistactory."lSO 
In those statEr.tonts ,~cTaggart has torsa.ken tho external point of view to 
stand on tho real grotmd or the noral lito. Tho e:::tpmsis is not upon the 
opinions of others or their ability to rerre.rd or punish me. It is laid upon 
the attitude or the agent hi!!lself'. If these stattr.ents nro true. r..y respon-
sibility to my rellov~en and nyselt does not consist in the one case in the 
rnct that they do right to reward and ptmish r.1e and in the other thnt I do 
well to fool shame and remorse. To say so is to confuse the consequences 
of a. judgMent or vnlue with tho jud.grlent itself. ny rosponsibiUty to my 
fellowmen and to myself springs from r.y recocnition of r..ysolf and r.1y fellows 
as ~EJ'!bers in a :coral order whoso values we are oblir;atod to realize. I 
may fulfill or disregard ny responsibility to others in cany ways knann only 
to myself. A nothor' s spontaneous sacrifices for her child are hardly in• 
spired by tho thoUGht of the praise to which those entitle her. Her ideal 
of motherhood. is quito above such considern.tions. Again• ny hatred for a 
rival. concealed for politic roa.sono. is beyond tho roach of social rewards 
and ptmishnc."tts. Bven if r.ry tollcmnon wore aware of ey nttitude thoy would 
not do v:oll to combat ny r::otivo 1Ti th the clu:::.sy Moo.sures at their cou:.:a.nd. 
To do no would bo to a.tt(l'lpt to rcoove a particle of dust from the oyo Trith 
a pair of tonr;s. Thoro are virtues nnd. sins of r;roa.t cocial oigntficanca 
1
:! 
' 
I 
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tlnt aro too delien.to to bo e;rv.spod lrith the a7:km:trd instrwents with "''rhich 
sooioty !":Ust work. Tho !"!Other's dovotion and ;:y hatred !'or an cncr.y involve 
rcspectivoly, an acocptanco and n rejection, or social (and thus ~crsonal) 
responsibility, ~thout avon rnisin~ tho question ~s to the r-rniso or bla~o, 
rmmrd or punismont .-:hich thO"J r.ig;ht:. merit !'rom others. They spring !'r~ 
tho nr.turo o!' tl:e individunl' s personal, yet soeio.l, idrol. Thoy re!'er back 
to tho !'o.ct tl"'.:lt ho either M.s, or has not, imposed ur,on hinsolr ":.".e r.ornl 
obltcation r.hich every loynl citizen o!' the kinc;doo o!' value rust ai!H3tr.o. 
It is this !'act Trhteh ~·cTaggn.rt so-c:r.1s to recognize in the paesar;eo 
quoted nbave. It to thia tnct thnt he seems to hnvc in mnd l'lhen he e.d::1its 
that r.1ornlity is not "nltocothor n social ~ntter;"131 that it is possible 
to be in !'unda""!entnl opposition to your society and yet be in the rignt..132 
It is this truth or "''rhioh ho sooos to be thinld.n!; tthen ho criticizes Hegel 
tor diorogardtnc tho stcni!'iennce or conscience. In this connection he says: 
"Tho subjective COil"liction is by no nee.ns too whole or r.:orality, 
but it is an essential part."131 
Such inoights as these 'Would seor.t to necessitate a revision or his 
troo.t~ent of rtoral obligation in his discussion of froe will. But thia is 
too nuch to expect. "cTnggart res not attm::ptod to give any search!~ and 
consistent trcat!":ont or moral obligation nnd its runotion ns the organizing 
principle or tho nornl lite. Uor docs ho seem to reco~;nize its t:lctaphysical 
eigni!'icance. 
b) P'.e fo.ils to see that deter.::i.niSt:l throws tho t:lOral lite into 
contradiction. 
l'cTa{%nrt cnnnot "see tho least r;round !'or the conclusion trot 
the boliof in datenniniSI!l r.akes choice tmreasonnble."133 The deteminist, 
- 38-
as ~oll nc the indotorr1inist, boli~vc~ t~~t hi~ ~hoico ~ill hnvo sono in-
fluonco on tho rooult. lihnt nattor then 1f his choice itsoli' bo inevi-
tnbl~? Tho belief that ~J choice to abut the door is c~letely determined 
will not t:ake it unreasonable for r.e to choose to shut the door.l33 As 
long as I knaw that ny nill cnn affect the result ny determinism will not 
make choice and judgments of ob~ation absurd or render "it absurd to be 
moved by a regard for duty.nlS4 
ile night reply to !!cTaggart that on deteministic nrinciples, 
althoUGh I want the door shut, it is entirely reasonable for me to sit 
lazily in ny chair and explain ny indolence on the ground that my action 
to completely determined. The fact that I do choose to slmt the door after 
considering this alternative indicates that I take my dete~ini~ with a 
grain or salt. It is l~cTaggart' s superf'icial and external view of obli~a­
tion thnt conceals fran ~ the contr~diotion into ~hich doterMini~ r.ould 
t hror. tho moral 1 if e. 
The categorical ~perative tells ~e that I ~ obligated to act 
reasonably and to live tho best possible ltre. Deteminism ini'oms no that 
whether or not I try to act reasonably or to ronlize my best, I ~ doing 
ey best. !"y ef'fort or my lack oi' effort is an inevitable result of con-
ditions beyond rr:ry influence. It is evident tmt this involves the r:oral 
life in a contradiction. It is not a purely practical ~at.ter, e.s HcTa.ggnrt 
se~s to inply.l35 It is a question of facing a contradiction ·with which 
;,- tho dinloctic is supposed to t"ako us dissatisfied. Uhen f'cTaggart urges 
us to r~J~ber that doterninism does not render choice absurd, ho is tell-
ing but hnlf the trut.h. '.the opposite is also true, - neither does doter-
miniBrl render the lack or choice absurd. 
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e. Ho caricatures indet.eminisr.t; interprets it as belief in sheer 
en;'rice. 
!'cTaggart oaricatures indetemtnism by interpreting it as belief 
in caprice. He charges that the indeterminist has forsaken all right to 
speak of a probability that a person will profer the good to the evil•l36 
or to hold a person responsible for his past. For does not tho believer 
in free will too.oh that a r:1a.n1 s choices havo no rolntion whatever to his 
or.aractort137 
If' this be nn accurate stattT.lont of the indeterminist• s position 
'-t is not strange thnt !rcTage;art has e':'!bracod its opposite. In e. previous 
section 'we criticized ?'cTagr;art tor speaking as if motives inpi~od UPon 
tho self from without. instead or being tho self's own unique crontion.l38 
This very fact nakes a choice the expression of character. For into thnt 
choice tho self has placed sonethtng that it could mve withhold. The 
choice v:as deliberate. and because doliborato an expression of tho self's 
unique character. Tho indeterminist might insist tmt only on this theory 
does tho net or judging a character have nny neanin~. tle would also insist, 
thllt on this theory it is roasonnble to predict tho nature or tho future 
choices or n nan. llut such n prediction is licited to possibilities only. 
A necessary choice is e. contradiction in ten:!s. Hora.l choioeo are roal 
choices and not r;re.tuitous approvals of decisions that the self is com-
polled to cake. 
3. Tho suprono r;ood nnd tho noral critoricn. 
Wo are considering '~cTllbe;art' s vicn of the ethical nature of the 
sell'. Tic mvo soon th:1t he regards tho self as by nature guided by ideals. 
nut r.~t is tha principle by ~hich tho self ought to aolect his idoulst Dy 
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what rule slw.ll tho salt r.!e.ke its cho:tces? Tlha.t idools aro of suprEr.c• 
rather than of' instrur.tent~l value? Those questions introduce us to the 
probleo of tho Ct,,prmo (';OOd and tho ~ornl Criterion. 
a. Tho supror.1o ~ood identical ffith the suprono reality. 
"cTa~gart reminds us thnt tho supr<r.o reality as ouch noed not 
be the suprO!:le good.139 It nuat bo d~onstrated to be so. He believes 
hinsolf to hnvo nado the demonstration. llis dialectic lns arrived at the 
Absolute !dea. This can bo expressed only in 
"a unity Of' individue!a. <::C.Ch of' nhom• perfectly individual tltrouc;h 
his peri'oet unity 'Vrith all the rest. places before hins&lf nn er.d 
and finds the '\7hole of the universe in cooplote hnmony .... i.th that 
end." 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
"This is the sUPre:1e reality - the only roo.lity ~ spccio 
aotornitatisA tho goal or the process of the universe sub opccio 
termor is. u !~9 -
But is this suprcr.:o reality also tho suprOl:'to good? l'cTnggart believes so. 
It coincides with tho S\ll)rme good. Each conscious being adequately ex-
presses his individuality in one end with ~hich he finds all other indivi-
duals to bo in hnrnony •. Ttros "it Trill necessarily follow that the ond is 
fulfilled. Here is n supreme good ready to our hnnda."140 
1) Asstnod. not dooonstrnted. 
It see-ts that after all the supr~e reality as such has turned 
out to be the suprene good. It appears that PoTnge;nrt is guilty or nsnum-
in~ that tho universe of' spirit is a ooral univorsa and that tho satisf'ac-
tion which it eternally offers is nornlly good. Sooe solves are satisfied 
with low ideals. How then do we know th:lt any universe that satisfies us 
I 
I 
I 
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will bo right.eous?141 The reason tor ''cTaggo.rt' s failure to establish the 
c.oro.l n~tcrc of' his u.-.ivo:-se >:ill be discussed luter.142 
2) Results in the conviction or harnony essential to reli~ion. 
Here we zhnll bo content t.o point out tho.t lfc~aggnrt concludes that 
he has discovered the r.arnony necessary to rolie;ion. ~ho dialectic proves 
.!!! !!; nbstnct r.'J.y t:".'J.t tho universe nust bo both rational and righteous. 
But this is not e~lete kno-iilodt;e. It is only o.n outline. It is necessary 
to dctor.inc tl:e co::lcrctc cluractcr of this universe or spirit. or spirito.l43 
3) Tho suproco ~ood is "tho only reality sub snocio aoternit~tis. 
[nnd) tho c;oal or the process or the u.~crso sub specie ter.l-
poris." ---
Another point to be er:xphfl.si:od l1ore is that Hc'io.:;gart holds this 
supr~o GOOd to bo "tho only roo.lity ..!!2 snocio aetornitatis [nnd] the goal 
or the ?roccs::; or tho univorao ~ specie tocmoris. nl39 
4) Tho supro::'le g;ood not purely hedonistic. 
H., docs not conceive it to bo "purely hedonistic • ., 
"It contains pleasure • • • • ilut the pleasure in only one elenent 
or tho perfect s~ate. The suprone r,o~d is not pleasure as such• 
but this ~:.rticul3.r ploasant stnte.·•LO 
b. Ho distinguishes the suprcr.1e good from the moral criterion and 
rejceto tho fornor na useloaa for practical guidance. 
Tho supr~e good ia not to bo identified ~ith the ~oral criterion. 
"Thqrccn be identical. no doubt, but they need net be so. Tho object 
or n criterion i~ norely practical - to r,uido our actions tm1nrd the 
~ood nl40 b •••• 
The Str)r~c cood cannot serve this purpose. It tolls us only what is the 
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nature or the supreme and ti.x:leless reality. It doos not aid us in neeting 
our prnctice.l ~ornl nroblena in this iMperrcot and chnngi~ world. 
"The reality cont~plntad by Hegel in his Absolute Idl)a is absolutely 
spiritual, absolutely timeless, absolutely perfect. Ilow none o£ us 
evor get a chance of performing an notion the result of which would 
satisi'y those three conditions. ~he result of any actions possible 
to us now would be a state in which spirit ?.aS still encortpnsscd v:ith 
nattor, in whioh change still took place, and in which porreotion, if 
rather nearer than boi'oro, was still obviously not attained. 
"It is useless thon to test our notions by onquirin~ if they ~ill 
realise the supreoe g;ood. i!one of them will du that, and we are re-
duced to considering which of theo will ~ne.blc us to reach rather nearer 
to suprer:~e good than 'Vie wore beforo. 11 4 
He adds tmt this consideration "is almost useless. 11 It can nevor tell us 
'tlhich of two courses we should te.ke. in1at 'WO need is a practical criterion 
that will enable a ran, ~nlli~ to do tho right, to dooide betnecn two courses 
of action both~orally good and yet incaopatible. 
1) Ho rejects perfectionism as a moral criterion. 
In the opinion of f'l'.cTaggart 1 perfectionilml, as n Moral theory, 
fails to 1:1eet this requirer.lent. The idea or perfection can only guide a man 
in choosing betY:oon the !':!Orally c;ood and evil. If he had not been nilling 
to ci1oo~.: tho former he would not have sou;:;ht ~idanoe i'ron nn ethical cri-
terion.145 It follows tlmt the idea of perfection, or of tho supr~e cood 
is al.nost. vo.luoleas as n guide to acti.on. It can never assist us r.hen r.o 
Meet renl dii'ficulties. In theso cases wtnt help is the knowledge that tho 
ultir.ate goal is a perfect and tineless ronlity'l 
"such results as theso can but rarely be available as guides to action. 
Tlo learn by the::~ what is the nature of that ideal, which, ~ specie 
aeternitntis, is ~resent in all reality, and which, ~ specio t<nnoris, 
is tho goal tovmrds which all reality is T."oving. ilut such nn ideal is, 
sub snecie aeternitatis, re.r too innlicit, and sub snocie t~noris, i'e.r 
tOO distant, to allow us to use it in decidin~ on-any definite course or 
action in the nrooent. tror can it be taken to indicate oven tho direo-
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t1on in which our present action should nove. For one of the great 
lessons of Hegel's philosophy is that, in o.ny progress, we never nove 
directly forwards, but oscillate froc side to side o.s we ndvance. 
1~d co n st~ ".'1hich Sf)er.S to be almost directly alVB.y fror.t our ideal 
may sometimes be t~e next stop on tl~e only road by ~:hich tl::at idc:ll 
can be attained." 46 
FrO!:l tha dio.lootio TTO learn tmt sin is a neoospary stage in prograas tOTro.rd 
porf'oction. Consequently we have no re:1.son to beUovo that actions which 
soo::l i~cdb.tely good Trill hasten the coming of' the supre:1e good or that ao-
tions T;hich see:'! it"!~ediately be.d will delay its realization. no have renscn 
to bel iove t mt this is not so in rany cases. 
"-;., britt~ our conduct today as close as possible to the supre::1e t;ood 
nay be to help or to hinder the co:ning of the su::>rer.:~e ;;ooJ in ull ita 
perfection." 147 
a) If' his reason for rojeotin.:; pcrfcctioniSI!! is valid, any .cystcn 
of' ethics is impossible. 
These stat~ents seem to advocate a c~plcto othicnl skcpticis~. 
In a searching criticism oi' PcTacgart' s ethics, G. E. !~ooro has pointed out 
that if these stu.te':lents are to be tukon seriously i·cTe.gga.rt l'.:lo no rir;ht. 
to any theory of ethics at a11.148 If tho supremo good is the only rc:llity 
~ specie aotcrnitatis, and the goal of the process of tho uni·.;orse ~ 
sncoie "teuoris,. and T"'rul ia unable to tell whether his c.otions will t'..::.stcn 
or delay the realization of that ~ood, he has no re~son at all to consider 
one action better than another, or to choose one noral criterion in praf'or-
once to c.nother. 
b) His difficulty here duo to contradiction between his perfect 
reality and the ir.lporfection or the tir:e process. 
This critioiBT!l is valid. Yot i.t is only fnir to rro.fJ'Jber t:mt .. c_ 
Tn{;gnrt iD not consistently skepttoal. Furthemorea hia occnaional skcptia1sm 
·tt 
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is rooted in the basic dU'ficulty and contradiction of his systcn. ile con-
tosses that ho ia unnble to reooocile tho perfection ot• the tir.loloss Abso-
lute Reality with the tropora.l process, its apparent change and evu.l4 9 
It is this dH'f'iculty, we boliovo, that causes hit:t to we~.ver betl'reon thoo• 
reticnl pcrtcetioni~ and praetioa.l hedonis:!l. If the Ul'livorse is already 
coopleto and perfect, as ho thinks his logic to have demonstrated, porfoc-
i...tnpe.,.ati.ve. 
tion ~ould seam to be our goal nnd tho categoriealAof f'un~~entnl inportance. 
Dut t:t.,o c.nd. chnngo and sin sect:1 real. Thoro aoOI!lS to be £. vast chas:!l be-
t~een our inpcrf'cct ~rooont oxperionco and the d~onstrated perfection or 
the t!nolosa Abcolute. Tho latter seO!:lS to be utterly removed froo tho 
tor.:1or. It -;:ould soa:t that the idoals of the Absolute cannot be identical 
with our idoals.150 Thus in evory day life r:11y we not better forget the 
Absolute o.nd depend upon a criterion connected with tho hard facts oi' ac-
tual hur.tnn exporionoet A C?.loulation of plensuro-pnin is t~e ono r:ost 
"ready to our mnd." Y;}nt harn i.f ;:e adopt it 'Z The dialectic procoso is 
inavitnblo .nnd nothi.nc; tmt ;ro r.ay do can possibly retard ita r'OVfr.lcnt.151 
Evon thou:;h our ju:i(;nont nhould provo to be -:TrOll(;, it l'fill also prove in• 
oi'foctivc.152 :bppUy, the attainnent. of tho good docs not depend upon 
153 
our o.cticn. 
r;o culnit thiz a.3 a. fnir str<~ary or at least certain very prO!"li-
nont tendencies in '•oTar;r;a.rt' s othtcnl thou:;ht..154 V.e believe that v•e have 
nade a vo.lici inference as to tho theoretical source of his devil~ay-caro 
.·e attitude to;;nrd ethical problar:s. 
o) Yot ho c.dr.lits that wo have neans or deciding tint one action 
is bettor than another. 
i. In dotnr; so ho rof'utes hia OTm rci'utntion or nerf'ectionisn. 
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As we ha.vo said, HcTa.ggart is not consistently skapt.ica.l. A 
r~dico.lly s1:cntj_c::tl stater mt T".n:J be 1'ollo~7e-l Ly n sontcncc th<:.t is in-
cono!'l.tiblc mth sl::opticis-::1. In his discuMion of' "Tho SmrtT'o Good. c.nd 
the !'oral Criterion" ho f'ollov:s the assertion th".t T:e 1-.avo no roanon to 
boHevc t!:at our &~tlons r.i.ll help rather than hinder tho cOMing cr tho 
s~r~e GOOd, ... ·ith tho qw.lification tmt "r;e CB.n seo, to s<Y.:lo extant, 
'\"lh!\t con:iuct cr-'bodiM the supreme cood lcru;t i:!"lt'crfcctly. nl51 ThitJ is the 
.f'e.ct tmt r!O.!:cs c. theory or othica possible. As soon c.s 't':'O J.:ncm t!:..-:~ rie;ht 
actions nre those tha.t "Vrill tend to "brine; about, i~w:edif1.tcly, or in the 
CO!:lparativoly nec.r futuro r.hich v;o cnn predict ":ith rc~sonnblo cortninty, 
the state ~htch con.f'oros a.s closely as nossible to thnt ~orrcotion," r.c r~ve 
e clue to n ~or~blo critorion.l51 Tl~s ic tho very fact upon r.hich pcr-
.f'eotioniS!"l builds. Tio perfectionist believes tmt for l".n ido2.l to be ":)rae .. 
tto~l it ~ust be ~raopcd at once nnd conplotoly realized nt thin one ~~cr.t. 
Hoo.ven in not rc".chcd by u oinglo bound. Tho pcr1'octtoniot >7ould point cut. 
that. a truo !dcnl is a ~rowinG ido~l thnt .f'orovor precedes us. Eio m1ly 
aascrtion is thnt in bet~ loyal to tho best t~t he knorrs; in hocdtTlG his 
oblisntion to nohicve tho hi~heet values nvntlnblo for hin, he ia r,r~tnG 
in the direction of his ideal and in thus pcrfectinr; hinsolf he in :--arM.-
ctpntin& in the ultir'!nte perfection or tho ,miverso. Tho porfootton.ist 
does not cherts~ t h_, anbit1.on "to beca:!o perfect es the crow .f'ltos," rmd 
he nir;ht r,rnn~, providinr; he is not averse to ni:xtnc his fir;uros or apocnh, 
·- tlnt to do so "will only lend • • • • into ocr.o blind alley frOM v;hich" it 
Ttill bo nccesst'.ry to rotrnco one' a atc:')s. Orr.ntinc t~s, ho '\)i 11 oonsid.or 
th!lt, ''cTru;;g('.rt me uloo granted in tho ra.ssacos t.lmt follcr.:, sooo or tho 
principo.l !'nets upon '\7hich tho perfectionist baoos his theory. 
I 
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"A certain degree of knowledge, of virtue, and of hnnpiness, is appro-
priate and possible for every otago of the process of spirit. By tho 
aid of rofleotion wo ~ny perceive the existence or a stage ouch higher 
than that in 'Vrhich we are. But the knowlode;o t::-nt '170 shall re'lch it 
some d:1y is not cquiv<llont to tho pcrnar or reaching it at once. ••e 
are entitled to as nuch perfection as v.e arc fit for, and it is usc-
less to dc~end ~ore ••••••••••••••••••••••• •" 
"Hovertheloss, the knowledge of: tho goal to Tthich v;e nro going 
may occasionully1 if used ~th discretion, bo a help in directing 
our course. It will be somethi~ if wo can find out v;hich parts of 
our e.."Cpericnce are or value per ~· and can be pursued for their ov.n 
oake, and Tthich parts are r.!erely subsidiary. For however long it r.ny 
take us to reach the Absolute, it iG sO!::etinos curiously nee.r us in 
isolated episodes of lifo, and our attitude towards certain phases 
of consciousness, if not our positive ections, nay be materially ar-
roctcd by the consideration of tgo greater or loss adequacy with lrl1ich 
those plmsoa C!'.)tody reality." 15 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
"For thoro are parts of our lives '\'::lich, even a.c ...-e live them, soel!:l 
inc~plote and r.orely transitory, having no value unless they lond 
on to scr.:ethtn;; better. And there are pnrta or cur livos v:!1ich setn 
so funda~ontal, so absolutely desirable in thenselves 1 that we could 
not nnticiputo nithout pnin their absorption into sooo hiGher perrcc• 
t.ion1 as yot unknown to us, e.nd that v:e da::and that they shall Ul'ldor-
eo no further cl~nco1 e7.ccpt an increase in purity and intensity. 
now Tie ::light. be able to shcm or the firat or these groups or experi-
ences tlnt thoy are1 in fact, r.1ere ':lassinQ phasce, with :::ca."ling only 
in so far ns they lead up to and aro absorbed in sonething higher. 
And 'V:o niGht even bo a.blo to sh011 or tho second that they are ac-
tually run~ontul. lackinr; so far in breadth and depth, but in their 
explicit n!\ture alroo.dy ravro.li.l1g tho i!::I?licit roality." 156 
l~cTa~a.rt ooncedeo,~ t:-ton, that ue do have value experiences that 
are"o.ctually fundn~onta.l, lacl:irlb so far in broo.dth and depth• but in their 
EP:plioit a::~turo already ravoalint; the" ultinnto goodness. If this be true 
tho perfectionist co.r.not ·~·onder th!lt tho Absolute ic "soootines curioualy 
near us." Hdhcr • thll curious fa.ct .-rould bo to 1:-.a.vo tho ulti.I:late Goodness 
:- so fa.r beyond tho roach of lur.lan exporienco, to explain which it -y,-cs pos-
tulc.tod. Tho oonsiotent. conclusion r.ould bo that not only in ''isolated 
opicoleo"' of our lives, but in tho ::~oot od.i:mry of our moral expe1·ionces, 
tho 5upr<r.o Goodneoa ia "curiously near us." as is tho opportunity to achieve 
our :-::or['.l destiny nnd to hast.on tho rc:~.liza.i.ion of tho ultir'..o.te c;ood. 
l [ 
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of the c::ood in their rosncctivo tendencies to nppro:cir.e.to tho suprtt:tc good• 
Y!cTar:;eart. contradicts his ethical skepticism. 3ince thin T:as advanced to 
disprove perrcctionis!1 as a criterion or !'lOrality. it rollcr.-:-s tmt the rore-
goine objections to pcrfcctionicm aro not valid. 
H. rio indicntes that his pleasure-pain eritorion i:J br.nod on 
the asemption ror which he rejects ped'octionisr.~ 1 na~oly. 
that our kn<ml~n of' the suprre!e eooi is sui'f'ioicnt for 
practical guidance. 
i'1o shnll nttfrlpt to shO\'f tr.tlt ''eTor;e:nrt 1--~s based H:::: hcdcr.ic 
criterion on tho vo~J nssunption ror which ho has rejooted pcr£cotionizn1 
- on tho assertion that our knO'WledGo or tho BU!'rC"'lo Good is sufficient 
for practical guidance. 
Ias plcnsuro-~ain criterion is ~ercly ~racticnl." Its tusinocs 
is to guide our actions definitely t~rd th'l ;ood.l57 But h this not n.n 
anbittous undertnkins for any criterion, if tho su,r~c cood be so distant 
and tnpossible or nnproxir.ation ns l'cTSbenrt•s r-ost skeptical uttorance3 
assert? liO'l'T can V!O be suro t~.at 11hnPnincss is also an ol~cnt cf pori'oc-
tion;"l58 thnt tho supr~o r,oGd containn nlc~sure as un cl~ont; 159 and 
tlnt "h!lnninoss is not by itself tr..e suprEro ~ood1 ~>ut. any h~nnino::::n, co 
158 fer as it cocs, ta cood, end nny nboonco or ~~ptnosa ta bnd?" This 
irnplios that our experience turntahos a clue to tho nature or tho ouprtr.o 
~ood; that ~e can know when we ere realizinG at lcnst one or its olo~ento; 
end thnt this knmrNoonstituont or tho supro:"'!o e;ood !n nlroouro or 11!\ptJi• 
160 
ness. 
Probably T'eTag;~art would rC!'lY to t'hoso crr.rgos by nd:.litti~ t::cn. 
There are evidences tmt his acceptance or tho ploasure-po.in criterion is not 
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based on its practical utility alone. but on tr.o hiGhlY spoculo.ttvo theory 
that in the experience or pleasure "'0 have our eloa.rest innisht into the 
nature or that state or harnonious lovo round in tho tiroloss existence or 
Absolute Renlity. In the roll0\·1ing passnce such n thou.;ht is dof'initoly 
expressed. 
"And if cur consciousness should over free itself or tho forn or 
cuccession, thora is no reason -why pleasure should not bo ro:llisad., 
like all tho other oloc1onts of oonsciousnosa, in nn oternc.l for:=. 
Indeed pleasure seorns bettor adApted for tho transition t:mn tho 
other olcnonts of oonsciousnoso." 161 
And n;;nin: 
"the idouls of uhioh i':o postulate tho fulfilli!lont arc not abso-
lutely the s::une ideals nhloh would be fD'.md in o. state of per-
fection. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • In GO far., t"leref."oro, ns our ci'forts aro dwotod to tho 
incrc~sc or ::o.ppinoos, t;hey ";/ill tor.d to produce a ~r(Xltor a.nount 
of lnmony botwoon individuals and tooir environooi'lt, and so Trill 
be dirootod to tho incraaso of one r.oncr~ or the supr~o good.nl62 
It sco::a th~r. th.n+, ~e oio mve dei'inito kno~ladt;o or the supre:::e 
good o.nd tmt this knOT;lodc;o is or very practic:ll value. :·,e c~·.n be uortain 
that in incrc!lsin.:; tho experience or h~: piness >:a arc holpiilb to rca.li:o 
at loo.s·!i "ono :-::ccont or the suprme goo1." 
These po.ssn~es proopt us to o.~;: w!".other it ia tho 07.? orionca or 
ploosure th.'1.t •·cTnc;c;art considera "fun.ia.:.cntal," "abnolutoly deoirablo" 
in itscli'., und "of value ].S! .!!!•" And doos ho think that ninco tho ront 
or aur idc..1.le "are not o.bsolutoly tho S!l.'1e idoo.lan to be rou.'1d in Abso-
lute E.eality, tho oxpurioncos or t}l(HlO O.t'C "ncrcly su'.Joidiary,., havint; 
;4t "neo.nil'IG only in so fnr o.n they load up to and are absorbed in ocncthi~ 
hiGher?" At looot this nuch aocos corto.in, - th::d. hio ro~son for rojcct-
1ng pcrfcctionim~ o.nd accoptint; tho hedonic criterion is not that tho lat-
tcr is practical o.nd tho forr.or his;hly npocula.tivo, but t~1n.t t:1e forncr io 
bused upon our clcurost insic:-rt-. into tho n:::.turo oi' tho suprEJ:'lo cood und that 
-·~=- ~$·1' 
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by 1 t ";70 ore enabled to see "what conduct enbodies tho suprene ~ood leo.at 
inporf'octly." 
iii. This raises the question as to nhether plon.sure !a a trust-
·worthy clue to_ tho nature of the good. 
But is !•'-cTo.ggart' s ovn.luation to be nccapted'l In our experience 
of' ploosure do we have our clrorest instght into tho nnture or tho supr01:1e 
good? 
i) Our answer will depond upon our conception of the e;ood. 
We have seen t)Xl.t !'c'l'ag;gart las f'ailod to define the r,ood and to 
distinguieh between our idools, desires and plen.suros.l63 His language often 
lends itself' to the interpretation that satisfaction itself' is a good. 
"But instead of' assorting that tho satisfaction or sel!!e desires is 
better than that or others, because tho f'oroor are dirooted to nora 
perfect ideals, he soe::1s to ~gest that it is better because they 
are more fundamental. Nor does he anywhor o try to provo • • • • 
tmt all desires for what is good arc in fact funda.""tcntal • • • • 
and thnt all fun~ental desires are in fact desires for what is 
good." 164 
Althoue;h r~cTae;gart tolls us thnt pleasure or h.appinoss is a good, ho nowhere 
attempts to justify this assertion. l!oro tinn this, he !:akes adr.lissions th!lt 
are i'ntnl to this position. For oxnnple: 
"It is possible that thoro nay be qualitative dtrrorcnoes or pleasure 
which night nako a comparatively unploosant state nora truly desirable 
than one in which tho pleasure was f'ar greater. "165 
To us this seaos true. But 11' so does it not invnli~~te s h6don1o criterion! 
?~Taggnrt's phrase "conparatively unplensnnt" does not necessarily indicate 
n totnl absonco or plensure. tJevertholeso it implies t'b.at pleasure in and for 
itsolf' nlono i.n not nlTmys to bo chosen. If' thi.s distinction be true pleasure 
is not nlwnys n ~cod. On the contrary it r.ay be positively vicious. As such 
, 
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it is not a correct criterion; nor is it our best clue to tho nnturo or the 
suprer.1e good. 
i.i) Our answer will also depend. upon our· conception or the euprone 
good. 
(o.) .. cTo.ggart' s conception of love as tho state in Absolute Reality. 
llo re!:!!e1bor that ,.cTa.ggart thinks pleasure better fitted "tor the 
transition" into "an oternal rorm •••• than the other el~ents or conscious-
ness. nlSS f!ore than that, he holds that while "the suprcr1e good is not pleas-
ure as ouch" it is "this particular pleasant state. "167 Such a sto.te will bo 
a state or hnmony for the ideals of each sell' will be fulfilled by a.ll othor 
selves.l61 This harmony is incoopatible with strivin& or discontent or the 
nocossity of c~oice.168 In its enjoyment tho self will be c~plotoly acqui-
oscent.l69 This hamony is the ulti.wato o.it!! and unity or kncmledgo and voli-
tion. tihon portoctod those will be transcended in a higher unity that rotnins 
all t~t r.ns valuable in both.l70 Tho "concreto and ~aterial content of 
such a. life as this • • •• is one thing only - love." This does 'hot moan 
benevolence, even in its nost ~po.osioned fo~;" nor "the love or Truth, 
or Virtue, or Bonuty, or anythillb else whose MT!!O can be found in a die• 
tionnry." nor does it "moan sexunl do3ir~s" btrt. "passionate, e.ll-e.bsorbing, 
e.ll-cons'UI!!illb love.11171 
(b) Ia thia state or ulti!!la.te love a nora.l experience'l 
Is this state of love a noral condition'l t'cTaggart night reply 
tmt the adjective cannot be applied to a state that has trnnocendod our 
impertoct categories of thought. It this is so it TTould see::t that we have 
no right to talk about a condition so rm:loved fran our experience. Our con-
l 
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viction 1a t.mt !'cTa.g;Gart has e.rri:~ed at a predOI!linantly lor;ical conception 
which ho vntnly ntter.tpts to interpret in terns of concrete pereonal o:xneri-
once. In doinc so he finds that terns describing the relatively passive 
states or consciousness nost readily lend t~selves to his purpose. The 
.prominence or the toms "love," "pleasure," "harnony," "acquiescent," etc., 
supports this interpretation of his native, as does the fact that he rer;ards 
the experience or pleasure as best fitted for the transition into the all 
e!'lbracin~ unity. In his conception of the suprene good pleasure is tho !'lost 
prominent chtlrs.oteriatic. "In that harnony alone we live," he says. 172 
Again he ir.t!'lies that 'trhile we can be certain that ultinately thoro 'trill 
be a union of portection and pleasure, hore and now we nay occaoionally be 
able to secure this hamony only by lowering our idoa.ls to acc~odnte our 
enviromont.173 
Our oonolusion is that t!oTtl.bb""'l-rt' o conception or the s\l!)reme ~ood 
is prinarily lo:;icnl rather tmn r.:oral. The harrn.ony of r.hioh he speaks seeos 
to be or n lo3icnl nature, difficult to interpret in ethical terns. In so 
far as it can be so interpreted, it is boat described by terms expressing 
relatively pnssive etatos or consciousness. !f this supre!'le good possesses 
moral character it cannot be ndoquately interpreted in toms or pleasure. 
If it is neroly "this particular pleasant stnte,"167 it is consistent with 
his hedonic criterion but void or any character that entitles it to the nar.1e 
"suprEne good." 
iii) Our answer will depend on Trhether pleasure, though not nn 
inrnllible test or tho r;ood, is yet our only availnblo test. 
!'oTacga.rt hinself has ncbitted that plensure ia not nn infallible 
test or tho good; that in nnd ror itself it is not always to be chooen.l65 
But it does not follow that ho rojeots tho hCdo.~16 criterion. He does not 
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dony thnt this is difi'icult to apply.rl4 Ho adnite that thoro nro cases 
to which it. does not apply, when, i'or instance, tho choice of' ploosure would 
nee.n a ancrii'1ce of' !dealt'!.. In such a caso ho holds tmt there is no rule 
~~· to i'ollow and no roo.oonable solut.ion.175 
l!cTnggart declares that this "occasional i'ailure of' the only avail-
able critorion"176 is duo to our inability to c0::1pe.re heterogeneous goode 
"with any hope of' discovoring which [ioJ tho I:!oro desirable. "177 iihon tre 
desire for pleasure clashes 1'1ith the interest of our ideals uo are f'aced with 
an insoluble ethical probl~. For we can never be auro "hovr ~uoh happiness 
will be nore worth h.a.vi~ than a given dogrol3 of' devolopnont." l78 
''cTnggart has nodif'iod his position at this point. In a note to 
tho second edition of' Studies .!!l ilegolian Co~ol$Y he doclares that ho now 
attributeD "more validity and importance to irnnediato j~enta of' hotero-
goneoua r;oods. "179 If he !"1oans to say thnt we ~ toll hem ~uch l'.aprinosa 
would be r.orth a certain degree of develop~ent, he saves his hedonic cri-
torion f'ro::1 1r1barras~ent. But does ho not also withdraw his objection to 
porf'ectionism by confessing that we can distinguish dogrocs of developcont 
toward our idenlt 
{a) He ad::lits that tro are ablo to measure other elonents of' the 
good. 
Our purpose is to ol".DT7 thnt !~ctaggart' s oricinnl argtr-cnt did not 
SUPPOrt his conclusion. In his discusoion of' !~cTa.ggrn·t' o et.hico, G. E. l'oore 
ms eallcd attention to the r.anner in which "cTar.znrt concludes hia discus• 
oion of' tho "tailure of tho only available critcrion."lSO 
"Ncr.: TTO saw o.bovo thc.t it '\"!'as 1r:tnossiblo to caa!)c.re suoh ela:!onts with 
aeyl1op~ diaoovorint; ~nioh na~ tho ~oro :losirablo." (Italics ours.)l81 
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The l'1ords "nor. r.c sau above" are entirely r.!isleadinc. T'c'l'agc;c.rt h!l.s not oven 
ntt~~tcd to :l<r.:!onstrate hla conclusion. Ho probably refers to his long ar-
gw.ent to provo that the idoo or rorfoction cannot be or practical valuo.182 
But the forco of tho ~plea by which he ''iould illustrate his argw.ent rests 
upon tho assumption that Tie can and do cor.1pure other elooenta or the ~ood 
tmn pleasure, although the practical matter of deciding is of'ten complex 
e.nd difficult. 
He r~arka tlw.t "innutlera.ble cases could bo found" to provo the 
forco or his contention and continuos: 
~blio achoola knock a. great donl or ?retence out of boys, and knock 
e. certain n."nount or Philistinisn into th<r.l• In heaven we shall bo 
neither s~s or Philistines. But nrc TTO nenrer to heaven, if nt this 
noncnt \7e buy :;onuinoness with Philistinisn, or buy culture with 
n Sc~rr::eroU Tho r.mn uho e.nB't'l'ors that question would need to bo deep 
in tho secrets or the universe. n 183 
All t.hnt this argu:tont proves is thnt the situation is c~le7. c.nd 
difficult or solution on tho basis oi' nny criterion. Ii' we 'Tiere to decide 
the matt·"'r on the basis oi' the hedonio criterion it would be just ns hard to 
n decide nhcthor genuineness plus Fhilistinisn or culture plus SohwarMeroi 
should be chosen. To know which c~bination r.ould result in the greater hap-
piness ror the greater number a ~nn "would need to be deep in tho secrets oi' 
the universe." Regardless or tho criterion to be used, the force of the e:z:-
amt'le rests upon the i'e.ct that r.e ~ .nnd ~ oanpa.re such heterogeneous goods 
as Phllistinirnn and culturo, genuineness and Scl~erei. 
(b) I~ adoits that tho hodonic criterion is difficult cr application. 
''c'l'o.r;curt to ra.minin.:; objection to pcri'ectionim is thnt it i!l dii'-
i'icult to C.tlply. H.e has adnittod tmt the s~e objection is vali:l in rei'or-
enco to tho hedonic critorion.1 74 It follO\'Is that an this ground. he cannot 
disprove tho i'orner without rejecting the le.ttor. 
l 
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CHAPrER FOUR. 
D. Tho metaphysical nature of the self • 
Vic have discussed !~cT~a.rt's views or the self as studied by the 
sciences of' psychology and ethics. and as related to peysica.l Mture. These 
studies ho.vo furnished the data vihich HcTnggo.rt nuat interpret in his ~!leta.-
physical conclusions. Thoy hnvo also ~de necessary a nore or lc&s preli-
~tnnry discussion of his general philoso~hicnl position. Tie are now ready 
for our fin.'ll !Jtudy of his general theories and nethod. We shall proceed 
by di~oussing two ~nin subjects: "The netnphysical nature of the self," 
and "Is tho hs.rnony of tho mivorse duo to a supre"le person, or God?" 
1. Tho priority or loc;ic over ethics in '~cT~ga.rt' s system. 
In considering r:oTneenrt' s psJ'cholo;;ico.l o.nd et.hioal viows of 
tho aelt we ho.vo noticed the in!'luence or his general r.:athod. 'l'hat his 
r.:othod and interest are locicnl rather thnn ethical, relatively abstract 
rather t~ e::!pirical, structural rather than functional• mll be our con-
tontion in the followlnt chapters. 
a.. Evident in hlo interpretation or T.'!etaphysios as the discovery 
of' a priori prir,c i'(Jlf;S • 
T'cTtl.GG!lrt describeo hirlsolf' o.s a. "thinker \'lho accepts Ho;:;ol' s 
lo~ic • nle4: Accorditlb to hir.: "Ho;;al' s prino.ry object in his dialectic is 
to establish 1tho existence cr n lo~ioel connection between tho vurioua 
catocorics" of o7.pcricnce.185 no coos on to say tl~t thio connection is 
or auoh a kind that any cat~ory nay be foun1 to lead on to and invo~vo 
another on tho pain or contradiction. In the s~e 1my the second cator;ory 
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will lead to a third "and the process continuoo until at le.st TTO reach the 
goal or tho dialectic in a category which betrays no instability."l85 
It would S('en that this niGht bo t~1e nethod or any philosophical 
enquiry. The ain is to find the "locicnl connection bet-rrcen tho vurious 
cntegorios" of experience. But HcTe.gge.rt doocribes tho n.'l.ture or this 
loe;ical connection ns one or "inherent nccosnl ty" rather than or l!lere nrob-
ability. otherTTiso it cOJ.ld not nbo sa£oly applied beyond the sphere in 
which it hnd been vcrif'ied by experience. "165 The dialectical "process i~ 
one or pure thought. only." Tho Absolute Idm "can be deduced f'rO!:l any piece 
of a:xperienco whntavor. "167 It has. boon re~ched throu:z;h "a pr!ort conclu-
sions derived frc:1 tho investi(;;a.tion o£ tho n~turo or pure thought.." lee 
These conclusions t;>.ro independent of ezperienco in the oom:o that the lnws 
of" f'ornnl logic c.ro independent. 'rhO"J o.re "the only conditions under which 
wo can CX!'Oricnco anythiilG at o.ll." 187 
1) Nocessa.ry for philooophy ~o rcco~nizo and invcsticnte theee 
principles. 
r:mt kind or cortninty docs l~cTagge.rt attribute to hie conclusions? 
In the process or a.rrivitl{; o.t tho Absolute Idoa the dialoctic has d0!:1onst.rated 
thtlt tho phyd.co.l 'rlorld can only be concoivoo in tems of spirit nnd tmt real-
ity nu~t consist in a dirforcntiat~~ ~~ity.189 If it ~3 not decided tho 
question as to tho rotistence of God, it l~s e.t loost nade it vory dtff'icult 
to boliove lUJ'!t oxiotent.190 Now such conclusions me.y or nay not be va..lid. 
They may or nay not be the best possible hypothoocs for the interprato.tion 
of oxnericnco. .:Jut it is cvilont thnt thoy cannot poaseae the certainty 
attaching to tho propositions of ror.:1o.l lop;io. If ''cTasgo.rt 1s thinkl.Db oi' 
the latter ld.nd of certo.S.nty uhen he speaks of the deductive and n priori 
---~----·-··-.::'--,_, .. _1 
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cha~cter of his conclusions he io in error. 
?hilosophy nust recognize and investigate a priori principles. To 
point out that tho nind inevitably thinks in te~s of CO.USO and effect, U.''lity. 
plurality. space, tino. purpose. ~to •• is an essential part or ito tank. But 
philosopcy errs to suppose trot all or its generalities r:ay posses!:! tho cor-
tainty of those necessities or all ti".otl{;ht. As soon as "We quit the rC!lln or 
pure tho~ht for tho concrete fullness of experience,. VTe nust procood by r:oons 
or the most rcnsono.ble hypothesis. Hc':L'l{;3nrt does not ~eke the nistnke or bo-
liCVit"..g that all his cor..clusions ponscss a priori cortainty. In Studios in 
-
P=$Olinn Coccolor-:y he is concerned 'iTith "the a.pplic~tion. to oubjcct ~nttor 
c.npiricnlly kncr.:n. or~ priori conclusiono derived i'ron the in'7csti.Go.tion or 
the nr.ture or pure th01.1Cht."191 He is discussing the questions or i.~orality, 
the personality of the Absolute. the supror.1e good and Moral criterion, pun• 
islncnt. etc. In doine so he prof'es~cs only to ded11ce his conclusions "rrom 
prQ';'ositions rel::'.tinc to pilre thou:;ht.'' Tho question l'lhich ne are not able 
to anS':'I'cr concerns tho kind of' necessity which he elaine for the btter prop-
osit.ions. 
2) Such principloa rmst altmys be tested by the concrete f'nots or 
cxporienoo. 
a) !~cTn.ggart insists that. the dialectic is not divorced from ex-
perience. 
''cTtlOG~rt insists that the dialoctic io not divorcod i'r0!:1 e7.por1-
enco. He ~haoizoa t!m i'o.ct tmt thout;ht r.ust bct;in TTith exporionco. Its 
f9jCistcnco ir.:plioa tho.t so~othing ia nlro~dy c;ivcm.l92 i"!itoout tl~ dnta or 
cr.porionoo tho dblcctic could not exint.193 In !'not tho dialectic process 
is but an interpreto.ticn of' any piece or expcrionce whatsoover.194 It springs 
l 
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£'r0"1: the nind' .t: dc::-.and for a vrholo•idoa, an interpretation of experience in 
all ito fullnoss.194 As soon o.a the understandtn.:; sots up a concept tho 
nholo-idea b~ino to t70rk upon it• drivinG l.t on to its antithesis. then to 
a higher synthocta. und so on until the process is co~lote and an intcrpro-
tc.tion or OX?erioncc as a "Zlhole is rcs.ched.. T~e dialectic proceos io but a 
correction or tho understanding's e.bstr~ctioiW fr!X! tho ccmplctoncos o£' o.ny 
one expcrionco. 
"tho ~otivo to t.he ~1holo adva.nee is tho presence in experience~ and 
in our r.:dnds as they bcco."le conscious or ther.salvea in CY.Pericnoe., 
of tho concrete roolity • or which all cn.tcg;ories are only desorip-
t~ons.11n~~5or nhich tho louor cntcr,orios are inperfoct dcscrip-
t:~.om;. 
The rrosress or tho dio.loctio is £'ro.:1 tho abstract to tho concrete. Thus 
thoro occurs "tho deduction of the vrorld or !!o.ture rron the Lor:;ic, and o£' the 
~rorld of Spirit frco the world or ?lo.ture. "196 Spirit ia the eoal o£' tho pro-
cess junt ns it has been tho i~plicit ~otivo. 
nl97 the 5'Jtrt.er.. 
II It iA the locical prius o£' 
It ia evident t!r.t !'cTnc;gnrt rcgo.rdn t:-to dinleotio proco3a ns a."l 
interpretation of o,.;ptlr5.onco ra":.ho r t~"l an nbst.rnction .f'rom it. Our cri-' 
or ouch or its content. To hin it,!! but a lo"j~cal prius. It does not t•op• 
reoent the rullneoo or !)ersonal H .. i'c. It consintent.ly leaves out or a.ccount. 
both the ethical a priori and ethical intuition, both fore and content or 
othioal expcr!once. 
b) r·c'.i.'o.:;r;urt icnorc3 the et':<icul a r-riori in his conception of 
Spirit. 
In our di:lcussion or '·cTa('%nrt' a ethicnl theory '\':o criticized his 
superficial treat~ont or noral oblicntion.198 5o falls to take account of 
~~------------~--~--~-~~-~~~-~-~-~-~~---~~-~~~---~~~~~-=----=~-=-~-=-~~-~=-·~-~~~~~~=~~--~-'-2'--l 
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th~ ethical a priori. This io e.s stgnii'icf\nt for n systEM of' philosophy as 
are tho a r>riori principles of ooionoe. Later we shall see hem fatal to his 
system. is this neglect of the "our,ht ."199 Here we shall but point out tmt 
''cTagr;art considers ethics r.~ore of' an nprycndar;e to • than a vital part of • 
phUogophy. In ccMluding Studies~~ Hg;ol~ Dialectic he discusses 
the practical sir;nificnnoo or philooophy. ::e points out tbs.t philosopby ia 
able to demonstrate "th~ .:;cnoral convici:.ion oi' the rationality and righteous-
ness or the universe6 " and adds that it is not necessary to ~t-,ply the dio.loo-
tio proocsa to tho opeoifi4 "facts around us." iHth these tl'xl finite ooi-
encos oust deale 
"And we shall fir.d i:1 COt:t:lOn sense. and in the GOnora.l princil)loa of 
ethics, the ~oosibility or ~ursuine a coherent and rea.oonablo course 
of notion. even if -... o do not l.:now tho !1roclso pooition e.t v:hich TiC 
are in the dinloctio process t<m:lrds tho perfection uhioh io tho r;oa.l 
of our efforts." 200 
Tmt is. even t.hou~h our philosophy c:ny be or little practical use we can 
be g;uidod by ccr:":":on senso and tho eoneral principles or ethics. This is 
to r.~kc et.~ioe but a practical an~cndix to plulosophy; to ignore tho "ought" 
until tho "is" has yS olc!ed a. cone op-tion or ultinate reality t.hnt is essen-
tinlly statio a.'1.d lo:;ical; t~1en to force the fact of "ou:;htncas" to fit a 
philosoohico.l conclusion doomed to bo abstract. bocnuso or !l preliminary am 
consistent n~lect or one-halt tho data.. To use T.'o'l'nggart' s terninoloc;y. 
not only does he begin Tlith an abstraction or tho undorstandine; but the 
wholo-idoo. ir-plicit in• and notivo.ti.ng the ontiro process. is but a purt-
• ideo.. 'Xhus when at t:-to ond of tho procosa it recovers ita concreto whole-· 
ness. it has recovered but o.n abstraction. Consequently it proves tmt the 
universe is rational Tti thott.. dor.onntro.tir..£ that it is ri.;htoou3. !·cTc.ggnrt 
nO"tor estnblishoa his richt to o.nply ~ho 7'rcdicnto "richtoous" to tho uni-
verse.201 
.! 
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c) In spo~king or tho ~p!r!cal data which tho d!aloct!c nust 
interpret ''oTa~:;!lrt usu'11ly i.:;noras ethicnl intuition. Tie 
thinks only or tho dnta or son~tion • 
?'oTa~r;m-t rarely roco::;nhcs tr~t tho d.o:~a unon ·which nurc thour;ht. 
rr.wt ~ork consist or r.1ora.l as Troll !l.S sensuous intuition. He is at na.ins 
to prove that his '9rocosses or pure thoUGht. are not sterile boenuso indo-
pendent or any purticulnr oxporionco.202 Pure thour;ht. he says, tal::on by 
itself is ns t::uch oi' e.n abstraction o.s tho datu or L"ltuitione Pure t_hout;ht 
al\'!'D.ys inplics a given olcoont. It is found only in cctlbination uith en• 
pir!ce.l data. i:!oy;ever. tho d~ta ~f -:thioh T'cTaggart St3oaks are tho dato. c£ 
sensation. He a~ost invariably ignor~o ethical intuit!c~ nnd in doing so 
he is guilty ci' an abstraction. This is evident in the foll<ming passage. 
"For ll' tho idoo. is. nhcn :::ot •rith i."l re'llity. alv:nys perfect and 
concrete. it is r..o leas true t.r.nt it is, ":.'hen net '\'lith in raolity. 
invnrie.bly. e.nd or necessity. foun:i in connoction uith sensuous 
intuition. without r.hich ovan tho rolntively concrete idoa. w~.ich 
ond.s tha Lo~ic io nn illo(;itir:o.tc o.bstrnction." 203 
Our contention is that the "rele.tivoly co:1.croto tdoa v:htoh 0:1ds the Lor:;ic 
~ e.n illocitinuto abstraction" (italics ours) bocnusc it has not att~pted. 
to 1ntornrot tho et::ico.l data. vrith which it is nllmys found "when r.:ot t:ith 
in reality." 
b. l'cTagca.rt' s interest in tho self ia logicnl rathar tmn ethical. 
1) LoGical und structural versus functional nnnroo.ch. 
?'cTag{;a.rt vorcu:. Sorlc-J• 
If tho i'orcr;oing crtticisn be vo.Hd. "We r.ny expoct ''cTnggnrt to 
v.anifcst a lot;icnl• rnthor th.a.n em ethical intorcst in the ocli' • tor tho 
latter is ossontinlly a. i'unotional interest. Tho conviction tr~t the nature 
or tho soli' is our Lost l:oy to tho -onnil\',; of tho univor::;o r.:ie;ht be roochod 
·-
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through c ctudy of v~lue er.poricr.ce. it~ ~orson~l and objective rcforcnco. 
This •:ould be tho distinctly ethical ap~roach to philosophy. Thic is the 
nethod end c.prro~tch or Vi. R. Gorley in his ~·oral V~lues nnd tho ldctl. of.' Cod. 
- -- ....__.---
'·cTaGgo.rt' s cpproo.ch in entirely difforc::t. T:1cro ia no rcnoon ".":hy it s!-.ould 
be othemiso. :Philosophy res a. ri[;llt. to choose her cr.m sto.rti~ point. She 
r..D.y bc;in .. dth any particular expor).cnco. as?ect or axnorienco or problm. 
The only roquiro.nont is thc.t she tul::e ovarythil1{; into o.ocount and correct her 
proli~i~ry nbstrnotion. It soccs to us that Sorloy has dono this. ~o be• 
gins r.ith the "out;ht" in its rolntion to tho "is;" studios the significance 
of nornl c~porionco; relc.tos his ethical data to tha findines of scienc9 and 
offers a synoptic viaw or htr.nn cxperior.ce. •·oTU&bc.rt. on the other hnnd. 
begin3 ·.-1ith c. lo;;icc.l "io;" ignorea tho ''otl6ll't;" nnd arrives at a final 
tL';.aory to accor.odato l'Il1ich he doos violonco to tho !'acts or ethical exnorionco. 
zaa oorcl theory is but n deduction fron. rather than a contribution to. 
his notnpl~roicnl conclusion. It is not str~n;o thut hio netnphysico rcl'uses 
to nourish tho child trot oho ho.s not borr.c.. 'iio ropoat tlnt hts interest 
in tho self is ~ninly loGical. 
2) For h!.tl the soli" is not coscntially c center or vp,J, uo uc!lievo-
nent. It is o. nooossary diffore:1tia.tion of the Absolute. !io 
finds the self in 11.-lr!:ony "tith its universe of other solves •. 
•rhich necessarily o.mross tho Absolute. 
This is ET:Uont in hi:J conception cf the self a.a a fu.."lda.-e:lta.l 
differentiation of tho Absolute. He arrives at this v!~ through a study 
of tho Hecclio.n trin.d Lifo. Cor,nition end Absolute Idoa.204 Tho ca.tezory 
of Life tolls us t!'.::tt \10 r.1ust thi.nl: in te~s or both unity and. nlurr.lity. 
"rro.Hty io ~ unity d.iffc~entic.tod into c plurality (or a nlurc.lity 
oonbinod into a. unity) in such ~ v:ay th.:?.t tho \ri1Cil<:o r:o!::.n:\.~ and sig;-
nU'icnnco or tho unity lios in its boir'-ti dU'forontiatcd into that 
particular plurality. and that the VJholo ~enning nnd significance or 
t 
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~ho parts of the plurality lios in thoir being coobinod into that 
particular unity." 206 
Du~ how cnn uuch a unity oxistt If tho individuals are real and 
tho unity exists only in them, tho unity would soco to be false nnd the in-
dividuals to form but an aggregate. On the other hand U" the unity is ronl 
and if it expresses the whole moaning and significance or the individuals, 
it TlOuld soon to swallow up the individuals. This dilemma forces us to the 
category of cognition. In the act or knOV7lede;o the individual reproduces 
tho systan of v>hich he is a part. Here is nn individual expressing his in-
dividuality in the way that he grasps tho unity te v:hich he belonr;s.68 Tho 
conclusion follows: 
"Tho Absolute must be dU"ferentiatod into persons, because no other 
dU"i'erontiations have vitality to stand against a porfoct unitOA and 
because a unity which was undtri'erontiatcd could not exist." 2 
"cTnggart maintains that both unity and individuals are real. 
Tho unity is real because it is round "in that spoota.l and unique nature 
which distinguishes one individual rroo another," "and not merely in the 
ocmii:~on nnturo which tho individunls share •••• " The individuals nro 
renl ror the uniqueness or enoh "is contained in its hnmony T1i th the 
othors." T'cTaggart believes t.mt there is only one state or conscious-
ness fitted to express suoh a condition. Only in love is the selt truly 
individual and yet identified with tho not-selr.207 In Absolute Reality 
love is "th.o relntion which binds individuals together." Doing cooplete, 
"nll relations, nll roulity, 1'1ill have been transfomed into it." 208 
a) The truth in this conception. 
This is t t'e Absolute Reality nnd Sunre:'lo Good as conueived by 
!!cTa::garl. Is it his answer to the question raised in his definition ot 
i 
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roUgion? 209 As such it norlts both positive and negative criticism. 'l'le 
sr.nll now state what we conceive to be the truth and value or the concep-
tion. 
i. As to the philosophical !"'ethod. 
At least in motive, J~cTe.ggart' s logic is organic. He has rocog-
nized the place or both analysis and synopsis, Understanding and Reason, 
in philosopny. His conception is that or systoo rather than or olooents. 
11. Tho aim is to account ror both individuality and unity. 
!!cTacgart has aimed to account ror both tho individuality and 
the unity or 07-perience. The fact that he does not establish the ronlity 
or tho latter need not detract fran his insight into the necessity or doing 
so. '~any other advocates or tho Absolute would hn.ve r:-.ado tho unity real 
at the expense or the individuals. t!cTae;gart refuses to do this. He can 
attribute no !"'caning at all to "the inclusion or one self' in another."63 
His refuaal to concoive the Absolute as personal r-:ny also be duo to his 
willi~ness to look the racts or ovil in the race.210 This readiness to 
take seriously tho ract or evil and the uniqueness ot tho self is to be 
ccr:mondcd. In ViO'Ir or tho general trend or his syst0::11 this chocking or 
logical MOtive by ~pirioal fact is of special interest. 
iii. The self is the key to ultimate reality. 
t'oTaggart oophnaizos the importance or tho s elr as a key to tho 
mturo or ulti.rnate roallty. ills theory that Absolute Reality is m:press-
iblo only in toms or individuals united in an all-absorbing love aug~ests 
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an ~ortant truth. Value is to be found in h~an experience and there alone. 
The self is the center and h~e of value. If' value endures, the self nust. 
be rnore thnn a trnnsient episode in the flux or physical events. Respect 
for the life of value it:lplios respect for personality. fie r.~ay well conclude 
thnt if i~ortality be a fact we shall one day clearly see thnt devotion to 
the good is locicnlly identical with porsonnl love, that is• with tho ~orship 
of peri' octad Solfhood, the hor.te of o.ll value. 211 
iv. A bo.ois for religion. 
!'oTD.bgart' s oonooption furnishes e. basis for roli~ion o.s htl con-
oeives tt. For him it assures the self or an ulti.t:lato hamony wtth ita 
universe. He regards his conclusions as r.~ystical and asserts that all 
true l'hilosophy !!lust bo !!lystical. not in ~othod, but in its conclusions. 
Even tho\lbh he denies the existence or God he feels that no !'letaphysical 
conclusion can rob us of tho right and power to feel reverenco.212 
b) The error in this conception. 
i. The hnmony seoos to be static o.nd locical instead or funo-
tionul and noral. Consequently it falsifies experience. 
fie beliovo that this conception is prtnnrily 10{;ioal.213 It has 
boon roaohod by reason or a de!':':and for an explanation of the facts or in-
dividuality and universality. It is the solution for a lccical probl~.214 
~~ !~oTasgart has ~ado a deterninod effort to find a synthesis for this thesis 
\ 
and antithesis. Furt.ho~ore, his solution is in tc~s of conscious export-
once. Dut ho r.takos use of that experience r.hose relative passivity is boat 
215 adapt~d to oxpross o. state of loGical balance. lm then proceeds to provo, 
by -oans of tho dio.loctio• that all other hurnn activities, such as r.~oral 
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aohiovEnent and knowledge, are but "distorted ahadows" or this absolute 
(and logical) perfoct1on.170 He seO!!ls to regard tho noral lite as but a 
passing phase or human activity. He believes that "perfect volition woulli 
~ean perfect acq~iosoenco in overyt.hiDb•" that is, perfect happiness.216 
The happiness or the Absolute is not to be disturbed by any activity. 
"!Tor can virtue have a place in our ideal, oven in the form or 
aspiration. Together with every other L~porfoction, it must be loft 
outside tho door or heaven. For virtue i~plics choice and choice 
implies either uncettninty or conflict. In tho realised ideal noithor 
or these could exist." 217 
ii. Bel~ static and loGiCal it cannot account for tho facts or 
evil. 
In our discussion or ~oTaggart's ethical view or the solr we 
saw that he rogards the Absolute Reality or Supreoe Good as the only 
' 
. 219 
reality ~ specie neternitatis. It follows that in sane way the uni-
verse must be already perfect. Evi.l is unrcs.l, it the result or the lo;ic 
is valid.220 It evil is unreal all selves cust bo necessarily ~cod. llere 
appears the necessity or Y~cTnggart' s ethical deteminisa. To save the dem-
onstrated fact or a logical mroony in the universe he r.1uat deny that evil 
is real. 
"To one who fully CO!!lprehends t~rncts11 Sin would nlt:nys npponr too 
rutile to be taken seriously.~ 2 
tntor we shall see that this conception is inconpo.tible with the raot or 
change also. 220 
iU. In spite or his assertions to tho contrary, his plurality 
is but an aegrogate. 
l'oTa~nrt insists that his Absolute is not a nero aczregnte or 
individuals.222 The unity is a roal unity. It is the expression or the 
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individuality of' eo.ch of' ita nO!:lbers. This is not to attribute to it a. / 
distinct personality, however. If' tho Ab~olute is "to be called a person 
because it is a spiritual unity, then ovmr; College, ovary goose-club, 
every cane of' thiovoa, ~ust also be called a person."223 ne should be 
'\'lilling to raviae this stata:Jent and say thnt. if' every gang of' thieves, 
goose-olub nnd coller;e is to be called a unity, thQ:\ and only then, ''c-
Taggart's Absolute ahould also be called a unity. Tho fact that he consis-
tently refers to it as an ·orge.nist:t or e.s a "super-organic unity :•224 does 
not invalidate tho cri ticim of' Y!iss ''. ii. Calkins: 
"So long as, in !'r. 1'cTa£%art' s terns, 'the unity has no r:oaning 
but in tho differentiations,' it cannot help being an agere~ato­
in other ~ords, an externally related c~bination or parts. 225 
iv. Tho unity ~teht be saved by grantinr; the personality of' 
the Absolute. But since the Absolute neans "all that thoro 
is," to ~rant its personality ~ould be to dony the reality 
of' its parts, i.o., of' finite individuals. 
To !!iss Calkins' criticism !'cTag;go.rt night reply th:lt her solu-
tion not only preoorvos tho unity but destroys the reality of' the indivi• 
dtl.'\ls. To us this scOI:ls a valid objection to tho conception of tho unity 
o.s that of' an Absolute. If ~e regard "o.ll that thoro is" as an indivi-
dua.l, i.e., as a r.holo "whoso unique nuturo is r.anif'osted in tho particulo.r 
realities ?:hich f'om its parts," wo go to tho opposite extrET10 of' reducing 
226 tho individuals to ~ere appearances. In this criticism we agroo with 
"cTnggart. Our suggestion is that we conceive the unity as an Individlllll, 
but. not as o.n all-inclusive Individual. .l.iathor, ns a SuprG!:Ie Person upon 
whom finite individuals are dependent, but ~th whom thoy are not idonticnl.227 
This view sh:lros tho plur:l.llS::l of' "cTo.ggart.' s view, but it would think of' 
tho unity as erounded in a Suprono Porson, the continual croator or the 
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comnon physicnl-logical~ornl order. and of the lL~ttcd selves. These God 
would have croatod as unique individuals dependent upon his creative ac-
tivity. yet forever distinct from him. This view will be elaborated in tho 
last chapter of this paper.228 It is i.r.tporte.nt to r<r.~a:1ber that this is not 
a problc:n of lo;;ic alone. As 'Will be argued in ohantor five. tho adva.ntnge 
or the view here outlined is that it may also do justice to tho functional 
aspect or eXperience, especially to noral experience. 
To sunt'tarize: iie hnve ~de four oritioims or !'cTo.cgnrt' s view 
of Absolute Roolity. 1. Tio havo said that it wo.s prtr.arily a lor;ical con-
caption and thus not able to do justice to r.oral experience. 2. Being 
static and logical it cannot explain tho existence of evil. It rc;;nrds 
the universe as etornally perfect and finite.selvos as dcternined by tho 
good. 3• In donyint; thnt the l\bsolut.e is n person '·cTac;gart reduces his 
plurality to an aggro:;n.to. 4. This is due to his interpretation of the ; · -
u l'\·\t-y. c.s "all tl".!lt exists." His pluraliS'"l r.ir;ht. be rotn.lned by conceiving 
the Ul'lity c.s o:d.stin;:; in a. Suprme Person U?On ~hor:t finite selves v.-ould be 
depcnlent yet frcr.J. whoo they 1rould bo forC!Ver distinct. 
c) Tho ~orta.lity ~R§ pro&xi.stonce of tho soul cannot be deduced 
by loctc alone. 
1. This particular plurality eternally necessary to tho unity. 
That ~·oTacga.rt' s interest in tho self is prinarily locical is 
, • evident in his theory of imr.lortali.ty. He holds that wo cnn believe tho 
self to be tcnortal only if wo can show that tt is an osso~tinl and por-
~ont oxpresaion of tho Absoluto. 
"cTa.b{';art h.o.o found that Abaolut.e Ronlity lo a diftoronti.ntcd 
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unity in -v:hich "the unity has no !'leaninc except in its expression in the 
plurality. the plurality has no mooninr; except its C0!!1bil'llltion in tho unity. "230 
This is a logical a.no.lysis or reo.Uty. It rovools what is tinelessly true. 
The dialectic procaos does not ~ake place in ttme.231 So to int~rprot it 
would involve us in the contradiction that what is but partially rc~l (the 
lower oat~orloo} exists. Absolute Heo.lity expresses whnt is neoesso.rUy 
and timelessly truo. Its internal relations do not change. The unity and 
its ditterentintions eternally imply each other. 
"hero we have a union between the two sides l'lhich is so close tr_,t 
we are forbidden to think anything in the one irrelevant to its 
relation to the other. The conclusion would seem to be that the 
elEr.!ent or i!':1!1edie.cy can emnge no r.1ore than the ela!ient or pure 
thought. and that therefo~e absolute reality as a whole nust be 
regarded ns unchangine• n 32 
"~cTa~gart hD.o found that only persons cnn bo regarded as tunda.-:-ental ditf'er-
11 
entiations or the Absolute. Finite selvos arc the el~ent or imnediacy" 
described above. It f'oll~s that oo.ch is a necessary differentiation or 
tho Absolute. As an expression or tho unity it is an eternal nocons!ty. 
Therefore it ~ust be tm~ortal. 
"Tho plurality has no ~0!\nint; except to be cor.1bined into the unity. 
But tho unity has no !"'eaning except to be dtrf'orentiatod into the 
plurnlity. And not into s01:1e plurality or other. but into that 
partioulnr plurality." 233 
ii. Im!norte.lity is thought to involve prehistenoe because tho 
appeal is to logical structure rather than to ~oral exper-
ience. 
i) If' self' essential to Absolute now• al\vnys essential? 
If' valid this nrg~ent proves both tho pre&xistence and ~ortal-
lty or the solt. !•cTaggart stnnda by thi.s conclusion. He beHoves that this 
ls the only vnlld proof or i~orto.lity; that tr a nan did not exist in the 
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past there in no reason to boli~tG t~~t he ~y not cease to exist in the 
future.233 
"Our only g~rantee of tho ~ortnlity of the self ~ould be a. 
d~onstration that the existence or t~at self' ~s essential to 
tho Absolute." 234 
U) '•cTn,:"gnrt beHoves that tho loss or r(5:'lory and. the fact of 
evil are not conclusive objections to his t~oory. 
Such a d~onstra.tion ''cTaggart believes his logic to have yielded. 
He recognizes that tho absence or ::-:EI!Iory or "revious existences 'rr!ny be urged 
as an objection to his conclusion. out he docs not consider nanory essential 
to identity or personality. It is conceivable, he says, that ny present 
character is the result or the total tendencies of ny nrovious existences, 
and thnt the present vnll boquonth its con1cnsod results in my character in 
future CT.istencos. 236 T·nny things tmt vro l--Ave forgotten have left nn tn-
pression on our lives. It is not necessary that tJO should rEnEnbor all our 
present cxperionccs to have t!".m doterninitlb factors in lives to como. fur-
thornore tho inoxplicnblo ai'f'inity or soul for soul can best be referred to 
relationships f'o~cd in previous existences and renewed without n~ory here.236 
HcTaggart is a'\"11l.ro t!:'tnt his t hoory icplies the eternal ncrf'ootion 
or tho Absolute and its dtrf'orontiations. This contradicts our or.perionco 
of' tino, CPA~O, lini~ntion ~nd evil. 
"Tho difficulty is no doubt acrious ono~h. 0ut it is •••• 
n difficulty 'VIhich applies equally to all idealistic theories, haw-
ever interpreted. It is nat~IlG loss than the old difficulty of the 
origin or ovil. And for this •••• idealism has no solution. "237 
He seos no decisive objection to a belief' in both the pre8xtstonoe and the 
ir.r.'tortality or tho sell'. 
Hi) ''cTaggart s~gests a t:1ora.l nrgtront that would be valid U' 
God existed. 
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In outlining !fcTaggnrt' s vien or ir:t.,orto.lity we have had no occa-
sion to rotor to a noral arg1r1ent. This is whnt we mght expect. "cTaggart 
would call his d~onstration philosophical• as opposed to an ethical argu-
nont.238 In attacking this probleo he has boon concerned to discover the 
necessary structure of thought. The eir;nifico.n~a of ethical experience does 
not interest hin. He bases hie conclusion on a lor;ical "is." or in other 
terms. ho studios a cross section of our thour;ht to sh~ that we r.lUst think 
or salvos as permanent expressions or the unity or all thought. 
Interesting is his ad~ission that if God existed and were known to 
be ~cod a different kind of nr~~ont night be available. In such a case it 
Might be able to dtr.'onstra.te in:"!ortality aoart froo prell"tistence. For a 
creator "to. annihilate existing persons night well bo a ~uch nore serious 
bl~ish on tho universe thnn to postpone tho creation or persons not yet 
existent." "And so." ho continuos. "if i~ortality could be based on this 
ground at all• '\70 nir;ht prove tmt a boine -r:ould never oMso to exist in 
tho future. nlthOUt~h he had fomerly not existed." 
As one who donios tho existence of God• P.cTaegart believes "that 
immortality cannot be based on tho ground.n239 However it is instructive 
to observe th:lt as soon as he introduces ethical considerations he finds it 
possible to consider the question or ~orto.lity apart from that of pro8x-
istenco. 
iv) This nrgtrnont dovolopod. Tho decisive question is not whobher 
I have had a previous existence but whothor I ncm discover r..y-
self to bo a citizen of a ~oral order with a task thnt is by 
n~ture endless. 
This suce;ests our next contention. If T.o are to consider not only 
tho facts or lo~ical structure but also tho fncts or ethical proceooes as 
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data for metaphysics, we r.ay arrive at a proof or 1~ortality that is not 
involved in the question or prn3xistonce. If I discover that I am. not a 
citizen or n r.oral order whoso values I rooognize as binding upon !':e• I 
may be led to believe in a Suprme Person as tho hooe and r;round or this 
order. As t:!cTe.ggart has suggested. such a Person,. being tm otornal Good-
ness, could 'Well be trusted with tho rate or the noral beings whom ha has 
created. Perhaps I shall find that by n~ture I am fitted and inclL~od to 
renl!ze values which r:o.y frngnentary tenporal existence GiVes r~e no two 
nor opportunity to achieve. The lifo or value r.ay prove to be by nature 
endless.240 If so, the porfcction or the universe and or each self will 
be in its perfectibility.240 And I ~ay be forced to conclude that.a ~oral 
univer~o will not offer the c~ding vision or values ~orth achieving 
only to arouse a vain hope and a noble but rutile anbition. This we con-
ceive to be tho distinctly noral argment. It or.J.phasizes the significance 
or ethical process. It furnishes a reason ror creation. It suggests that 
God calls finite selves into bein~ in order to co8perate with hi~ in an end-
less achiev~ent or value. It also furnishes a basis for religion. In the 
objective reference or our vnluo ju~onts it finds proof ot the existenoo or 
a moral order. It b~ins with the sense or obligation and the facts or value 
exnerionce and discovers, rnthor than assunos, a universe in noral harmony 
with tho solr. Dut this hamony is !:'lore or a task than a gift. It is not 
to be acquiesced in but obeyed and achieved. Its rownrd is not passive 0'1• 
._ joyr.tont but tho joy or willinr;, disciplined pursuit or tho t;ood. ¥;o shall 
see whether such a theory will not better explain the facts or chango and 
evil than tho view thnt ultir.m.te reality is already pertect.241 
11i. !~ rojocts natorialistic objoctions to ~ortality. 
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Early in our study we considered ''cTa::gart's proof that the physi-
cal universe must be conceived in tc~s or spirit.242 Tho proof wo accepted 
as valid. It undernines the objection to i'::":r.ortu.lity rounded uncn the nind' a 
dependence upon the brain.243 But oven if" the brain, aa a p~rt or the 
physical world, be or the netur9 of spirit, nust we not still nay tr~t its 
existence is essential to all r:1ontal liro'Z Accord.ill{; to !~cT~ggart cuch a 
sw..,gestion only shows thnt Sot'le body is necessary to ::~y aolt. An instan-
taneous change to another body at. death is concoivablo.244 But this cr.nnge 
night not be necoasary. Tho fact that tho self has a body proves only 
that "while n self ~! bod¥, thnt body is essentially oonnoctod T:i. th tho 
self's !"'ental lire. "245 It ia possible that the sell', freed i'ra!n tho body, 
ray have other ~e~ns or securing its nental data. 
tv. Crit1oiSJ!l ot' his theory or series of existences nithout 
~E1!1ory. 
l!oTace;nrt bel iaves that we srall "mve many H.veo - p3rhe.po l'lany 
millions or lives, and ~crmps an infinite nunber. "246 There will b.e com-
plete loss or T:o:cr.ory botweon nny two existoncea.247 ''cT'aggart anticipates 
" tmt this t~oory will be T-!ct with tho assertion that we might as well be 
248 
nortal •••• as ~ortal without a r1er.ory beyond tho present lire." 
i) l'cT~art' a replies to this objection. 
(o.) In Absolute Reality nll evonts in ttno t>till be ti!::olossly 
presont; tlms noth.in{; lo!;t or rorgotton. · 
He h!l.s savornl roplios to this obj·'otion. Porhnps his i'unda~onto.l 
thought is thn.t in Absolute Hoality tho tiMe aeries r.ill have disappo:lred 
nnd "than tho reality TThioh now i'or.1s a tiMo-oories will be ti.':lolessly prcsont 
!I 
h 
I 
',J 
'I 
I 
I~ 
t 
I 
.I 
·I 
! 
'I 
f 
--~~ .................... ~--~~~~~~~~~~~========~~~~.~~~--~· --------1 
I 
- ?2 -
in o. m..y '\'7hioh 'I'IOUld render r.t:r.'.ory quito nupcrfluoua."248 Tho noo.nin,; sc~s 
to bo that everythtne; novr npparently forr;ottcn r.ill be present to our thoucht. 
The loso or r.a<Jcry io but acanine; loss. Evcrythtnc of vnlue r.ill bo rontorod. 
(b) l!cr.tory not neoossary to continuity or personal lite. 
As wo r.::tve ooon abova246o. he nlno rci"lioo that tho effect or our 
present lives nill appear in condensed result in future existence~. Only 
noo.ory is discontinuous. Ench lifo has ito ci'foet upon thO noxt. All tl"tl.t 
hns boon wqn or r>.ch!oved in one li.f'o ;;ill be Prosont in st.rength or r::in::l 
nnd lntont ability in othnr ~1stoncos.24:9 
(c) Personal relations or one existonco doternino those or 
future oxistcncos. 
Tho third rO!'lY is tho.t love is tho fino.l nnd doternining force 
in the universe. ''iiith or without menory love nUl have its TJay." Tho 
very !'net or love proves thnt tr.o people belong; together. ~en thoUGh for-
nor ~orioncoo nnd associntions nrc f'orcottcn; O'V'en though thoro nit;ht be 
a separation for nn existence or ~oro. tho bon::l or love will noaort itself 
nnd those vrho3e O%istonoos nro bound up to~ct:1or l7ill be reunited. 260 
ii) Objections to those roplios. 
(n) Tho first reply 't':'ill not intcrcat those r.ho reject T'oTncgnrt' s 
conception or ult~to reality. 
(b) !'er:ory oosontinl to identity or poroonnl lito. 
This objoction ms to do not only T:ith the practical vnluo or 
i.r.t"!ortnlity without nonory but nith tho thooreticnl possibl Uty. ?~eTaggart' a 
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view seer.1s to contradict th.e definition of a self as a tioe-tranecendinc, 
soli'-!dontical unity. !!oTae;ea.rt labors to prove tmt it is no o.bstraot 
~ ~ .!!2.h tmt he he.s in r.t!nd. It in rather a substance v:hich expresses 
its ~hole nature in its attributes. 
"If, therot'ore, tho attributes wore exactly the sar:e, so v;ould tho 
substance be, and I should not. bo a.nnil"'.il!:lte:l at all. In ardor 
tmt t.he:-o !lhould be u ne\'1 self' • tho o.nl'lih!lation and tho creation 
nust c~usc a breach 1n tho continuity of the attributes." 251 
Then the question bocOl:les, Is l'!:cnory ono of tho eosentia.l attri.Lutas of 
the self? 
HcTar,gnrt reninds us that even in this lU'o no do not remc;r.bcr 
r~uch of the r.ast.. Yet. its v~lue has not been lost. i,o ccm be -v:isor !'or 
h:.\vin~ hud the discipline o!' e.n education even though "?:"a have !'ore;otton 
262 
many o!' the specll'ic facts. Vnluablo experience loovos ito deposit not 
only in r~cr~ory but tn strengthened Mind. This is ?ttrtiully truo, no doubt. 
"liet it is doubtful Tlhethcr a.n~h!n,~ or in!'luence cun be considered a. p0.rt. 
of MYSol!' that is ~;one !'oravor past recall. T~ny past exporionces are i""'-
plioit in r.tEnory. So!!!e could be brOUGht back 1n t:lEr.lory only 'ty l\ very strong 
stit!lulus. Those ~hat are beyond tho possibility of reco.ll oa.."l hardly be con-
sidered as bolcncing to no. 
In connection ~ith every orcnnis~ thoro ie probably a hierarchy 
or selves. As I have been writill£ ono or those selves !'as beon alert to 
the tickint; or tho clock. I. the person who io 'Wl"itin[;. lnvo bcon quito 
oblivious to tho clock's presence and activity. Now it' tho clock "ore 
suddenly rD!!:oved from the roo::1• no doubt thia oubordir.ato self T:OUld rcr.::ind 
r.te that tho room scC!!!ed unusually quiet. If I wore too buoy to hoed its 
r.tcssa~o and to nok for nart.iculars, I should know no r.toro or the incident. 
But i1' I \'Tore to relax and assur.te the attitude "neyt" "What t" tho int'or-
.I 
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nation would be instantaneously supplied. NOTT usually I pay no attention 
to the clock's presonce. Yot, on occasion, I roalizo that it hns been 
present and that tho inforr..ation as to its presence has been continually 
at oy co:n:-::and. The point is that the al'13.renoss of the clock' o presence 
belongs to a subordinate self and becanes mine only on occasion. I havo 
no mcr-ory a.t all that the clock T:as here yesterday m-ening. Probnbly my 
subordinate knew or its preaonoo. But I did not. Tho experience was not 
my omt. I have no ner.tory of it. It nay bo that some such view will be 
necessary to explain tho experianooo entirely beyond recall or r.ecory. 
If in cor.1ory no trace of thm!l ra:'lains, thoy mve naver boen !:!l experi-
ences. Tho valuo oi' lmcrnlodge does not consist only in "P:o:o.l.ssed facts." 
But proba.bly a fact tlnt is completely lost -uas never my fact. Like the 
tickint; or the clock it v:as known to another; not to~· I believe tmt 
Tca.nofi' i& right. when he says that. the identity of self oi' nhich T'cTo.r,gart 
speaks ic not the identity of a conscious unity but of the scholaotlc s~­
plo-aubstanoo.253 
(c) Lavo ca.n hardly "have its way" without the aid of ner.1ory. 
!.'a Taggart • s last reply is so hiGhlY fnnoii'ul th:lt oriticicr: is 
difficult, if not unnecesoury. If no re::1ory or our lovo nnd aosocintions 
ronai.no, r..ay it not bo that we shall neot othors for who::1 no shall mve a 
stro~cr affection th::.n any over bei'ore e."tporienced'l254 To be sure tho.t 
lovers will noet, reexperience and deopon their dovotion. TIO nust know not 
only trot "love will have its lmY" l1ut. trot it 'r!i.ll h!l.vc tho holp or !1a:lory. 
f 
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C :u\l'TER FIVE. 
II. IS THE .HAiil!lO'NY OF THE tniiVEtiSE DUE TO A SUPH.E!'rE PERSON• S..o., TO OOOt 
In tho course or our otudy r.o hnve !'roquontly rof'orrod to "cTag-
cart's denial o!' God's ~~1stonco.255 Our rcfcroncoa have ~-ado it el~r 
tlnt no dissent !'rcr.:J. this vicr.I. Thus tho n~a.tive crorncter or tho !'ol-
10\Vinr; clnptcr r.o.y bo nntici!la.tcd. In Gcnernl the treat~ent "''''ill be ne0-
o.tive in rc;:;ard to ''cTa~,~rt' !J own nrc;U"lent, but oosttivo in the n!'t"ir."n-
tion or views ~hich ho rojects, as ~o bolievo, without ~ood reason•• 
A. Definition o!' tho tortl ''God." 
T'cTnsp;a.rt rightly do!'inos the tom "God" to !":OM a solt-oonscious 
boinr;. Ho rroinds us that this ts tho r:e:1nir~ of the v<rd in "''Festern the-
olO{';Y• To r:;ivo it a dU'i'erent ncnning is to cause needless cont'usion.256 
Trot He~ol used 'the tom in n special philosophic scm:Je h!ls resulted in a 
misinterpretation of his Absolute. Accordtru; to ,.cTnr;eart, Hegel thought 
of God, not as n personal beinG• but as a. society oi' nersons.257 But by 
his constant use o!' tho r.ord "God" to dositin:1te the Absolute, He;ol en-
couraged the belief th:l.t he thought o!' tho Absolute as an individual.258 
T'cTaggart will not invite 3uch a t!isundcrst:mding or his cnm view. By "God" 
n259 
he ~oano "a being 7-hO is personal• sunr~e, and r,ood. His personality 
Manns seli'-eo:tsciouoness; his sut're::!ac:~. that he is at least the r~ost l;'OW-
eri'ul oi' beirl6s; his coodne~s, trot he is "or sl.!eh a nature tmt he "flould 
"2u9 be rightly judr;ed to be r::ore (;OOd than evil. Of these .!ohree attributes 
T'cTnggart considers personality the r.ost si(;nificant. A.."l L'"ipersonal being 
could not lave !::en. It could not be wise or good. Neither could it serve 
as an object of rolte;ious er.totion. God, thetJ,1 nust be dei'ined as a poracn.
260 
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D. The question !'or !~oTne:ee.rt. nsaunos this !'orn. Ia tho Absolute 
personal? 
'~ 
fie havo soon that l'cTaa;t>.rt speaks of' ultim.to reality ns the 
Absolute. For hin• then. tho question o!' tr.o {Ptictenoe of God Trill assuno 
thia !'om. Ia tho Absolute a person? 
1. '·oTa.gr;art • a Absolute a structural. lo;;ical conception. 
Tho !'net that T'cTar;r;nrt rofer3 to ult1T'1nte reality as the Absolute 
is signi!'icant. In contrast to the functionnl nnd personal concePtion, God• 
it eopmsizes structure nnd lo::;ica.l annlyaia. The dialectic, !'or !'cTarzart 
is not a process in tine. It is an analysis o!' t~olossly existing rela• 
tions.261 lie 'hnve ropootodly pointed out the abstract, loc;ical notivo or 
t'cTn,r,gart's systoo. lie have seen that it detemines tho na.turo or tho 
wholo•idoo. nnd thus of tho Absolute. For the sake o!' enphnsis we shall re-
peat thia nrguo.ent, • that r•oTar;t;art' s Absolute is alcost wholly a logical, 
structural concept. 
2. lus Absolute a "need o!' cocnition" not or value oxnerienoo. 
D~nnd for loc;ical• not noral, wholeness is tho notive or his 
sy5tm. 
In defending tho validity or tho dialectic !'oTaggart replies to 
Inrteann' s c~rse that tho lonr,ing !'or the Absolute o!' .,hich Hegel apo!l.l::a 
is but the desire to sm~glo back into philosophy the God whon lta."l.t ho.d 
- banished fro:n notapeysics.262 In his defense o!' tho Absolute Ide~ l~oTngcart 
spanks in his ~ost characteristic tonth Or • to change the figure. in this 
situation his rnind asslrtes its natural posture so thlt wo hnve no difficulty 
in securint; o. lifo-like portrait. ·;,}nt Tie observe is tho striking praoi-
nenoe or tho lo,s1cal roo.turos. 
•• 
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The soction is too long to be quoted in ful1.262 Howevor, tho pas-
sage should be read in its entirety for a thorou;:;h u.>1dorstandin;_~ of' "cTt:>.c:gart. 
He states that he ia not certain >~hothor P.urt!:!ann noons to say that Hegel's 
longing for the Absolute is "indule;ed oal:r in the interest of.' rolic;ton nnd 
ethics, or >:hethor he adMits th:l.t it is dc:::o.ndcd •••• by tho nn.ture or 
k:nowled(;o." lie proceeds to point out t.mt 11God, hanover is r1n idre.l whose 
reality ~ny bo do=nndcd on the part oi thor of thEX>ratical or or nrnctical 
reason;" that while iiegel' a intoroat in the Absolute "'ny have been "excited 
from tho oido of othio.e and reli~_;ion r:.:.thcr tr.!l.n or puro thoUf;ht," tho nhole 
notivo p011cr of his syot.or.! is "the deairo i'or co~lcto knOT1lod;c, a!1d the 
inpn.tienoo of :a10";:lod{;o l';hich is soon to bo uns:.>.tiafactory. "263 Oeconirc; 
nora nutobio;r:~phicnl !'c~na;urt adds, "The philosopher docs not believe in 
the Absolute nerely bccn.use ho desires it should exist," rather "Tho need 
or tho Absolute is •••• a nood or co~nttion."264 
~ho p!"edocl.nnnco of the lo::tcal r.1otive is evident. God nn.y: ..£.! an 
ide:J.l or the prncticnl reason but in this cnsc he is ~a need or co6nition." 
!lo is c.n idon.l of CO!:lplote knowledge, - a desire for wholeness in aur spec-
ulntivo conccntions. t!or. t:b.ie dcoiro for c~pleteness io a le;:;itirlate de-
r.nnd or the d.nd. !Jut it ia not a deairo for God na !'cTne;£;nrt hns defined 
hi~.265 The theoretical reason~ itnelf does not postulate God as an 
idonl nor ~J itself dc~nnd his reality. It d~anda only a cooplete knowledge 
of the physic~l ~orld ns a whole. This r~y lObically involve a don1nl of the 
- indepond-::-nt existence or ~attor and a vio-.-r or it as of the nature or nind. 
But even t:hen ao cancoived it leads only to en ldoo.l or lohio~l ccr.:pletcnoss. 
or to mir>d as tho univoronlizing po.rticuln.r• tho ~;round of the lobionl order. 
nble t.o reconcile tho pa.rticule.rity and univorsnHty or opocul•.itivo thour;ht. 
It hD.o not nsko:i nor noo'lll:led nnythint; concernin& t~1.e J::\ornl. chnra.ct.or or tho 
!, 
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world o.s a TThole. Tharei'ore it cannot postulate God as o.n ideal as T'cTagc;art 
hnD (correctly) defined hiM. 
!'cTa:c~rt '"akes it clear tint his Absolute is but a "need of' cor;-
nition." r.o have seen tlnt he identifies philosophy dth his dinlcettcru. 
rnetr.od t:hich is an investigation of tho nuturo of nure thought .266 'rh'JS it 
is dcci.slvo r.hon ho here contrasts the nracticcl ethical nnd reli;ious in-
torest. in philosophy with tho do:-:nnda of pure thoue;ht. Tho C'7i.dcnt tandoncy 
is to rolecnto tho ethical dcr.and for uholcness to tho plane of desire and 
tenore it in the interpretation of the Absolute Idoa, tho notive por.or ot 
dio.loctteal process. l~To.gGart elsewhere states that spirit. is the logical 
prius of tho 3"JStET.:.IG7 llut we have previously observod this ide!l of spirit 
to to a losical. rather thnn fully personal• concept.268 His whole-idea is 
a ooncont of static, lobico.l co~lotoness. inc~pablo of convoyi~ the id~~ of 
personnl and ~oral nrocoss. Thorofare it inevitably tssue3 in o. conception 
of the Absolute t~~t is l~3ical rather than completely porsonnl. 
3. His Absolute a. ~rinciplo of unity; not a !lOrsonnlity. Exhausted 
in the individuals which exist ~ but not ~ tho tmity. 
S!nco HcTe.~,I;art' s Absolute is but "e. need of' cocnition" vrc are 
prc?:>.rei to r.nvo him dEmy that it is pcroonnl. l'io he.vo soon that his inter-
e::;t in the self' is as n lor;icnl principle of individuality.269 We nay ox-
poet t~nt a ~imilcr intcroot will dictate his concerytion of the Absolute. 
Thio i'ro-:os to bo tho cnse. IIo denios thnt it can be a person bccnuso in 
his ooneo~tion of' l.bsolute RenHty tho unity is f'ully expressed in tho na-
ture of the individuals. Tho unity "m-.s no noaninr; except to bo dif'toren-
tinted into tho pluraltty."270 
"Tho unity nnd tho individ~ls o.re idonttco.l - tho unity has no 
nnturo except to bo tho individuals." 270a 
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While tho unity c.xists ~ nnd ~ the individuals• they exist ..!!!• but not 
~· tho unity. 
"Since, thon, tho individuals cannot bo for tho ~~ity, the diulec-
tic givos us no reason to supposo that tho unity oithor is a conscious 
being, or possesses any qualitio~ annlogous to consciousness. In th~t 
case it gives us no reason to suppose that tho Absolute. as a whole, 
is pcrso~l." 271 
Just as T!o':i.'ac;gart' a interest in tho self' ia as a principle or in-
dividuality, a necessary differentiation or the Absolute, so is he interested 
in tho Absolute as en nbatrnct lo~ical conce?t• As such it cnnnot bo n oor-
sonnlity. 
a. For this reason his Absolute cannot even solve the "Juraly 
lo~tcnl problco or ~articular versus ~~iver~al. 
1) Ens Plurality an ageregate. 
t·cTnr;cnrt nnticipatea that so~c nay rcca.rd t.his a.s an atcr.':iistio 
ooncoptior..272 It ia our conviction thnt it >:ust be so rcga.rded. !'cTa~nrt 
sooks to obvinto tho criticism by insisting that tho unity is n rcn.l unity. 
But vorbal insistence is not lobical de=on~:>trntion. Tho fact thnt r~ refers 
to his Absolute as a nsuper-orsanic unity,~273 in our opinion. does not in-
valiaato tho cr:1..rge tmt his Absolute is but nn nbe;ro;c.to or externally re-
lnted individunls. Conooqcently it docs not solvo even the nuroly loGical 
probletl in tho intorost of ·.:hich it lmS advanced. 
E.~crionco indicates t!~t finito selves nro real unitioo, able 
~ to think and intorprot tho larGer unity in r.hich thoy find th~solvca. But 
does it per...it t.ho vicrr that finite eelvos i.n relation constitute this l~r-
gor unity? Docs it lead us to believe t~.t tho lnrr,er unity is dependent 
on. o.nd exhausted in, tho finite indiviilrllo'l lie think not. 1-~or on this 
OA.')Orier.cc t.l:o univcr~:>al fcn.turoo o£ finit.o experience would be 0. mystery. 
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On such a. theory the principles or rathEI:lfltios a.nd the laws or nature nre 
but tho relations of finito solves. This is to leave the relations thEm• 
selves, thoir so~i~ independence nnd universality, and our experience of 
discovering th~, unoxplained. 
''iss Calkins has urged this obj ecticn to "cTaggart' s vi ow of tho 
Absolute. 
"if ult~~te reality were a. composite of c~plately related terns, 
and if the relations between the terns wero qualities of tho t~s, 
each for oach, then tho relations would thecselves need relating 
with each other, for oo.oh would belong to s~o particular reality. "274 
2) T"'cTf1Ggart' s reply: "botwoen" as ulti~ate as "in." 
!'oTa.r;Gnrt would reply to such a. criticisn by instating that the 
conception of "botnccn" is as ultit!late as tho conception of' "in," nnd that 
therefore vre do not need to seok a ground ~which the relations of finite 
solves !'1D.Y inhore.275 This is partially true. It we aro to re&ard finito 
individuals as real and as possessing coral freedom we ~ust grant that each 
individual's thought and choice are unique. They belone to him alone. Thoy 
need not havo been preoisoly what they are. Their character is in part 
rooted in his individuality. Tho relation or "in" is fun~~entn1.275a Nov-
ertholeos these thOUtihtS and choices partake of the character of tho ~ornl 
nnd loz;ical universe in which they occur. The universe sets linits to wh3.t 
r..ay bo willed and thought. Tho nost orizinal thc:n.tght and choice possess 
this chsrncter or boi~-lil'!litod, which is thus a universal. Ttmt is, all 
thought and choice nlso involve tho chnrncteristic of between-ness. It is 
out of our experience of·botnoon-noss that the problem or particular versus 
univorsnl {;rarrs. Truth soens to be independent of our finite ninds and of 
plnce and tko. It is truo fro~ nonont to ne7.:tent and from person to person 
! 
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and !'rO!!l thing to thi~. How can we accom1t for the !'act thnt truth is 
true botneon ~or.ents, thi~s and persons? In other words, hovr cnn we 
acootmt for tho universal ohnracter or all thou;:;ht? The !!lind do::tands an 1. explanation of tho logical order nhose Prinoiploa nrc tndopandoot of ua. 
iio believe tmt "cTnggart hns !'ailed to account for this order. His prtn-
c!plo o!' unity is but n !'orm of v:ords. It does not account for tho expcr-
iancod f~ct o!' unity. His univoree turns out to bo an O.G;:;re;:;ato of indi-
vidunls ~~elated by a common logical order. 
3) Suprone person versus lnporsonal Absolute as a solution of 
tho lOGical probl~. 
Our conviction is that the only valid aolut.ion or tho probleo is 
to soe in the universal features of all tho~ht the principles o!' a Suprooe 
l'ind. !'ind is by nnturo an individual that univorsalizos.277 If wo should 
consider the tmiverse ns an e::r.prossion o!' n SU!>ror.le Hind v:o 't7ould have an 
explanation of our lo;:;tcnl experience. For on that theory the ~articular-
· tty a.nd universality of all finite thou,-;ht vrould be explained as tho prin-
ciples or God's arm experience. 
It ~ould not bo necessary to consider finite selves us parts or 
thnt r:1ind. 1-~s wo have ~reviously sue;gestcd, to do so would bo to beoo::te 
involved in dit!'ioultios ns serious as those that we nro seelr..lng to nvoid.27(, 
A plurnliatio tmivorse is not a contradiction in toms. As long as tho 
!'tntte individuals are dependent upon the logical (physical nnd ~ornl) or-
- dcr r.hich is tho experience or tho Supr~e Person, tho unity is a real unity, 
yet c~pntible with the ronlity of the individuals. 
Our conclusion io thnt by conoolving t,ho universe exclusively in 
toms o!' loctcnl structure, 1'oTae;gart hns been led to deny the personality 
!!!:::::::::=::------------------ --------===::::=:;::;::::::;. -:=· ;:;_;,;:.:: .. ;:;:::-===:::::::=:::::::.:::;---~--:::::::, ......... -.c_ .. --.--~. -~-.---.·. 
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of the Aboolute. o.nd tint in doing so he has discarded the only conception 
able to roconcils the particular and universal feo.tures of O\ll" e:xnerience.276 
Personality is tho only universalizing individual that we know.277 It is 
therefore necessary to postulate the existence or a Suprc:r.1e Person, the laws 
of whose mind constitute tho logical order which finite selves experience 
but do not create. This order is not intelligible r.erely as tho relations 
binding together any mElber or finite selves. For on this theory the "bind-
ing together" it3elf ls a mystery. 
This argunent alone does not nrove tho existence of God. It points 
to tho existence of a. Supre:-e l'ind as the grotmd of our lor;ical experience. 
It asks and nravea nothing concerning the !'loral character or that 1~ind. Thts 
lends us to tho !"oral arg'l.r.ent. 
b. For this reason it fails to explain the ~oral order or to prove 
tho universe good. 
1) Conception of a SuprEr.!le Person offers true synth9ois of "is" 
nnd "O'U{;ht•" 
An Absolute that. is but. a "need of co;nitton" cnnnot CT.nlntn the 
nond ordor v:hich finite selves dtscovor.264 lie tnve soon thnt ''cTaggart 
overlooks tho fact that noral experience involves a d~and for wholeness. 
A dcrmnd for logical wholeness hna been tho native power of his dinlectto. 
driving htn on froo contrndtotory conceptions to hir;hor synthe~es until ho 
arrives nt. tho stable conooption of tho Absolute, i.e •• or the world ns n 
whole conceived in toms of spirit. Thus '•cTa~gart concludes thnt his Abso-
lute Idoo l7hich is tho do::-:nnd for this ca:roleto knowledge is oresont in nll 
sensory cr.'lerionco. 278 rto r.ay repent our contention tmt the doc:o.nd for 
wholeness is nlso the ~otivo po~er in ~oral experience.279 The catecorical 
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imperative de:::e.nds that. we rise above the contradictions and imperfections 
or our ~oral lifo. If r.e ntt~pt to rest in dootre. feol1nti• instinct. or 
!!lere satisfaction as our ond• this de:--.nnd for corrpleteness t'nl'lodiately sets 
to work u~on thic abstraction and drives us on to a hiGher value sJ~thesio. 
The nov~ent issues in tho concoption or n t:lornl ordor, the renlizat.i.on or 
whose values is our eternal destiny. Even this conception is inc~plete. 
Values exist only in and for poreons.280 Therefore this noral order can 
be ultir::1toly rclll only in a Supr~e 'Person, the hO!:le and ground or the val-
uos t~t finite solves ~erionce. Our contention is that this dialectic 
process is as significant and valid ao is tho purely lor;ic'll proce3s or ''c-
Taggart's syst~. Ir the whole-idea is a "neod of coenition" lt is as truly 
a need or value experience. It in its remer sense it de:~onstrates the ex-
istence or a lo;ical order, in its latter use it proves the existence or 
the noral order. tt in the f'orner case it is tho concept or "ind or Spirit 
and is tho lo6ical prius or a logical nov<r.tent, in the latter cane it is the 
concept or ?ersonnl, nornl process and is the locical nrius or an ethical 
mova:lent. If in tho fomer caao it loads to a conception or a lo;ical Abso-
lute, or !!ind, in tho latter case it der.ands tho existence or God. the Su-
prfr!e liorth or Goodness. 
Now we have ohO'Vin nbove261 that the fomer. the conception or o.n 
abstract. loeic~l Absolute, cannot solve oven the purely logical probl~. 
This nbstrnction ~ust recover lt.s original concreteness in the idea or a 
:- Oor.!ploto personality. the only universalizing individual. in order to ox-
ple.in our cor.r.on loz;ical experience. The '!"!OVa:tent or the dialectic in 
moral axperienco has already iasued in tho conception or a Supreoe Porson, 
the ground or all valuos.282 The finnl conclusion is evident. ~ain thoro 
is a novc::1ent rrot:1 thosis to antithesis, from the abstract. to the concrete. 
j 
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from tho Supr~o Hind tho.t univorsalbos, to tho Supreoo Goodness. The 
final synthesis is tho ooncoption or n full nersono.l lito, lacld.ng tho 
rr~entary and contradictory c~racter or finite oxporioncc, the ~unr~e 
Person or God, the continual creator of the logical nnd ~oral orders r.hich 
finite selves or.porience. 
~e subnit this as an adequate synthesis of the "is" and tho "ought," 
consequently as a correction of !'cTe.cr;nrt' s abstraction. i1o sub nit that our 
conception does justice to both structural and functional nspocto of oxpor• 
lance. The perfection of the Sunr~e Person lies not in tho fact ttnt he 
is "perfectly acquiescent nnd hanpy.''283 The goal or tho universe is not 
a statio hamony to acquiesce in Tlhich is tho final end or ht:r".an existence. 
God himself is eternally active. In the continll'.l not or creation He calls 
into beinr; finite selves, sustaina his dynn~ic ~~iveroe, and cvor finds 
self-expression in the creation or naw foms of vn.luo. 
2) }.n adequate basis for rel~ion. 
This conception furnishes n netapcysicnl basis for religion. It 
results in a conviction that tho universe is 1n ho.rnony t:ith th9 individual.284 
It doos not noroly nsslr.lo, but offers mota physical proof tln t this harnony 
is or a. ::1ora.l n!lturo.285 !lor is tho har::!ony :-:orcly a present fact. It is 
a promise nn1 a. possibility - a chull~~o presented by a riGhteous universe 
to finite boincs, by nature equipped for noral conquent, yet ablo to rebel 
- and, Tlithin limits, to retard the Tlhole upT!ll'd nov~ont. "i.hethor such robol-
lion rosulta in tho solf-e7.tinct1on or the ~oral redecption or the ~ickod is 
a problo::'l bot.h too oo:nplex nnd uncertain for diacusoion here. 
o. For this reason it fails to account for the pcysical order -
tho tine-process with its chnnGc, evil, inperfcction. 
1 
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1) UcTagGart' s inability to exnlnin our exnerience ot t~.e. 
~e saw above thnt the dialectic is not u process in ti~e.286 It 
\. io nn analysis or tbelosoly existing relations. The notivo povrer of the 
dialectic is tho ~rosence, throuehout the entire nrocess, of the goa1.287 
Tho final conception is the lor;ical prius of tho !:!OVEnont.288 The oxis1S-
once or any reality l'thatever implies the existence or all the cator;orlos. 
Thus they cannot cone into being successively. To eay so would be to 
hold that ~hat is but partially rool could exist. This 1o a contradiction 
289 in terns. 
The dialectic cannot be conceived as t~king plnce in infinite 
time for it is plninly a process ~ith a bCGinninb and an ond.290 If we 
att~pt to conceive it as tnkinc place in finite tine 1'ie encounter the 
dif'ficulty noticed above. Tlor could r.o answer the quest.ion as to wmt 
causod it or why it begllrl and ended at one tine rat her than at a.notho::-. 291 
"Ir we ask whether tine, ~s a fact, is finite or infinite, we find 
hopeless dU'tioulties in tho way or either answer. Yet, if' we 
tnko tino as nn ulti~.to reality, thoro se~s no other alternative. 
Our only resource is to conclude that tine is not an ultima.te real-
ity." 292 
Dut U' tir.o is not real how cnn we explain such e. persistent delusion as 
our experience or chan::; a, and or iMperfection and. evil 'l Hegel's answol", 
says noTncr;nrt, TTas that all these are but delusions. 
"Tho infinite ond is ree.lly acccn:tplishod. eternally. It is only a 
delusion on our part. vthich rmko:s ua suppose otherniso. And tho 
only roo.l pro~;ross is tho r«:!oval of delusion. The universe is 
etornnlly tho sa.1:to, and eternally perfect. Tho novcooot io only 
in our ninds. They trace one after another in succession the 
difforont categories or tho LOGic, ~hich in reality hnvo no tioo 
order • but conttnu:11ly coexist as elC":lmts or the Absolute Idoa 
which transcends and unttea th<r.." 293 
But ?'oTar;t;art. will not to.ko this cusy and ccr.:oon ,,.o.y out or the 
dU'ficulty. llo accepts tho conclusion of tho dialectic thtlt the universe 
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must be eternally rational. perf'eot and cor.1plete. But "it is certain tlnt 
. 294 
tho tmivorse is not CO!nplotoly ration!'.l for un." If' our experience or 
twe. change and. evil is a delusion, it 1:3 n. delusion requiring a positive 
cause and explanation.295 
"However r.mch we may treat tine as r.:ore c.ppoaranco. it r.:ust. like 
all other appenranoo ha7e reality bohind it. The reality, it ~y 
be annored, is in this case the tii:loless Absolute. ilut this roul-
ity will have to aocomt. not noroly for tho facts 'Which appear to 
us in tir.lo, but for the appearance of' succession which they do ·undoubt-
edly naal.r'lD• Hem can this be done? \'lmt ros.son can be given nhy 
the eternal reality should manifest itoelf' in a t~e process at nll?"296 
!.~cTe.gga.rt can find no anS?:cr. Ho acbits that "r.c aro lef't uith an au:krnlrd 
diff'erenco between what our phllosopey tells us ~ust bo, and vrhat our lif'o 
tells us actunlly is."291 He will not abandon tho conclusion of' tho dia-
lcctic and. hold that. 
"tho \"lorld is not o. co::mlete and neri'ect ::-:nnif'estatton either of' 
rationality or irrationality •••• [for] it is hardly exaggerated 
to sa.y that this is the only fact about the world which it T:ould 
account ror. Tho idea of such a principle ia contradictory." 298 
Nor '1'!111 he deny tho apparent reality of the tino nrocoas r.i.th its atten-
dant i.mporf'ection and evil. ilolievi.llf,• ns ho docs, in the validity of' the 
dialectic. and in the reality of' the ttce process. he can only 
"believe tha~ one oore synthesis reonins, as yet unknown to us. 
~hich shall ovoroone tho last an~ 2gat ~ersistent of t3e contra-
diction~ inherent in appearance. 
fie nd.o.ire tho vigor and frankness "With which !'cTe.ggart. has rospcc-
tivoly stated and faced this contradiction in hiD systor:1. Dut ";:e believe hU:l 
to be in error T1hon he assorts thnt any other idenlistic systm is equnlly 
·~; unable to of'fer a solution.30° Ho sees clearly that his difficulty is be-
t~oen a static loc1cal concopti.on and tho exoeri.oncod facts of' nrooess.301 
Yet it doen not occur to hiD thnt such a difficulty would not conf'ront a sys-
tO':! which, fror.t the start. had taken into account both tho structural and 
functional f'entures of' experience. 
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2) The conception of" a Supr0!!1e Person otters an explanation or 
both f"1mctionnl and structural aspects or experience. 
We submit that the system outlined above. in taking account or 
both f"lmctional and structural aspects or experience. arrives e.t n concep-
tion able to explain both the til=oloss nature or truth end. n:.oral obUga-
tion. and tho roolity of tir.to• change and evil. Ii' ultinato re!llity be 
conceived in tcms or personality. it r-:ust be prozrcsslvo rather thn.n stat-
ie• tor porsonnl Ute is a process. On such a theory ti'Oe r.lny be accepted 
as ultimately real - as an essontinl i'orr.t of nll consciousnesa. Its val• 
ldity for us r..e.y be explained by the fact tmt it is ve.Ud tor the Suprone 
Person. Tho consciousness at God nay possess a ti."le fom.302 !'oTo.cgart's 
objection to this is tmt it does not explain the tmeless nature or rea-
tures or e~erience. 
"ilhe.t thon is eternalt Nothine; but events. apparently •••••• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
not • • • • the event or the Absolute's consciousness. For that 
t!!USt omngo fS'Icry nOr.lent it regards as present s01:1ethine; which it 
had previously regarded as future. nnd regards as past scnethi.~ 
which it had, in the previous nooent, reca.rdod ns present." 303 
This objection seecs to be based on a paychological theory which 
ncTagr;art definitely rejects. Selt-consciousnoss is not a. nore cr.!lin or 
events or series of bricks laid end to end.304 It is a solt-identicnl, 
ti~e-transaondinr; process. The selt is not exhausted in the chan.Ging roo-
turos or enerienoo. If ultir.'tnto r~U.ty be grounded. in e. Sunrc:r.1o Person, 
both chanr;o and nornnnenoe r.le.Y be reOO!Jllizod as ultir.ntely rent. 
Our theory, then, is c~patible with the fact of c~ngo. It is 
o.ble to su,:":r;est a reason for tho tir.te process; it offers nn expla.no.tlon or 
tho net or orontion. ''cTace;nrt rejeots the idea or n crentive God on the 
ground that in an eternally porfoct universe thoro is no need for a creator.306 
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This is nnothor illustration of' tho Ol:!lbarrnsB::lont caused to a static uni-
verse by tho facts or ohfule;e. On our theory tho perfection of' the universe 
is progressive. Even thou,r;h creation be an eternal act it is a novment in 
the direction or r;oodness - or more c0r.1ploto value achiG"lment. 
4. rcTagge.rt' s objections to tho conception or a Supr<k:lo Person. 
l'eTaggart nould otter e.t loast three additional objections to tho 
theory tmt '\70 mvo SUGgested. 
a. He Tlould probably se.y that to conceive tir.te as essential to 
God's experience is to think of God as United. Is he lir:l• 
itod. by sO!!lcthi.ne; oxtorno.l to hinsolt? Then he r:o.y not be 
able to guarantee the trimph of' the good. He nay oven be 
more ovil the.n e;ood. 
To think or tine as essential to God's experience is to think or 
him as linltod. But lini.tod by lfr.ntt It by sa.1ethin{; external to himself 
it nay bo tho.t this lir.litinc pov:cr is too grant for hin to ovcrc0::1o. Ho 
have no certainty tlnt God, it ho bo good, will be able to effect the tri• 
umph or tho GOOde 306 Neither co.n we be sure that he desires to do so. 
The oxistonco of' ovil makes it as possible that God is vacillating and 
ticklo as t~t he is good.so7 
b. If lbitod by his o-m nnture alone, he cannot be good. 
On the other hnnd, it God bo United only by his own no.ture, his 
. -., llnito.tions a\"e rooted in his TJ1111 for the hypothesis is that there is 
nothing e."tternal to him to Unit his action. Ho can do anything that he 
wills to do.· n0t1 ovil exists. If God is lit:tited only by his own l'Till it 
must be that he '\'!ills tho ovU. And not as a r.eans to the good. ~'or v1ho 
imposed upon God tho necessity or attnininc tho good only by r.eans of 
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temporary evil? If" ho ia limited by nothinr; outside or hi~~elt thoro is no 
roo.son t'l'hy he should not rl.ll a universe in -which r;oodness Ttould bo possible 
without e7il. A bci~ who wills evil Tiithout. being forced to do oo 1a not 
ri~htcous.308 
e. God. eo.nnot bo both coed and or:mipotont. 
Evon !"':Ore ir.tpossible is it to attribute c;oodnoss to nn cr.mipotont 
God. Such a being would bo lirtited by nothl.nc at all. not even by his O'Ml 
nature. Nothing would be inposB1ble for hin to do.309 Ho "could exist 
even U' he vrilled that nothing else should e:xist." He need not evan will 
that any laws bo truo.310 Therefore tho fo.ct that he willed tho evil o:ould 
prove tmt ho T.'tls not God. 
_ 5. Haply to ?rcTo.gge.rt' s objections to God's existence. 
tl• ''cT~&art ir;nores tho rornl argu-::ent. 
In ur~in~ those objections ''cTa.r;!;o.rt ms given no evidence that he 
hns considered tho r.:oral e.rg'l.r-ont 'Which wo mve outlined. In nrguing tl{;ainst 
<Jevel"'.tl 
a non~nipotcnt, non-crentive God ho su;:;c;osts"~ nossiblo lines of' arc;u-
~ent in favor of such a conception. He rocO(;nizos tho ontolo;:icnl nrgmont; 
tho arc;tr::~cnt frorJ the nocesaity of 11 first cnuso, the theory that nll re!ll• 
ity r.mst be knovm to a suprmo nind or knm"Tcr .. and. tho nre;tr1ont rrot'l doai;~n. 311 
Those he rejects. i'io lnve indicated our bcHot that his rejection or tho 
third arGur.ont is fatal to his ~Jstoo. Since his ~lurality exists for no 
one r.1ind it beeO':los not a unity but an accroc;ate.312 Our nain concern here 
is his np!'nront indifference to an arg,r,ont fra:~. the objective reference or 
our vnl uo 0%1'0rlenco. iio have soon thnt our judu~ent that an obj active ~ornl 
.. <.- ~. c - .....,.____,.:...__ __ ~ c_::_, ___ c•:c_.__::_-:=;:~c.:::c:::-~~:::-.:::=.:::::.::..---'-=1 
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ordor exist a is as vo.lid as our belief in the o:xistonce of tho phyoicnl order, 
313 
and further, that such a r.1oral order co.n bo real only in a Stmr(J!le Pcroon. 
l!cm what tr the facts of evil contradict cuch o. conclusion? Are we not jus-
tified in saying that we are oonrronting a finnl antinOMy? If 1':e are not 
ablo to resort to a duali~ are we not justified in assuming, with 'rcTac~art, 
that t.hero nust be a synthesis yet unknown to us? If we bear in Mind l·o-
Taggart's final attitude tom1rd t.he proble::l of evil, his stubborn insis-
tenoe on the fact or evil as an insuperable difficulty in tho TIB.Y or a be-
lief in God appears rather surprising. Our conviction is tmt his attitude 
1o duo to a nogloot a1' tho argu-,ent frot1 the objective rcforenoe of our vo.luo 
or::lOrienoos. 
be ti' a:nni:potence is inc~atible with the essential linit.at ions 
of a nereonnlity God is not omnipotent. 
ti' omnipotence moans tho power to do anythine; at all, as ''cTar;gnrt 
insists, the idea of a God both personal and omnipotent is contradictory. 
''oTar;r;a::-t acbits that philo!l<mhy -mJSt re~nrd s~e concOTttion ns ultiMo.te, 
and that concerning such nn ulti.-,ate fact we ~ny not nr~erly ask, i"iho 
~Bde it, ~nd ~hy is it, thus nnd sot314 If this be conceded, wo hnve no 
ri!r,ht to sny that God is United because ti.~e is essential to hm tor;ether 
with the other essential characteristics of personnl life. Seli'-conscious 
existence involves certain definite attributes. It involves an experience 
or tiMe. It is r.oan!nr;loss apart fran the ability and neooss!ty or choice 
·-
.· J between th~ .-:o;ood and tho ovU, the rational nnd the irrational. Personality, 
by dof1nition, ~cans tho ability t.o act either reasonably or unreasonably. 
l•cTar,gart snys that nn omnipotent God "could exist even 1r he r.Uled that 
nothing olso umuld exist and trot no laws should be true ••• •"310 Dut 
j 
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if' he nillcd. tl".!lt no laws ehould. be true, this itself' would bo a ls.w. 
Why does not r•ctngg;nrt follow his lot;ic to its conclusion and eay toot nn 
omnipotent God. could. nUl hi.'!lselt' out of' exiotoncef Doubtless he ':;ould 
renly thnt we nre urt;inc; tho !'net that ho hi.""lselt' Trould. ostnblioh. - that 
the conception or an or.mipotent God is contradictory. Dut our point is 
tlnt in COC!b~tin[; such nn interpretation or omnipotence ''oTnggart is but 
triflin; ~th words. Ho nowhere suc5esta that the esoentinl conditions 
of !'Orsonnl existence placo Hnitntions unon God. To ask tl'nt God Make the 
lnws of irrationnlity rntionnl• to nnke it possible to draw n eirculnr tri-
angle, or to crcato a universe in which GOodness could be a~hieved ~ithout 
ef'fort and tho ~ossibUity or evil• is in 1'cTo.ggart's ~orda• a question that 
should novor hnvo bron nskod. 315 It is request!~ tho.t God r.1ako a univorso 
in which irrntionnlity is the rule. This is n contradictory conce~tion. 
It is but another wny or d~and!nc that God obliterate his own personality. 
Philosophy accepts SC%!10 conception as ulti::nto. PoraonnHstic thoisn no-
oepts as an ultir.1nto !'not a ~upr~e Por3onnlity. Like every other pcrnonnl 
being God nust ohoooo botwoen a ro:-.oona.blo and an unreasonable way or lire. 
If there is evidence that he has chooen to be good and reasonable. we have 
no right to dc:nand that he shall contradict both his r.torcl character and his 
inherent nature in tho oroation of a univers'l in which goodness ~ay be achieved 
without struggle and the possibility or evil. 
c. This e:1keo it nossible thnt evil is n ~eans t~nrd the reali-
zation or tho good. 
As soon ns this noint io established '·cTn~art' s nnin obj oction 
to n non-ornninotent. crcntivo God loses its force. For o. God, actin~ 
reasonably. our present universe Mig;ht bo tho be3t possible, or indeed 
I 
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tho ooly univox-so, able to servo aa a ~oons to tho ronltzatton or .~:oodnoao. 
In this ovmt tho o:tiotonoo or ovU r.ould not roi'loct on God's chnro.otor. 
It '\'.ould bo o.Ulod only no nn incvit':'.blo oonsoquonoo of the opportunity 
to noh!ovo tho cood. •·o'Incgi.U"t h!.nnolf' cuct;osto t.hnt th!.o to tho only 
!1ot!\od by "'htch t:o nlcht roconoilo tho cxlstance or ovU rrtth tho {;Oodnoos 
or God. 
"It tiO cru1 no dctomtno tho rundn..,mtnl n<1turo of reality as to 
000 1rl'nt u .. oo:!ltnttono it Lomooos on tho t\OOCXT,'lltemont. or God' 8 
voUtiono, ,. o nl:;ht rtnd t.hnt., T-'htlo lt e.ado it l~oodblo t~.t 
tho untvoroo Should bo ont!roly dovoid of ov11 1 it did not r.:nke 
it t~~osolblo ti~t tho cood should nlnayo exceed tho ovlle" 316 
Tho oloailll-; 'ords of• tho quotutlon revool t.h'-' fact tho.t '•cte.ccart is think-
1.nc or God only ns n dirootin.:; ntnd, rnthcr t. ... :an na the L~ont e;round of 
·our value o::porionco. lio lo Jonl~ with tho nrr;u·Hnt rroc doal;;n. rnthor 
tinn tho r.ora.l nrc~ent. tlcm in diooovorinG tho.t atrug!;le, froodoo of 
ohoico c.nd thuo tho poao1bUity that non \: Ul c!-.oooe tho mil, nro noooo-
Olley to tho nohiovtnont or coodnooo, h::\vo v:-o not 0000 l:nOtJlodco or tr..e 
"fund.n.~ont.nl nature or roolity" nr.d 11t.ho U.nita.tiono Lt!'lO.t] 1t i.r!poooo on 
the c.ooor.l?liolr.ant or God' a volitions'l" l.nd dooa not thio lmowlod.::;o oorvo 
c.s nn hypothonio by which TIO roy rooonotlo tho oxistonoo of mil T:i.th tho 
goodnono of God? Tho ecplrlcnl !'not that thO nobloot charnotcr is usually 
n product or ou!'f'orin(; nnd of nlorort.uno; t.hnt thO r;ood rlll 1B not do-
pendent tron orlo:-nnl otrcmoto.noo; e.nd thnt no e:morionco, not oven tho 
~ost. try~. 0~ deprive ua or root.!.n~ tmt 07.T'Ol"1enoo ln tho bost ~osal.blo 
~nnor, GUPi'orts t:•to hypotheala o.nd robs evil or its o.r:--c.rently :-onnlr.t{;• 
leas chnrnctor. That t: lo to n onti.eraotory e7.plnnatlon or tho ~ount 
o.nd int.o:'le!ty o!' htr.tm euf!'ttinc onnnot bo olnt.-:cde Dut. it BOE:nS to t:nko 
evll noro lntolliclblo t111U'!. ·j~:. nn;r other \~~heal&• On t.hia thoory 
tho o:dstonco or ovtl is u dl.!'rtculty. dut 1t is not n oontrndtotton. 
j 
l 
~I ~i 
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Thus uo do not ncod to resort to '~oTar;gnrt' s oxpndient of asserting that 
contradictory propositions cnn be true. ~o hnvo valid proof or God's ox-
istonce in our oxporionce of vnluaa. r:e nbo kncm th.."l.t r;oodneas can bo 
,._ uon only flO n result cr atrue;c;lo nnd that 1 t is orten ach loved in hir:;hoat 
degree es a. result or sutforinc and ~isfortuno nobly rot. Those facts do 
not ~.ko evil appear entirely intolli0lblo. They do• ~e believe. justify 
us in our expootntion that the futuro Tlill conf"im the hypothoDis that wo 
have adopted. 
~·;o ha-.:o norT CO!':Iplotod our ar~ont to ehO\"t th::.t Y!cTar;gart.' o Abco-
lute is not fitted to serve no the ultimto conoopt1on ot a systm or phil-
oaophy. T•o ho:vo attropted. to provo tr.at. a.rlsinc as a "noed. or cocnition" 
alone. it cannot neat. t~o ncod or vnluo ~or1enoe.317 As used by ''cTae;e;a.rt 
it is nn abstract lo0ica1 principle that cannot ev~ cxplnin tho lo~ical or· 
dor or nh1c~1 finite solves arc dependent nc=::borUS Even loss able is it to 
account for tho objectivity assorted by our ju~~ts or value and to dar.on-
strnto th~ t;oodnoss or tho univorao.319 l.s ~ purely structural conception 
it loaves t!10 ti!':c proco:s. rlth its ch::ln;;o. ovil and irtT'C'.rfcctton a. nystery.320 
r;o have a.ttcnptod to ?rove t:'l".t tho idea or a Supr~o !'orson, or 
God is o.doquatc o.a r.n ulti!:at.o nhtloso!)hic conoe~tton nn:l c.s suoh is :1blo 
to o.eeou."1t ror tho facts or eXjlori.enco, :-<J.ny or -:-:h1ch aro loft unaX";"lnincd 
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RECAPITUlATION. 
rio shall conclu:lo our discussion or "cTo.ggart' s philosophy or 
1• religion "With a rooapitulatl.on or tho oain points or our o.rgu::tent and a 
suonnry by chapters. 
1. Y'cTo.ggo.rt dei'inas religion as· an "motion rostint; on a convic-
tion of' o. harmony between ourselves and the universe o.t lo.rgo." As o. des-
criptive definition this is adequato.321 
2. !'cTaggart establishes his contention thnt rolibion so conceived 
can bo justified only by meto.physico.l 1nvostigation.322 
3. In genero.l, troTaggart' s notive n."ld approach is lot;ical and otruc-
tural, rather tht!.n ooro.l and functional. Ho believes his ttothod to be or-
ganic. In roality it is o.bstract and lo~ioa1.323 
4. His Method is oore synoptic in his psycholo,~ and study or tho 
self' in its relation to tho physical world.324 He would hold that tho sub-
ject ~tter of' psychology is tho self' as a. unique whale. Such a self' is 
not a Mere activity or its body. Inste-J.d, body, o.s o. r:1rt of' the physical 
world, !lust bo conceived in tert1a or conscious experience. T!cTe.gga.rt' a 
interest 1n logical analysis is constantly in dan&or or degrading thio 
emplrlcnl self into a soul substance. This tendency is especially o.ppo.r-
ent in his ethics o.nd theory or o.. series or existences vrlthout ':':'cr:tory. 
5. His ethical study of tho solf' ill incondstont nnd vacillating. 
Uo f'ntls to define the good. i!is es:;entially logical conception of tho 
eternal pcrf'cction or the universe results in a statio conception of' tho 
strorErle coo:l. His ethical deteminisn so~s to bo a corolla.ry of this 
j 
.-------------------.·--------~-:----.. ---------=------=::xr:"":: -·- ·- -
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propo3!t!on. The contradiction between such a st9.tio peri'ection and the 
tine proceos -with its OMngo and evil is reS'flonsible !'or his divided alle-
giance between tl}eorotioal pcr.t"ectioni~ and practical hodonisr.l.325 
6. This failure to !'nco fundnnental ethical facts 1s seen in tho 
abstract character of his dialectic !"lethod. Ignoring the ethical a priori, 
his whole-idea becor.tos n part-idea and his dialectic process issucn in a 
conception or Absolute Reality tr~t is a structural abstrnction.326 
7. Ilo'We7er. his dinlocticnl !":ethod eophnsizes the nind' s d~and 
for wholeness and its signtficanco for philosophy. Ias error is a failure 
to aee that this is a der.nnd of t!loral Oleperience as well as of coc;nition.327 
e. Hot seeing tho necesJity to prove that our nor3l ~orience 
refers to an objective ~oral order. ''cTac~rt reroly cs~es. rnther than 
d€r.lonatrntos. that the univorso. conceived in terns of spirit. is righteous 
in clnrncter. 328 
• 9. liio conception of ultiMate ronlity to n society o~ finite selves 
tirr.elessly e:dstinr; in a state or lave. In denying personality to the unity 
his society bocooos a r1ere aggregate, loo.vint; unOXT'lainod the unity of our 
experionce.329 
10. Ills statio conception or tho present, eternal port'ection or 
the universe directly contradicts tho roolit:; of' tho time proceaa, chnnc;o, 
ir.tperroction nnd avn. Adr.li tttne that ho has no solution for tho problco, 
he orrs in hold!QG that tho ~robleo is also insoluble f'or any other idcnl-
!stio s•rsta:::.. 330 
.. 
----l 
I 
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n. J"ost or tho dU'f'iculties of his systO!!l could be avoided by 
abandon!~ a lo::;ical Absolute ror n Supr~e Pcroon, or God. For such n 
pnrson ti'r.le and chnngo could be ulti!"!ntely roo.l. His rational and ~oral 
exnerionce ~ould constitute the lOGical and r.oral orders which we exper-
ience. las ~ood purpose, involvin::; the gift of freed~ or oholce to tho 
solves whOI!l ho creates, TIOuld bo CO!'!lpa.tible with evil regarded no a noano 
to a ri&hteous end, - tho achievenent of value by finite selves in co8per• 
ation nith God.331 
12. Suoh a conception TIOUld serve as an adequate basis or re-
ligion as defined above, der.!onatratin~, rather than assuming, that the 
hn.rtl!ony .or tho universe is Moral in oha.raot~. 332 
Stn~'ARY BY CHAM'ERS • 
Tho follO'Wing emptor by chapter sm-ary is ~cnoral, rather than 
detailed. Ref'oronoes to tho dota.ib of tho o.rgmcnt will be found in the 
analytical table or contents on pngos one to nino, inclusive. 
CHA.."'TER O!lE. 
In tho introduotion333 we e:m~incd. •~cTa;;gart' o definition of 
roli::;ion and or its rolo.tion to scionco, r.oraUty and philosophy. rio 
" concurred in his vien· or reli::;ion as an emotion resting on a conviction 
or a mmony botwoon ourselves and tho universe at large" and in his con-
, .• 
\ ./ elusion thnt !"etnpeysics alone is able to decide whether such a mroony 
exists. net.t.hcr scionco nor !:'!orality can do no. Consequently philooophy 
and religion• as ~oll as soionoe and norallty. are or great nrnotical !~-
portnnoe. AGainst ''cTng1;0-rt we urged trot both arc tho concern or the coc-
r.10n r.:nn as woll ns or tho phl.looophcr. 
·····~ 
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In discussing l'cTngr;o.rt' s answer to the question "Is There I:hr-
nony Dotv:oe:1 tho Solf' o.nd Its Environi:~cnt," we considered first his view 
of~ payc!1olo;-;tcal ~ture .£.t ~ ~· i'•e accepted o.s valid his defin-
ition of tho self and his distinction between the concrete self and the 
abstract soul• Sowovor, not only in tho devol~cnt or his psychological 
thoory, but in. his othios and !:!etaphysics, ''cTaggo.rt compromises m th the 
soul-psychology which he professes to reject. 
In trcatinr; ~ rolo.tion 2£. ~ .!!!.!:. _i2 physical nature, '·cTaggart 
correctly insists that tho selr is a clue to the naturo of tho physical 
world. Far fran being a r.ero activity of ~atter, the self finds thnt it 
t'lust conceive !'hysical n!lture in te~s of spirit. This 1:3 o. logical nee• 
essity. l1ut for such a dc:nonstration l'cTe.~gart does not look to science. 
The position of science is provisional in thit it raises and becomes in• 
valved in fu."ld.al:lcnto.l difficulties which only philosophy can salvo. i.r.nt 
~!cTe.ggo.rt consistently ic;nores is tmt science is also provisional in tl1!lt 
it cakes a prolirninury abstraction from considerations of quality or vnlue • 
.lia:fover wo found ourselves in agre~ont with his ~:;cmeral conclusion that 
the self r.rust interpret its physical envtron:::1ent in toms or its 0'\m nature. 
A certain hnmony th'lrofore exists. 
But to this o. mroony or t'loro.l cho.ract.ert We found tmt ucTa~art 
ncr.ror ao:-ioualy srnpplos with this questton. Ho ~o.kos the t'listnke of assun-
int; thnt he hna nlrendy established the fact of hlmony. that a hnmony or 
subntunco is n h'lmony of ethical nature. Consequently his d1acuas1on of." 
"The Et_hical Nature of tho Self" is inadequate. He begins v:ith the careless 
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assW!ption tm.t tho "provisional" view of science nuat bo accepted as 
fin.al and mU.d for philOsOJ?tw• Tho result is an ethical dotor.:tinlsn 
tlnt cr.Tade:J tho basic ft'.ct nnd organizing principle of noral oxperi-
oncc ... tho fact or pcrsonn.l obl!t;e.t!on. l'isstn& this !'la.jor point !'o-
TnQ;nrt confuses id&.lls "Jith desires nnd reclines. and advances ploo.s-
uro-pain calculation as nn ethical criterion, only to rotrnct it on the 
vory r;roundo for "hich ho hns preferred it to n porfootionistic thoory. 
Thio wnvcrinG bo~~;ocn thcorati.cs.l perfectionism nnd practical hedonisn 
r.o raund to bo rooted in tho fundn.":!ontal difficulty or his S"Jst«t• - tho 
contrndlction botucon tho lo.:;icnll:r dor!rootrotod eternal porrcotion of 
tho universe and tho e."tporienccd fncts or c!"'.nnt;o. ir.tpcrf'cction and evil. 
i':o sut;;gosted trot his ethtoc.l dcteminisn is also dependent upon hio 
conviction trot in rrovi.r.,; tho physio~l t:niverse to be of tho sa."':lo ~­
oto.."lco a.s tho self • ho has also ahor.n it to bo of a. r.oral character. .iie 
boliavos t.~.t his lo;;ic ros established tho ~resent and eternal p-:-rl'co-
tion or t!1o universe. Therefore nll thtnr;s nust be dotcminod by tho 
good• nnd evil io in sane sense unroal. Consequently l'cTar:;ga.rt' s ethi• 
CD.l theory contributoo nothing to tho answer or his r:eta.ph:ysical ques-
tion. lie tl'linb that he hns established tho fact or lnmony indepen-
dently of ~ otlucal UrlOStiGa.tione 
CI~ER FOUR.336 
In discussing "oTnc&nrt' o concQ?tion or "Tho nota:physical Hnturo 
or tho Self" wo oOUGht. to nrovo th!lt tho rntal error noted above 'Ml.B '-lade 
p03Giblo by hill USC or a. too-exclusively lo~ica.l ~othode I.e nrcuod that 
his dlulocticnl prococs io c.botrnct. l'ihilo it profossoo to -r,ork upon the 
concroto ;:holonooo or cxporionco it really tr;noros both tho rom and contant 
~-----------.-----------------~·--------------.~---."· .. -.-.. -.----------. ·-· 
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or vulua ~;pcrior..ce. Conoaquantly it re~e..rda the sell' as u. lo{;icn.l ~rinoiplo6 
rc.thor ti1.UD. o.s em ethical e.Gont. It interprets the universe in terns or 
lot;icc.l Gtructuro. It issuoo in Q. COi.lCoption or o.n Absolute that is bt.>t 
a. stc.to or lo.;ioo.l !nroony. 
CHA.PX!li FIVE. 337 
Tie than proceeded to consider the religiOUts consequencoa or this 
narrcmly lo~ico.l ~et.hod. We roitoratod. our charge that tho notivo.ting rorco 
or !~cTaet;o.rt' s dialootio 6 his rlhole-Idan, is but a l'tlrt-Idoo., a "nooi ot 
cor;nition" and not a. dcnnnd. ror noro.l wholeness. Thua it is d.oOl!led to 
issue in e. purely logical conception or the Abooluto. This conc~t!.on 
cannot evon account for tho loG1oo.l order in r.hioh finite selves parti• 
oipato but do not create. Neither cnn it explain the functional aspects 
ot ornerienco, i.e., phyaico.l and ~oral processes, and tho objootive or-
ders wrJ.ch these processes iE?lY• lie argued that the conception or a 
Suprooo Person avoida these fatal di£i'iculties nnd does juotico to both 
structurnl e.nd runctionul aapoots oi' e.~erienoo. In particular, ouch 
a conception a.cco"Unts i'or tho objectivity cla.i::lod "oy our !"'ornl judg:::ento, 
findinG that thoy point to e. ccrnl ordor ultiMtoly rool in tho Supr<r.o 
!~ind. In thio l'f!lY tho univors9 i::! found, ra.thor thc.n aostv.cd• to bo ~;ood, 
nnd tho r~ony roquirod by reli;ion is oota.blishod. 
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FOOT NOTES. 
Tihon s. source is frequently referred to it is desie;nated by tho 
nbbrovi~tion appear!~ after tho title or tho source in tho biblioc.rnphy. 
Tlma DR refers to Scmo Docpas 2£. 1iolif:i1on. sw. to Studios~~ llce;oUnn 
Cosmolo(dX, nnd Sib t.o Studies~~ Ho:;clinn Dtnloctic. Iehan the bib-
liot;raphy gives but one Trork or an author. the roi'ercnce to th1t source 
is in tho forr.1 or tho author's n~,.,e. follo;;od by the par;o nU"lber. \'lhon 
reference is n!ldo to other sections of this thesis• the terns "see above." 
"soc bclar." or "thesis" nre used, follor.oi by tho pa~o n~bers. The 
abbreviation CD indicates that tho Tlriter is conscious or direct depen• 
, dc~oo upon class discussion or locturo notes. 
1. FrO!:l tho ata.ndfloint or nrosentinr; HoTnJgart' s own rolir;ious ~hiloaophy. 
2. 
.. 
.,. 
4. 
5. 
s. 
This is not true fram the sto.ndpoint of their influence upon tho wri-
ter's om thou.:;ht. To othor books appoorine; in this bibliot;raphy the 
writer is t:;rretly indebted. lie has atter:t))ted to follO\'r no ono slav• 
ishly. But he is conscious thnt tho ini'luenoo of oertain thinkerff !'-"ld 
books has l'Ornootcd his thot~ht. In t:-:.19 connoction he desires to men-
tion w. n. Sorley' s T'ornl V~lues ~ ~ ~2£. ~ nnd E. s. Briiht.-
mn' s Ir.troduct!on .!:,2 Philosopcy. Hot only to Professor Bright!"'.e.n s 
book• but to tho inspiration or his tce.c!unc. tho writer is particu-
larly indebted. iihilo the writer alone is responsible for tho con-
clusions heroin oat forth. at ~.nny points ho is directly dependent 
upon clans discussions or lecture notes. iihenovor such depondence has 
b~'!'n r9cocnized, rather than 'IIDConscious, it h:l.s boon designated by 
tho abbrovi~tion c.o. 
DR •• P• 3. 
Brieht..~o.n • pn • 317-322. 
DR •• PP• 5-G. 
Ibid., n. 4. 
Ibid •• PP• 11-12. 
7. Ibid •• n. 10. 
e. ~'cTnr;._,--nrt hi.-:eelf does not -ake this orooiso distinction nor use those 
- L tel':!:&• Soo Brightman, PP• 317-322. 
9. DR •• P• s. 
10. Ibid •• P• 7. 
11. Ibid., PP• 7-10. 
12. roid •• P• 1. 
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13. Ibid., -rm. 1, 3, 32. 
14. Ibid •• P• 28. 
16. Ibid., P• 29. 
•• \ lG. Thid., P• :s. 
17. Ibid •• P• 13. 
18. Ibid., P~• 13-1~. 
19. Ibid •• P• 34 
20. Ibid., P• 35. 
21. Ibid •• P• 33. 
22. Ibid •• P• 33. 
23. Ibid., 13-lG. 
24. Ibid., 14-22. 
25. Ibid., PT'• 22-24. 
26. !M.d., P• 23, 24. 
27. !b!.d., P• 22. 
28. Ibid., PP• 24-28. 
29. !bid., P• 25. 
:so. Ibid., P• 26. 
31. Ibid., P• 28. 
32. Ibid., !'• 2Gl. 
33. !bid., P• 293. 
34. Ibid., P• as. 
,.; 35. Ibid., PP• 292·293. 
36. Thesis, Chapter v., PP• 84-86 especially. 
37. sm., P• 1E7. 
38. on., P• :s2. 
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39. SID. • P• 254. 
40. DR., P• 295. 
42. Thosia, C~~pter II, PP• 15•21. 
45. Thesis, Ch'lptor 1V ., PP• 54·74. 
46. Thesis, Ch~ptor v., PP• 75-93. 
47. sa: •• P• 4. 
48. sm., P• 57J SliD., P• 21. 
49. S!JC., P• 57. 
so. on •• P• 1oe-1oD. 
51. S!JC., PP• 33-34. 
52. SEC., P• 34. 
53. DR., 231; Rov~ow or R~;oo, P• 6Gl; SI~., P• 85. 
54. SEC., P• 254; SHD., P• 212. 
55. snc •• P• 37. 
sa. !btd., P• ~1. 
57. Ibid., PP• 41-42. 
58. Tho tolloo::int; critlcico probably o.pplios only to nn earlier stage in 
ncTagcart' s thOU\:;ht. In a note to tho second edition ot SIC., P• 55, 
he e:cplnins tmt he no longer holds "tho views as to the relation or 
tho solr and tho objocto or T:"hich it is conscious, 'Vlhioh o.ro oxpluincd 
in Sections 24-30." Those sections inclwe the throe passnr;os criti-
chod here. Zbv·avor on PP• 2£4-285 tho s!·t~o •:iOTI's are statod TFith no 
quali.tyln6 nato. · Doubtless ~·cTar;go.rt intends tho one note to ref'er to 
all I'Jtattronta or ~l">.o v10'.7 in tho book. He has not altcrnd tho texts 
os he thinkn those "limrs true expositions or Hogol' s ~hilosophy. Since 
..-:o hnvo no later state-:c:nt indieutillf; tho c::tont D.nd implica.tton:J or 
"cTa~nrt' s ohnll{;e or view, T1e C!lil but criticize his thoory as it stands. 
To un 1 t s~s nn intec;rnl pnrt or his syotcr:. 
69. Sl£., P• 23. 
.., 
,. 
• lOS-
eo. Ibid., P• ""'-· 
Gl. Ibid., !-P• 25-26. 
62. Ibid., PP• 2G4-265. 
63. See bel011, PP• 60-51; 60-66. 
64. See be1cw, PP• 30-'3'1· 
65. Soo bo1or., p;~q~··- ~. 
66. SEC., Cl-:npter IX, onp. P• 284. 
67. DR., PP• 173-174, 179. 
ee. SED., p. 214, ooe note 63. 
69. Soe bo1ow, PP• 66• 7~. DR., C~ptor III, SEC, Chapte~ II. 
70. DR., P• 134. 
11. Ibid., P• 12e. 
72. Ibid., P• 130. 
13. T!:os!s, PP• 72-74:. 
74. Tsnnorr, r• uo. 
75. DR., P• EO. 
78. 0.1., PP• 78-€0. 
77. Ibid., P!'• el-83. 
78. Ibid., PP• e2-e:s. 
79. Ibid., PP• 83-100. 
sc. Ibid., PP• 87-88. 
81. Ibid., P• 91. 
82. Thie 1s not !~cTc.ggo.rt' s tomino1ogy but it su::r:""Arizos his conclusions. 
DR., PP• 94-9S. 
ea. Ibid., PP• 98·99. 
84. !M.d., p • 99; SIID., P• 24. 
85. DR., p • S2e 
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e5. Ibid.~ P• 91. 
87. SHD •• P• 84. 
ee. Ibid., P• 83. 
89. Ibid •• P• lSG. 
90. Told •• P• 16. 
91. Ibid., P• 36. 
92. Ibid.~ P• 187. 
93. Soo below, PP• 30-31; 57-59; 76-78; 82•84. 
94. DR •• PP• 97-99. 
95. Ibid., 99-103. 
96. Sao bol0'1'1, PP• 60-66. 
97. Soc belcr.r, PP• 79-88. 
98. Thlo io our u.:n :rt.o.ta:!Cmt, not "cTngcnrt•a. It is doubtful whothor ho 
'\"'ould accept it. Our oritioiS!l or hii:l is that his ethics are an appen-
dix to hi:J !:1Ctc.peyeios. Tho-J do not furnich data for his philosophy to 
interpret. Rnthar thoy are dcduood fr01:1 his r.totapbysioal conclusion. 
Thosin. PP• 76-78. 
100. src., Cr..n!)tor IV; DR., Chapter v. 
102. Ibid., PP• 1621 270; SHD •• P• 30. 
103. oa •• P• 275. 
104. Ibid., P• 277. 
105. SIJ: •• P• 267 • 
Alt· 106. SED., PP• 213-214; SEC., P• 280. 
;-) 
j 
101. snc., P• 256. 
108. Ibid., P• 251. 
109. Ibid., P• 259. 
... , 
•· 
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110. DR •• 140. 
111. Ibid., 141. 
112. Ibid •• ~· 113 • 
1l;:j. Sco nbcr.o, PP• 23·25 
11~. DR., PP• 1~~. 177; SED •• P• 24. 
11~a. T~ylor, A. 8., ~hi1. Rev., P• 420. 
llG. DR., P• 1~6. 
llG. Ibid., ?P• 1~7-149. 
117. Ibid •• ?• 153. 
llC. Ibid •• P• 157. 
119. Ibid., P• 151. 
120. Ibid., P• 1G8. 
121. Ibid., P• 160. 
122. ~J!d •• P• 161. 
123• ~!d •• P• 164. 
124. Ho iGilorcs thc::l in this context. But sco sm •• PP• 24G-241. 
125. DR •• PP• lG5-lG7. 
120. Ibid., P• lC8-lG9. 
121. Ibid •• P• lCS. 
12u. snc •• P• 142. 
130. Ibid., P• 148. 
131. sa::., P• 24e. Dut .cee PP• 100-101 whore ''cTaggart. says that t.hcro 1s 
s~o ~ron!~ in s~ylnc th:lt I should endcnvo:- to cake others do tho.t. 
which t!1cy thcmao1vos think morally right, but tmt such a standard is 
useless in ~y O"rn case. As ustnl he qualU'les tho statcrent, but adds: 
"Such c. criterion can nover civo a ranson why tho nerally good should 
bo d~!lir~." 
It is tho one criterion which can give such a roason. Unless 
I desire and om true to the good,I ropuclinte my character as a noral be-
ing and ny noral lito is involved in contradiction. 
.. 
r------------------~~-----------.-.-.. --.----------------------~----~-------_-._~-___ __ -__ -~·-~-" .. -~.·--~--
•lOG • 
lS2. SII~., P• 241. 
133. ~q., P• 170. 
134. Ibid., P• 172. 
135. Ibid., P• 171. 
13G. r~id., P~· 174-175. 
137. Ibid., PP• 17£-179; SilC., P• 140. 
138. Seo ab~Jo1 PP• 20-21. 
l~G. Ibid., P• 9:. 
142. Thonls, Clnptcr V • PP• 76-84. 
1~~. sua., p~ 252. 
1~. Ibid.~ P• 100. 
145. Ibid., ~· 101. 
14C. SUD., P• 232. 
147. sue •• P~· 98-99. 
14S. l~ooro, ?P• 342-344. 
149. SID., Ch.:.ptor V, osp. PP• 178-100. Thosis, Cmpter V • PT'• 84-es. 
100. sm., P• 119. 
151. SEC., P• 99. 
152. snc., P• 12s. 
Soo nlco p. 174. "wmtcvor does hnp~cn to a ~ornl boirl{;• what. her it 
be !lin or Vtrtuo, is, when it hn..,pens. a nora1 advance. This is a 
classic illuotro.tion cf tho Y!O.Y in which ~·cTa~flrl rorcoa tho fo.cto 
oi' norr.l ~-q>orionco to fit his 1o-.;icnlly dcr.~onstrntod oterno.1 per-
fcotion or the univorao. Thoais, PP• 64, e4-85e 
153. sm., P• 127. 
154. I boH.C\o this crttioiST.I to be just in rcl'ercnce to n pror:1inent ten-
dO:lO] in ~~cTa.ct;art • a thoue;ht. or oourso thoro is another tondoncy. 
Tr.c :-1orc <r.p1ricn1 tendency io seen in his ar&UCent, or ir.tpliod con-
.. ,-------------------------·---::-:-:--:-:-:-.-:-.-:-:-.. -:-.:::-... ::::"'.-::-:-:. -=--::::. -=--_:~~----·-----~-- --- ·-- ~ 
-.107-
viction, thnt. in tho c.""tpcr1onco of plcnsuro we mvo our 'helrt. insic;~ 
into the Mture or the Absolute Good. ThtJs he seeos to select his 
hedonic criterion for ~piricnl roosons nnd not. ~ore!~ bcca.u::e of t1 
dovU~t1y-earo attitude tarmrd ethical nroblcns. The letter e.tt!.• 
tude ic very O.!'pa.ront in the -rns snGes ju:rt. quoted. Soc note 152. 
Cp. thesis, T'P• 46-49. 
155. SIJ:., P• 253. 
156. Ibid., l"• 254. 
157. Ibid., P• 96. 
158. Ibid., P• 122. 
159. Ibid., PP• 96, 119. 
100. "'cTa.gc;nrt usos tho ten-ts "ha!'Pinoss"nnd "fneasure" int.orcl-ul~~bly. 
no believe this to be an error. Tho i'oreer involves a rororence to 
principle and syste!:l which is not all os sential to tho la:ttor. 
sw., Chapter IV. 
151. snc., P• 110. 
162. Ibid., P• 119. 
16~. Thosis, PP• 28-30. 
164. T'oore, P• 346. 
165. SI~., P• 261. 
166. Ibid., P• 110. 
167. Ibid., P• 96. 
168. Ibid., PP• 258-259. 
169. Ibid., PP• 285; SHD., 228•229. 
1 '10. SHD., PP• 224•226; SHC., Chapter IX. 
H0t1 nuch or this criticisn applies to Y'cTe.eo~rt• s finn! thou~ht iB a 
question. In a note to tho second edition he states that he no longer 
accepts the nrguMonta to prcr.ro ttnt. knOTTlod:;o and volition cannot bo 
o.bsolutoly real, but that ho believes "ttnt. every state or conscious-
ness in absolute reaUty h a sta.to nltke or kncmledr,e, or .,-oUtion 
and of" love." P. 293., sm. It is t.mfortunate that we have no 
elaboration of this C~e of ViEm• Ina.s:mch ns hiS t.roat.~cr.t. of 
the good is ao vague it is doubtful whother thia c~e or view would 
MVO m!Ch offoot trpon hia ethics. or even upon his Ccr.!OCjt1cm. of thO 
state 1n absolute reality. 
- 108-
171. SID., P• 260. 
172. Ibid., P• 289. 
173. Ibid., P• 119. 
174. Ibid •• P• 124. 
176. Ibid •• P• 126. 
176. Ibid., P• 127. 
171. Ibid •• P• 122. 
178. Ibid., P• 123. 
119. Ibid., P• 128. 
180. trooro, PP• 360-362. 
181. sac., P• 122. 
182• Ibid., PP• 99~107. 
183• Ibid., PP• 103-104. 
184. Ibid., P• 2. 
185. sno., P• 1. 
187• Ibid., P• 92. 
1ee. sac., P• 1. 
189• Thesis, PP• 22•23, 60-62. 
100. sac •• P• 60. 
191. Ibid., P• 1. 
192. sno., P• 113. 
193. Ibid., P• 39. 
194• Ibid., P• 92. 
195. Ibid., PP• 91•92; of. 67, 22, 102. 
198· SliD., P• 28. 
197. Ibid., P• 201. 
')< 
t 
- .. 
- 109-
198. Sao below, PP• 33-39. 
199. See below. P!'• 76-84. 
200. sao., P• 253. 
201. See above, PP• 39-41) see below, PP• 76-84. 
202. SED., PP• 17•18. 
204. SOO., PP• 9-16. 
205. Ibid., P• 9. 
206. Ibid •• P• 17. 
207. Ibid., t'- 285. 
208. Ibid., P• 291. See note 170. 
209. Thea is. p. 1. 
210. Thea is pp • e7-e8. 
211. Sorloy, P• 352. 
212. DR •• P• 289. 
213. Seo abovo, P• 50, 51. 
214. Thosia, PP• 79-82. 
216. See below, PP• 60-51. 
216. snc., P• 285. 
21?. roid., P• 268. 
This quotation is not tnkon !'ron a aeotiori covered by the not.e to the 
second edition, P• 293. Seo noto 170 of this thoais. 
219. See above, P• 41. 
e 220. Seo belcm, PP• 84-86. 
221. SID., P• 1'15. Sao above, PP• 30-4:0. 
222. SID., P• 209. SII:., PP• 282, 292. 
224. sm., P• 210. 
........ ~, --~--~w, ........... =~----------~A ----· -
-110-
225. Calkins, RcvtC'.'l' of SHC., P• 89. 
226. ?PP., P• 381. 
• \ 
227. c.o • 
228. See bol07T, ?!'• 79-82. 
229. SHC., Chllptor II; DR. Chapters III, IV. 
2&). sm., 1'• 32. 
231. Sec be10\'11 PP• 84-86. 
232. sm., P• 29. 
233. Ibid., P• 47. 
234· Ibid., P• 47. 
235• Ibid., PP• 50·51. 
236. OR., PP• 120-121. 
2S'i• Sl£., P• 34; SW., Chnptor V. 
2SS. Soo below, PP• 76-78. 
239. na., P• 21e. 
240· c.o. 
241• Seo bolaw, C2-8'i. 
242. Soo abovo, PP• 21-26. 
24S. DR., P• 101. 
244• Ibid., P• 104. 
245. Ibid., P• 105 
246. DR., 134• 
,~: 247. sm., 49-55. DR •• PP• 127-133, 137. 
248. SII: •• P• 49. 
246a· 'J:hcsis• P• 68. 
249. SDC., P• 60-52; DR., 132-133. 
260• OR., P• 133-136; Sit: •, PP• 52-54. 
0 &L:ZUi!&Udli£&2£UMJlUJ!.JJJ& .. W 
-' 
261. SEC., P• 51. 
2E2. oa., P• 102. 
253. Tsnnorr, P• 253. 
254. Tsanof'r, PP• 135•137. 
-111-
255. Theaio, PP• 34;39-41; G4-:s; G8-70. 
256. DR., 166-188. 
257. Cp. 'PPP., PP• 877-382, and Allm, Louise VI. 
255. SEC., PP• 56-69, 213. 
259. DR., P• 185. 
260. Ibid., P• 186-188; SI£., PP• 60•57. 
2G1. Sec bolO'n'1 P• 84. 
262. SHD., PP• e1-e2. 
253. Ibid., P• e1. 
264. Ibid., P• e2. 
265. Soo abcvo, P• 75. 
266. Soe nbove, PP• 64-55. 
267. S!JD., P• 201. 
26e. Soe abovo, PI'• 57-59. 
269. Sea abovo, P• GO. 
210. SIC., P• 47 • 
270a. Ibid., P• 61. 
211. Ibid., P• 63. 
212. Ibid., P• 61. 
273. SHD., ~· 210. 
274. ~., P• 381. 
276. rr.B., P• €2. 
275a.. c.o. 
~ ...................... ~----------------------------------~~~A 
'-
-112-
27G. Soe abovo. PP• C4-G6. 
277. llrichtnnn, P• 138. 
278. Sea abovo. PP• 5G-57. 
279. Thesis, PP• 57-50; G9·70; 7u•78. Cp. PP• 39-41. 
281. Thoois PP• 79-82. 
282. Brir,ht.r.:!lll, Chapter V, osp. P• 164: Sorloy, Croptor 1.III, esp. PP• 346-349. 
283. DR., P• 254. 
284. See abovo, ,. 1. 
285. See abovo. PP• 39-41. 
286. Thesis, PP• 66-67. 
287. Seo above, PP• 56-57. 
288. SED •• pP• 201. 171. 
289. SliD., P• 1135. 
290. Ibid., 'PP•I58..f59. 
291. Ibid., PP• 162·163. 
292. Ibid., P• 16 ... 
293. Ibid., P• 171. 
294. Ibid., p.170. 
296. Ibid., PP• 174-178. 
29u. Ibid., P• 177. 
297. Ibid., P• 179. 
298. Ibid., P• 186. 
299. Ibid., P• 196. 
300. Ibid., P• 1G4. 
301. Ibid., P• 192. "llaw tho Absolute Idea only boc0r.1es k:ncmn to us throur;h 
n. nrocoss and consequently o.s sor.othi.nf; incon;;lotc a;.d in:1crrect." 
\Itn!lcs ours). 
~~~~~~~------------------·-------------------- ---:::r... - ------
ft;· 
- 113 -
P• 193. "tho eternal reaU.sation or the Absolute Idea; and tho exist-
once or cmnce a.nd ovn. nre. ror ua ao T:O nre, nbsoltr..cl~· incompatible, 
nor -cs.n wo oven inngine a wny in r.hioh they TiOU1d coo.se to be so." 
302. "cConnell, F •. J. 
303. Rovi~ of Royoe, P• 559. 
304. Sett above, P• 15. SHC., P• 38. 
305. DR., 234, not.o i. S~., Chnptor II. 
306. DR., PP• 259-260, 266. 
307. Ibid., P• 257. 
308. Ibid., PP• 224•233, 217. 
309. Ibid., ~· 217. 
310. Ibid., P• 207. 
311. Ibid., P• 237. 
He nloo r;ivos re.eoing r.ontion to several other less ii:Iportnnt ari;tmcnta. 
312. Thcsic, PP• 64-65; 79-82. 
313. Sco above~ p·~. 69-70; 82-e.4:. 
314. DR., P• Z4e. SED., P• 52. 
315. D~., PP• 2G7, 217. 
310. IM.d •• p • 26E • 
317. Thcats .. r-p. 78-76. 
318. Thecla, PP• 78-82. 
319. Tc.onie, PP• ez-e4. 
320. Thoois, PP• 84·87. 
321. Theoir., P• l-2. 
322. Thesis,pp. 3-10. 
323. Thesis, ?P• 25·26; 30-31; -!0-U; 49-00; 57-f,l; 62-64; 67-'lO.Ch:lptora IV nnd V. 
324. Thoais, Chaptor II, PP• 15-27. 
325. Thooi~, Clnptcr III, PP• 28-53. 
.--------------~_--------·----------.. -...... -. ----_-,:;;r~~ ·-- --·----· ------
-114-
326. Thesis, PP• 57-58; 76-78; 82-84. 
327. Thesis, !'!'- 56-5'8'; 61-62; 75-78. 
328. Thea!.s, P!'• 40-41;E2-84. 
•• 329. Thesis, 'P?• 60-51; 64-661 79-82. 
330. Theois, PP• 13-4-1; 64; &1-87. 
331. Thesis, cr.np":.cr v • PP• 75-93. 
332. 'i'hosin, pP• 1, 40-11; 82-84. 
333 .. Thos!.n, PP• l-14. 
3:34. Thos!.~:~, PP• 15-27. 
335. Thooie, p~. 2C-G3. 
336. Thosis, PP• 54·74. 
337. Thesio, P':"• 75-93 
.............................. ~ .. Hti·------------------------------------~A· _ 
e-· 
• 
-115-
BIBLIOGRAP.Hf. 
Sources of special valuo are i'ollowod by a cmzont indicating 
tho nature or their contribution. Those of little or no inportanoo from 
tho standpoint or our probl~ appear withe~ c~ent. 
Tho capital letters in pnronthesos following certain sources 
indicate tho ~:ethod or designating those sources in the root notos. 
I. BY f!oTAGGART HO'SELF. 
A. Books. 
l'cTo.ggart, Joln T!. E., ! 'CO!:Il:lontary; .2!! Hegel's Logic. Cam-
bridge: Ce.r.Wridgo University Proaa, 1910. 311 PP• 
---, Human Itm10rtal1ty ~ Pre-existence. !l. Y .: 
Longnan' a Groen and Co., 1915. 119 PP• 
Roprintod from !2!:!! Dogwas ~Religion. 
····-----, ~ Dorr.a.s ~ RoU.r;ion. London: Arnold, 1906. 
299 PP• (DR) 
Clear exposition of r•oTaggart' s reli~ious position. 
Inportant. but not so funda'!:lonto.l as Studios in the 
Hegelian Comoloey. - -
----, Studios_!:! !.!:!2 Hor;oUan Cosmolorq. Cambri~o: Ctm-
bridge University Pross, 1918. 293 PP• (Sl£) 
Probably the noat irtportant for our problem. Dis-
cussion of particular probl81:1S, !:lOst of th01:1 being 
or religious s~tricance • 
-------, Studios _!!. ..!:12! Hopolian Dialoottc. Ccnbrid{;o: Can-
bridge University Prosa, 1922. 259 PP• (sm) 
Discussion and dot"ense or roT~ 1 a philosophical 
noth.Od and general conclusions. Very !J!tport.o.nt. 
•• 
~ ~--- ----- -- -I.... ~ -~------ .. - • 
- 116 -
l!cTa:;gart, ,!!!! Nnture ~ Existence. CW!Ibridge: Car.tbridge Uni-
versity Preas, 1921. 309 PP• (tlE) 
Highly tochnion1. or little valuo tor our problem • 
B. Articles. 
f'cTaggo.rt, John H. E •• "An Ontolo;ico.l Idealtm" in Contor:'!Po-
!!:!:l Brit.!!,h Philosop~. J. u. l'uirhoad, editor. 
N. Y.s l~illan., 1924. Pp. 251-269. 
) 
Brtof' and technical atattr:~ent or t'cTaggo.rt t s general 
position. or little value tor this problOl!le 
----, "Imi!lorto.ltty and t!onad1stio IdeaUsn." l.'oniot, 31 
(1921), 316-317. A ~eply to Tsanorr•a crittcisn. 
----, "The Individualism or Value." 
18 (1908), 433-455 • 
Int. Jour. Ethics. 
__. -··-----
.... ... , "The l-Toaning or Causality." ~~ 24 (1915), 326-344 
-· ... , , "Personality" in~· .!!!!• ~ Ethics. Jar.tes Iaatings, 
editor. Vol. IX, PP• 773-781. 
---. "The Unroa.Hty or Tine." ~· 17 (1908), 457-474. 
C. Book reviews. 
l'cTo.e;go.rt, Jom U. E., Review ot G. H. Howison, ,!!!! Lmits .2£. 
Evolution. l!tnd, 11 (1902), 383-389. 
• -, Rovtcnr or A. Seth Print;le-Pnttison, The Idea ot 
---
!J!r.lorto.lity. ~·• 32 (1923), 220-224. 
....... ••1 Review or Josiah Royce, .!!::! Tlorld ~.!:!!! Individual. 
~- 11 (1902), 557-563. 
--------------------------------__ -_-__ -___ -____ - ____________ _I. -------
-117-
II • REiiEI'iS OF l'cTAGGART. 
B1anshard, Drand, Review of: Studios..!.!!~ Heselinn Dia1octic. 
~· !!:!!.!·· 20 (1923). 413-415. 
Broad, C. D., Review of,!!!! 'Raturo 2£ Existence. lfind, 30 (1921), 
317-332. 
Calkins, lnry fl., Review or Studios .!!L~! llopjolinn Cor.olOtiY• Phil. 
Roview, 12 (1903), 187-193. 
Criticim or He Taggart's intorpratation or Hegel as deny-
ing tho poroonn.lity or tho .Ahsolut.e. 
Il1bben, J • G., Roview or ! Ca:Jr.~entary ,2!! ilerjol' s Lor,ic. £.h!!• Review. 
19 (1910), 639-642. 
Boernlo, R. F. A., Review ot f! Cmm:1ontary ,2!l Hegel' a Logic. !!!!!,• 
Review, 32 (1923), 79-88. 
"Pringlo-?a.ttison, A. Soth, Reviaw or ~ Dop;:as 2£ Rellrj1on. The 
Philosophical Radicals. Edinburgh and London: V,m. Blackwood 
and Sons, 1907. Pp. 195-212. 
Royce, Josiah, .lteview ot Studies_!!! 1h! HogeU.an Dia1ootic. !h!,!• 
Review, 6 (1897), 69-78. 
Discusses relation or dinloctio to ~erionce. 
Taylor, A. E., Review or~ Dope~ Rolir;ton. !!!!!• Ravie't'T, 
16 (1906), 414-424. 
Oood rovimr by ono ayopathot.ic TZith 1'oTo.ggart.' e religious point 
or view. 
• 
-116-
Taylor. A. E., lieviow of ..!..!!! Nature ~ Existonca. Y'onist, 3:5 
(1923). 139-169. 
III. SPECIAL CRTIICISHS OF l!cTAGGAaT. 
Allen, Louise f4 ., \tcTaggo.rt t s Interprot.ation of Hegel's Category 
of Cocnition." .!h!!• Rev low. 12 (1903), 694-696. 
A criticim of !~oTe.ggnrt in interpreting Hegel as denying 
porsonnlity to the Absolute. 
Calkins, !\!!.ry n •• "Honistic Spiritualim: The Systm of Hegel" in 
Persistent Problems _2!. Philosophy. N. Y .: !!a.cmillan• 1925. 
Pp. 360-394. (PPP) 
A brief', clear exposition or Hegol for students. Brief cri-
ticim or VcTar;ge.rt, especially for his denial or personality 
to the Absolute. Pp. 375-382. 
Gregory, Joshua C. • "Dr. !~cTaggart. on Cauaali ty." Jour. Phil., 
--
19 (1922), 615-625. 
&eking, ii illiam E., "The Need of a Go:l" in .,!h! !'oo.ninL) _£!: ~ Ja 
liu!:le.n Expcrionoo. Umr Ilaven: Yale University Preas, 1923. 
Pp. 207-226. . 
A orit.ioiam or ~ Dopa ~ ReliGion. Especially good cri-
ticiam of !!cTtlgbfli't Is treat.!tont. or the problem or evil. 
Knudson, Albert c., Tho Philosophy of Personalism. W. Y .: Abin~;don 
Preas, 1927. Pp. 22-26, 28-30, 75 • 
t'atthows, \\. R., "Three Philosophers on Religion." Ct.urch Quarterly, 
100 (1925), 122-138. 
!'cTacgart is one or the philoaophers reviewed. 
• 
- 119 -
ttoore, G. ~ •• "I'rr. !~Tat;e;nrt1 s Ethics." ~· ~· Ethics, 13 
(1902-1903), 341-370. 
An ef.'f'octivo, dotnilod criticiST!l or ~'cTaQ;art' s ethical theory. 
Very it:rportant. 
Rogers, Arthur K., "The Idoa1istic School. ?!cTag~:;art. Howison. 
Hocld.ng. I.aurie. Sot.h Prinblo-Pattison." in English~ 
A..,oricnn Philosophy Since~. tt. Y.: l~cmillan, 1922. 
Pp. 297-314. 
Briet but suggestive crit.icisn or ,.cTe.ggart, OS?~ially in his 
divergence rrao llot;olinn tradition. 
Tsanotf', Radoslav A.,.!.!'.!! Problo::1 2£. :Ir!lnort.nlity. N. Y .: lhCr.11llnn, 
1924. Pp. 285-290, 125-142. 
The i'irst. retorenco is to a critical conparison of' the troa.t-
nent oi' individuality by !~cTaggart, llosanquot and Prin61o-Patt.i-
son. Tho oocond i.s a critici:m or 'rcTo.ggnrt' a psyc~olor;y and 
doctrine or imlortality. .An errectivo and itxportant criticism 
or PcTncgart' 3 doctrine or ~ortality o.nd pre&cistence. 
IV. DISCtmSIO~lS REL.\Tl.Jl :o TiiE PltODu;!.! OF 'Z:~IS !'lJ'ill. 
Bright.t'lo.n, Edgar Shef.'tiold, E! Introduction t.2,_Philosapey. N • Y .: 
Holt, 1925. 
A clear exposition or personalistic thoi~ far students. Ea-
pecially it:lport.ant for this paper is Chapter V on the subject 
or universals and values. Soe footnote 1. 
''cConnoll, Franci%1 J ., "A fiord o.oout. Time" in ".!! ~ Lir.titod?" 
N. Y .: Abinj;don, 1924. Pp. 45-55. 
Brief.' but clonr discussion or r.Oillling ot time in tho oxpori• 
cnce ot God. The entire book should be road in connection with 
!.2 Does 2! Rolir;ion. 
ZI&L&bll.ZtZJMlkti&.C 
-120-
1921. 
An ethical nppronch to tho philosophical problem. Very 1mpor-
to.nt. Sao rootnoto 1. 
Thilly. Frank. ·A Hlntory ~ Phtlosontsf• H. Y .: Holt, 1924. Pp.462-477. 
Discussion or· He~e1' B systOC'I and. plo.ce in tho history or thought. 
Weber, AU'red, Hlsto2 2!, !'hllosophy;· Trans. by Th11ly. N. Y.: 
Scribner's. 1896. Pp. 4:96-535. 
Discussion or Hecel'c syst~ o.nd intluenco. 
